VZCZCXRO4289
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHPO #0178/01 1231939
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021939Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0144
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0127
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1659
RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 0005
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0166
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1529
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0037
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0151

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 PARAMARIBO 000178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP: DAJ KENDRICK,  INL/HSTC, AND WHA/CAR JROSHOLT, 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS; 
CARACAS FOR DHS AND LEGATT 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC NS
 
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - SURINAME, 2ND QUARTER FY 2008 
 
REF: 07 STATE 171211 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000178  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶1. Per the instructions in RefTel, Paramaribo submits the following 
post fraud summary for the second quarter of FY 2008.  Answers are 
keyed to the letters found in RefTel. 
 
¶A. Country Conditions 
The economy, while stable, is still developing, and more than half 
the population lives below the poverty line.  Inferior economic 
opportunities and low wages create incentives for economic migration 
to other countries, including The Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, 
and, to a lesser extent, the United States. At the same time, 
Suriname's inability to fully control its borders and large parts of 
its interior make it an attractive place for illegal migrants, 
including Guyanese, Chinese, Brazilian, and Haitian nationals. The 
lack of computerized systems at the borders (including at the 
airport) and within the local government creates other problems, 
including information/identity verification and criminal activity 
checks. Corruption within the government also leads to questions 
regarding the legality/legitimacy of travel documents, residency 
permits, and other government-issued documents. 
 
¶B. NIV Fraud 
 
The volume of NIV fraud is low, occurring predominantly in the 
business and pleasure category. Applicants sometimes present forged 
job letters, salary slips, employee identification badges, bank 
statements, and other fraudulent documents in support of their 
applications. Applicants also occasionally attempt to conceal prior 
deportations from, or overstays in, the United States, which is 
typically uncovered by checking the CLASS database. 
 
Post recently reenergized its fraud prevention program, increasing 
the number of fraud investigations. In one instance, a discovery of 
similar false documents and stories used by at least six NIV 
applicants, most of them Guyanese nationals, resulted in reporting a 
false document provider to the local police. 
 
In FY 2006, a woman suspected of having ties with an alien smuggling 
ring attempted to procure a visa for her infant granddaughter. 
Investigation into the case indicated that the woman had plans to 
sell the child to a distant family member living illegally in the 
United States. The visa was refused. 
 
In FY 2007, using the text search function of the CCD, post 
identified a naturalized US citizen who was "sponsoring" several 
young Surinamese nationals for tourist visas each month. Although 
difficult to confirm, the consular section believes that this U.S. 
citizen, 20 years the senior of the individuals applying for visas, 
was arranging for these young adults to work short-term in the 
United States while they "visited" him.  The U.S. citizen contacted 
post directly in the first quarter of 2008 reporting that several of 
his "visitors" had absconded in the U.S. and could not be located. 
 
In the third quarter of FY 2007, a Surinamese applicant applied for 
a NIV to visit her sister in New York.  Upon interview, it became 
apparent that the sister in the U.S. had entered on a B2 visa and 
never departed.  The visa was refused under section 214b.  Upon 
review of IDENT results, a previous entry into the U.S., at the same 
time as the sister still living illegally in the U.S., was 
discovered, showing a different first name and date of birth. 
Applicant had used a younger sister's civil documents to obtain a 
new passport, in a new identity, in an effort to reenter the U.S. 
Applicant dressed in children's clothing and wore her hair in 
pigtails, in an effort to convince the Consul that she was younger. 
 
