VZCZCXRO2711
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0399/01 1340904
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130904Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PHNOM PENH 000399 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, P, DRL, EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL KJUS CB
SUBJECT: HOR NAMHONG, SAM RAINSY SEEK EMBASSY INTERCESSION 
TO FIND COMPROMISE ON LAW SUIT AND AVOID ELECTION CRISIS 
 
Classified By: POL/EC CHIEF GREG LAWLESS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
 ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Foreign Minister Hor Namhong summoned the 
Ambassador on May 8 for a one-on-one meeting to explain to 
the Ambassador his defamation and disinformation cases 
against Sam Rainsy regarding Rainsy's assertion that Hor 
Namhong was a former Khmer Rouge prison camp chief.  The aged 
and increasingly sclerotic Foreign Minister, saying he 
realized the negative impact of a law suit in the run-up to 
national elections, requested that the Ambassador speak to 
Rainsy to seek a compromise short of the lawsuit he said he 
had reluctantly filed to defend his honor.  In a series of 
meetings on May 12, the two sides displayed to Ambassador 
some mutual rancor but also possible agreement on a way 
forward:  Hor Namhong would drop the criminal disinformation 
charge, both sides would cease their war of words in the 
press, and the civil defamation suit would proceed through 
the courts.  Rainsy confided that if he could not win a civil 
defamation suit on the merits, he promised to pay the fine, 
but stood by his general assertion that Hor Namhong had once 
acted like a Nazi concentration camp "kapo".  Rainsy is 
taking risks with his high-visibility slur campaign (without 
much evidence) but is characteristically brazen in reminding 
voters of the ruling Cambodian Peoples Party's ties to the 
Khmer Rouge (KR) while undermining the CPP election platform 
plank that the CPP liberated the country from the KR.  With 
Rainsy's assertion that he will have his lawyer talk to Hor 
Namhong's lawyer about a compromise, the Embassy is moving to 
the sidelines to watch as this game plays out.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
Hor Namhong Paints Himself as a Victim 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In apparent reaction to public remarks by the 
Ambassador expressing concern about the possible damaging 
effect on elections of the defamation and disinformation law 
suits filed by Hor Namhong against Sam Rainsy on April 22, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs told the local press May 7 
that he regretted having to file the case but saw no other 
way to defend his honor.  While saying he would leave it to 
the courts to rule on the two charges, he noted especially a 
recent Radio Free Asia interview that repeated the charges 
against Hor Namhong and indicated this was proof of Sam 
Rainsy's intentional spreading of disinformation.  Responding 
to the Foreign Minister's request for a meeting on an 
unstated topic, the Ambassador May 8 walked into Hor 
Namhong's otherwise empty office, where the Foreign Minister 
sat alone, with no note takers. 
 
¶3.  (C) For the next 30 minutes Hor Namhong recited an 
impassioned, almost tearful soliloquy on his travails as an 
inmate in the Khmer Rouge Boeung Trabek re-education camp 
located in Phnom Penh's suburbs.  Hor Namhong asserted that 
he was not a camp director, but eventually became head of a 
committee of prisoners in one of three adjacent camps.  He 
stated that he worked alongside other prisoners in fields, 
often applying human excrement to the crops, acquiring a 
smell that none of the prisoners could wash away.  Noting 
that both of his predecessors had been taken away and 
executed, he claimed to have evidence that he, too, was on a 
Khmer Rouge black list of victims to be executed.  He cited 
evidence collected by his son at the S-21 torture prison 
after the KR era that one of his predecessors had named him 
as a CIA collaborator (NOTE: a charge that quite frequently 
led to imprisonment, torture and execution by the paranoid 
Khmer Rouge). 
 
¶4.  (C) As for allegations that he caused the removal, 
disappearance, or execution of fellow inmates, Hor Namhong 
said that he lost more than 30 members of his extended family 
during the KR era.  One of his sisters held in a camp 
adjacent to his was eventually executed, he said, although he 
did not learn of her fate until the 1980s.  He claimed that 
one senior KR official now being detained by the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal knew about his being listed for eventual execution. 
Hor Namhong's lawyer states he has requested the testimony of 
S-21 torture prison director Duch. 
 
Regret at Filing Case; Indications of Compromise 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador said that a civil defamation suit was 
one thing, but a criminal disinformation suit with possible 
jail time would have negative effects on the political 
atmosphere and the upcoming parliamentary election and he 
urged the Foreign Minister to drop that case.  While he had 
to defend his reputation, Hor Namhong said that he deeply 
regretted bringing the case against Sam Rainsy.  He knew that 
it could affect the election climate, but felt that Sam 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000399  002 OF 004 
 
 
Rainsy kept spreading the disinformation again and again, 
including during Rainsy's recent ten-day trip in Canada and 
the U.S.  This was spreading disinformation with the intent 
to destroy Hor Namhong's honor, he bitterly noted.  Hor 
Namhong said that he had won a defamation suit against then 
Prince Sihanouk in France in 1992 related to similar 
accusations.  Among the three witnesses called by Sihanouk's 
lawyers they all agreed that Hor Namhong had worked alongside 
other prisoners, had been appointed by the KR to perform as a 
committee head, and that other KR cadres controlled the camp, 
he recounted.  He recalled that in addition to the Boeung 
Trabek camp head, a Khmer Rouge leader known as Sovann, there 
were three KR cadres who came every day to supervise the camp 
and thus he had no power as prisoner committee head. 
 
¶6.  (C) Hor Namhong asked the Ambassador to speak to Sam 
Rainsy and handed over segments of an English translation of 
a recent Khmer press interview he gave.  The excerpts 
included closing remarks by Hor Namhong that he would be 
willing to drop the case if Sam Rainsy publicly apologized. 
The Ambassador agreed to Hor Namhong's request, and closed by 
again urging the foreign minister to drop the criminal case. 
 
Sam Rainsy Adamant 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador May 12 relayed to Sam Rainsy the gist 
of Hor Namhong's appal, indicating that it appeared Hor 
Namhong was still open to some form of compromise.  He asked 
Rainsy what he thought about striking a compromise in this 
case.  The Ambassador noted that the issue arose at a time 
when he was about to depart the country and was worried there 
was little the Embassy could do if this should develop into a 
more serious case.  The Ambassador condemned the criminal 
disinformation law and told Rainsy he had asked Hor Namhong 
to drop the criminal case.  Noting Cambodia's was not a 
defamation law that Americans would support, the Ambassador 
commented that it was nonetheless not inconsistent with other 
democracies' defamation laws (such as in France or Japan). 
The Ambassador also indicated that there appeared to be 
little evidence to support Rainsy in the civil defamation 
case. 
 
¶8.  (C) In the 30-minute, private meeting with the 
Ambassador, Sam Rainsy adamantly defended his allegations 
against Hor Namhong, claiming - but not supporting with 
evidence - his allegations that Hor Namhong was: (1) a true 
Khmer Rouge prison camp "chief" with the power to finger 
inmates for removal from the camp (and eventual execution); 
(2) the KR camp leader who alone presided over daily 
self-criticism sessions where - Sam Rainsy believed - he did 
indeed criticize prisoners who disappeared soon thereafter; 
and (3) an inmate with special privileges which Hor Namhong 
also secured for his wife (head of camp women) and son (head 
of camp youth).  He compared Hor Namhong to a "kapo" in a WW 
II Nazi concentration camp.  Kapo's were privileged inmates 
serving administrative roles and could be brutal toward other 
prisoners, he recited.  Like a kapo, when Hor Namhong pointed 
his finger at inmates, they later disappeared.  Kapo's were 
eventually replaced as new batches of inmates came in, Rainsy 
said, conceding the point that Hor Namhong might eventually 
have been executed, but noting that only confirmed his role 
as a KR collaborator.  He alluded to other sources - former 
inmates - who might back up this assertion, but was not 
specific.  A 2001 Phnom Post interview with the late 
FUNCINPEC Senator Keo Bun Thouk was one source.  (NOTE: 
Rainsy apparently began seeking this evidence in earnest only 
after Hor Namhong had filed his cases against him.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶9.  (C) Rainsy expressed his strong belief that Hor Namhong 
was more than the ordinary prisoner committee head he claimed 
to be.  He indicated he had not defamed Hor Namhong, but 
later conceded that he could not win a civil case concerning 
defamation in a Cambodian court. 
 
¶10.  (C) Rainsy was also strident on the criminal charge of 
spreading disinformation, noting that this UNTAC era law came 
about at a time when the UN "had to be tough" because the 
Khmer Rouge had abandoned the truce and was bearing arms 
against the UN's effort to bring democracy to Cambodia.  But 
that was a different era, and in this time of peace and 
stability, given the original spirit and intent of the UNTAC 
law, such a law was no longer necessary, he said 
emphatically. 
 