In the second quarter of 2008, a group of young men, some Haitian 
and some Surinamese, all resident in Suriname, appeared at the 
Embassy to "pick up" their visas for the U.S., which supposedly had 
been arranged for by the organization sponsoring their travel to a 
trafficking in persons conference in the U.S.  The documents 
presented were of a very low quality, obviously created by 
non-native English speakers.  The group of men, who were using the 
invitation to attend the conference as a means to illegally 
immigrate to the U.S., had, in turn, fallen victim to an advance fee 
fraud scheme originating in West Africa.  The conference was not 
real, nor were any of the documents, and the young men had sent 
their entire life savings via Western Union to the con artists in 
Africa. 
 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000178  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
NIV applicants include TCNs and recently naturalized Surinamers from 
Guyana and China, as well as Haitian nationals residing in French 
Guiana, which is part of the Embassy's consular district. These 
cases often lack good supporting documentation and/or tend to be 
riddled with fraud. 
 
There are reports of organized smuggling rings and false document 
providers catering to specific TCN communities. For instance, in 
early FY 2006, a group of 30 Chinese applied for NIVs under the 
pretext of a conference in the United States. These applicants were 
clearly economic migrants who were using Suriname as a transit 
country and were directed to the consular section by a recruiter. 
One of the applicants presented an expired Chinese passport with a 
photo of an apparently different individual, although his most 
recent passport had his photo. 
 
Haitian applicants from French Guiana, part of the Embassy's 
consular district, frequently present false employment documents and 
U.S. contact information; their claims are usually easy to disprove 
as most such applicants lack familiarity with the details of the 
documents they are presenting. Occasionally, Haitian NIV applicants 
have presented what appeared to be forged French residency cards and 
false immigration stamps in their passports. (The French Embassy has 
engaged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject of Haitians 
issued Surinamese visas on the basis of fraudulent residency cards.) 
 In the first quarter of FY 2008, a group of Haitians applied, 
separately, but on the same day, for NIVs presenting suspicious work 
documents and bank statements.  All the applicants were refused 
under section 214b.  However, after review of IDENT results it 
became apparent that at least one of the applicants had previously 
attempted to enter the U.S. on a fraudulent French passport, 
eventually giving CBP authorities a different name, which was, in 
turn, different from the name he used when applying for the NIV at 
the Embassy in Paramaribo. 
 
The consular section has not detected any individual or systemic 
employment-based, student and exchange visitor, or religious worker 
visa fraud in the last two years. In the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, a tsunami disaster employment scam appeared as an 
advertisement in a local business publication, offering disaster 
relief job opportunities in the United States in exchange for a fee. 
The scam was brought to the attention of local authorities. No 
tsunami-related employment applications were presented at post. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶C. IV Fraud 
 
IV volume is low, and with relatively low incidence of fraud. TCNs, 
primarily Guyanese, make up half of the IV workload. A significant 
percentage of Surinamese IV applicants are recently naturalized 
former Guyanese and Chinese nationals. These cases often lack good 
supporting documentation and may involve fraud. Especially in cases 
of TCNs, post takes care to verify family relationships, employing 
CA/FPP investigative tools such as LexisNexis. 
 
Police certificates acquired by IV applicants are untrustworthy and 
unreliable.  Post began double-checking all IV applicants with the 
RSO office to determine if the individuals have any criminal 
backgrounds.  Several cases were identified in which individuals 
with violent criminal or drug trafficking histories were issued 
clean police certificates by local authorities. 
 
Due to the unreliability of civil documents in the region, Post no 
longer accepts birth, marriage, death, or divorce certificates more 
than 6 months old, as it is impossible to determine if the 
authorities in Suriname or Guyana legitimately issued the document. 
 
A recent marriage fraud investigation showed that the marriage 
between an American citizen petitioner who filed for his Guyanese 
"stepdaughter" residing in Suriname and her mother, a Guyanese 
national residing in New York, was fictitious. While there was no 
record of the mother ever having resided with the petitioner or 
having received a green card, she appeared to have been living with 
the beneficiary's biological father in a house registered as his 
property. The evidence suggested that the biological parents of the 
beneficiary immigrated to the United States illegally, following 
which the mother proceeded with a fictitious marriage to an American 
citizen in order to petition for her daughter to join them. The 
consular section is currently in the process of returning the case 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000178  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
file to DHS for revocation. 
 
The consular section encountered a case of employment-based fraud in 
FY 2004 when a small restaurant in Mississippi petitioned for five 
Chinese applicants to work as specialty chefs (E-3 Skilled Worker 
category). The interviews at post showed that none of the applicants 
had any cooking experience, and were in fact related to the 
petitioner. The petition was revoked. 
 
In FY 2005, the consular section worked with DHS on a case of a 
Surinamer who entered the United States in 1999 as a dependant of an 
A-1 holder spouse and later sought to benefit from an 
employment-based petition for "babysitting services." An 
investigation showed that this applicant was already running a 
shipping business in the United States and had no babysitting 
experience. 
 
¶D. DV Fraud 
 
While the number of DV cases processed at post is very low, the 
consular section encountered a number of cases where individuals or 
bogus organizations tried to exploit public interest in the DV 
Lottery to earn money by posing as the U.S. Government or an 
authorized facilitating agency and soliciting fees via online credit 
card payment or Western Union money transfer. In FY 2006 and 2007, 
the Embassy issued media alerts and a press release to warn the 
public about these schemes, and the consular officer gave an 
interview about the subject to a leading local newspaper to further 
raise awareness. 
 
The consular section encountered a new case of DV Lottery scam, 
reported by one of the targeted individuals, in which a bogus 
organization posed as the U.S. Department of State and solicited via 
e-mail a fee of $989.67 via Western Union money transfer from "lucky 
winners" for further processing of their "cases." The Embassy 
continued prominently displaying a DV Lottery fraud alert on its web 
site and in its public waiting area to raise public awareness of 
such scams. 
 
¶E. ACS and Passport Fraud 
 
The incidence of ACS and passport fraud is low. In FY 2004, the 
consular section encountered one case of a Guyanese citizen posing 
as an American citizen; his claim to U.S. citizenship was easily 
exposed as false upon consultation with the CCD database and further 
interviewing of the subject. The consular section encountered no ACS 
fraud cases in FY 2005, 2006, or 2007.  In FY 2008, the consular 
section was contacted by the Surinamese police regarding a prisoner 
who was claiming to be a U.S. citizen.  While an investigation 
concluded that the prisoner had lived in the U.S., he had never 
become a U.S. citizen and remains a Guyanese national. 
 
¶F. Adoption Fraud 
 
The consular section's adoption workload is minimal, with one orphan 
adoption case in FY 2005, two cases in FY 2006, four cases in FY 
2007, and three current cases in FY 2008. While post has not 
detected any indication of fraud in these cases, there are 
unconfirmed reports that a criminal network is operating in Suriname 
that relies on recruiters and corrupt government officials to entice 
poor parents to give up their children for adoption in exchange for 
money. According to a few unofficial accounts, children are being 
placed with wealthier families both locally and in Europe, 
predominantly the Netherlands, as well in Aruba and Curacao (there 
have been no reports mentioning the United States). In cases of 
child placement outside of Suriname, recruiters allegedly rely on 
false document providers, including corrupt local government 
officials, to obtain legal adoption documents or fraudulent birth 
certificates to enable them to take the children out of the country, 
entirely bypassing the lawful adoption mechanism. The legal adoption 
mechanism involves a court determination that the child is an orphan 
or that the child's parents are unfit or otherwise unable to take 
care of the child's basic needs, a review of all documentation and 
its authenticity, and an investigation into the matter by the family 
legal affairs bureau. To ensure that none of its adoption cases 
involve fraud, the consular officer and staff conduct field 
investigations before approving any adoption case. 
 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000178  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶G. Use of DNA Testing 
 
Post may request DNA testing in Immigrant Visa cases when the 
relationship of a beneficiary to the petitioner is in question. 
Testing is coordinated through genetics testing laboratories in the 
U.S.  Samples are collected by a panel physician, under the 
supervision of the consular officer, and then forwarded to the 
laboratory by the consular section, observing at all times chain of 
custody protocols.  Results are sent directly to the consular 
section by the laboratory and reviewed by the consular officer for 
consideration in the case. 
 