What did Sam Rainsy Say or Do? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) As he has done in a number of public interviews 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000399  003 OF 004 
 
 
since his April 17 remarks about Hor Namhong, Rainsy first 
tried to tell the Ambassador that he did not implicate the 
"current" foreign minister, but just referred to one foreign 
minister among many serving since the KR era.  (NOTE:  In 
fact, Rainsy referred to the current deputy prime minister 
and foreign minister and alleged in front of a crowd of 
hundreds that, as a KR prison camp chief, Hor Namhong had 
made people disappear. END NOTE.)  Rainsy also tried to say 
that he was not spreading disinformation in the proper sense 
of that term, since the "information" must be of some 
sensitive or confidential nature. 
 
Was Hor Namhong Chief of KR Boeung Trabek Prison Camp? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Telling the Ambassador what he later told the local 
press on May 12, Rainsy tried to tick off a number of points 
in his favor, saying he had read the complete S-21 prison 
confession of Van Peany which named Hor Namhong as a CIA 
collaborator.  Hor Namhong succeeded Van Peany and Van Peany 
is described as the "chief" of the camp in those KR 
documents.  Thus, Rainsy concluded, Hor Namhong must have 
been the camp "chief" also.  Rainsy also recounted an 
elaborate story about only those with five counts of "CIA 
collaborator" against them being sent to S-21; thus, Hor 
Namhong still had four to go. 
 
¶13.  (C) Relying heavily on a feature article from The 
Cambodia Daily published on July 1, 2000, he cited sources 
who said Hor Namhong was a "chief" at the camp.  (NOTE: The 
same article cites other sources clearly stating Hor Namhong 
was a middle man under KR cadres. END NOTE.)  Rainsy insisted 
that Princess Sisowath Ayravady had implicated Hor Namhong in 
disappearances.  However, in the article Rainsy cites, the 
Princess notes only that Hor Namhong was an "ambiguous" 
person whose role as potential collaborator could not be 
known.  (COMMENT:  Current sources in the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal have a similar view of Rainsy's allegations - that 
Rainsy's black-and-white accusation is based on a grey 
situation about which there is little or no evidence.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
A Rainsy Concession 
-------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Rainsy told the Ambassador he was still not certain 
he would answer the first summons to appear and give 
testimony at the Phnom Penh Municipal court on May 22. 
(NOTE:  He expects to depart for France on May 13 and returns 
on May 21. END NOTE.)  Rainsy later told the local press that 
he would not make an appearance at the court.  Nonetheless, 
he told the Ambassador, he was willing to concede that he 
might lose the civil defamation case on the merits, and 
promised in that case to pay any fine levied without creating 
a crisis about criminal penalties if he did not pay the civil 
fine.  He would thus allow the courts to uphold Hor Namhong's 
honor but only if the criminal disinformation suit was 
dropped against him. 
 
Hor Namhong: Rainsy's Lawyer Should Call my Lawyer 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶15.  (C) In a meeting with Hor Namhong late in the day on May 
12, the Ambassador relayed Rainsy's message, noting again the 
bad effect this case was having on the election climate and 
particularly stressing that the criminal disinformation suit 
was objectionable and that in the United States all public 
officials were subject to almost any characterization. 
 
¶16.  (C) Hor Namhong commented that Rainsy was stubborn, but 
said that if Rainsy's lawyer called his lawyer, he would 
consider dropping the criminal case.  He noted further with 
some disappointment that the pro-SRP press continued to 
publish the allegations.  (He did not note the pro-CPP press 
was also publishing more accounts in Hor Namhong's favor, 
including an interview that day with MFA Secretary of State 
Long Visalo who was also at Boeung Trabek.) 
 
¶17.  (C) In a follow up call to relay this information, 
Rainsy told the Ambassador that he would sign a letter that 
evening to assign a lawyer to the case and that he hoped the 
two sides could meet by the end of the week.  In the 
meantime, Rainsy also agreed that the two sides should try 
avoid raising the issue in the press and that their 
negotiations should be discreet.  (NOTE:  This conversation 
took place after Rainsy held a very blunt press conference 
implicating Hor Namhong's family as KR collaborators.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
Comment 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000399  004 OF 004 
 
 
------- 
 
¶18.  (C) Sam Rainsy finds himself embroiled in another 
headline-grabbing defamation brouhaha that pokes the CPP in 
the eye and raises issues of freedom of speech and fair 
comment about a public figure.  However, it is unclear in 
this case what Rainsy's objectives are for his party or the 
electorate.  At the same time, our legal sources indicate 
that his civil case does not appear to be strong. 
Furthermore, if the criminal case is not dropped, Rainsy 
could force a constitutional crisis over his parliamentary 
immunity.  Reaching a compromise soon would help set the 
stage for more smoothly run elections. 
 
¶19.  (C) If the lawyers cannot work out a solution to drop 
the criminal disinformation charges soon, the pall these 
charges will cast over the elections cannot be ignored. 
MUSSOMELI