¶H. Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud 
 
Post processes very few asylum cases, and has not uncovered any 
fraud in Visa 92/93 processing. All recent cases involved derivative 
following-to-join applicants: two Haitian nationals in FY 2006 and 
one Surinamese applicant in FY 2004. Embassy Port-au-Prince fraud 
unit assisted in assessing Haitian documents. Post has encountered 
no fraud in lost or stolen I-551 cases, as was easily verified 
through coordination with the DHS Forensics Document Lab. 
 
¶I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
 
There have been reports that TCNs, most particularly Chinese, 
Haitian and Guyanese nationals, are using Suriname as a staging area 
for onward travel to North America and that criminal smuggling and 
possibly trafficking networks are operating in Suriname, providing 
these third-country nationals with false documents and facilitating 
their onward travel. In FY 2007, the consular officer assisted 
DHS-ICE in identifying two young Guyanese females, using fraudulent 
UK passports, being trafficking into prostitution to the U.S., via 
Suriname and Aruba.  The females were intercepted in Aruba by CBP 
officers at pre-departure clearance and placed into a trafficking 
victims' recovery program. Chinese Embassy officials have 
acknowledged the large influx of Chinese migrants. 
 
The Government of Suriname has acknowledged the problem of human 
trafficking into and through Suriname and has taken measures to deal 
with this problem. As a result, in 2006, Suriname was upgraded from 
"Tier Two Watch" to a "Tier Two" country in the U.S. Department of 
State Trafficking in Persons Report, indicating that trafficking in 
persons (TIP) into and through Suriname is an issue and the local 
government is taking action to prevent it.  Suriname retained its 
"Tier Two" ranking in the 2007 TIP report. There are reports that 
some of the Brazilian, Dominican, Guyanese, and Colombian women and 
girls are trafficked through Suriname to Europe for sexual 
exploitation. Recent re-energized activities by the host government 
to combat TIP, resulting in more police investigations and its new 
cooperation with consular representatives of the origin countries of 
nationals believed to be trafficked into and through Suriname, show 
progress in anti-TIP efforts. The Embassy cooperates with other 
foreign missions and consular representatives in Suriname, and 
consular section staff meets with counterparts to discuss fraud, 
TIP, and alien smuggling. 
 
Organized crime remains a problem in Suriname, with drug 
trafficking, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering being 
particularly problematic.  The Surinamese police have special task 
forces established to counter these organizations.  With this in 
mind, the consular section takes particular precautions to identify 
these individuals and looks for several indicators in visa 
applicants that might suggest connections to these organizations. 
 
There are no documented cases of terrorist travel through Suriname 
to the U.S. or other areas; however poor control of borders makes it 
difficult to make definitive statements.  It is known that members 
of the FARC, the Columbian resistance group which has been 
designated a terrorist organization by the Secretary of State, 
operate in and out of Suriname. 
 
¶J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
 
There have been no DS criminal fraud investigations at post to 
date. 
 
¶K. Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000178  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
The consular section notes the 2005 release of an updated 
machine-readable Surinamese passport reduced document fraud, as the 
new passport is of significantly better quality and has more 
security features than the old, non-machine readable version. In 
some cases, the poor quality of the old style Surinamese passports 
(which are still in circulation) and of Guyanese passports and vital 
records continues to make it difficult to distinguish between 
genuine and fraudulent documents. There are reports of false 
document providers, including those catering to specific 
third-country national (TCN) communities (i.e., Guyanese, Chinese, 
and Haitians). While it does not appear easy to obtain genuine 
national documents, the consular section has noted many cases with 
discrepancies in names and dates and places of birth on legitimately 
issued documents and several cases in which documents were issued to 
imposters using another individual's civil documents. 
 
Most civil documents are hand-written on paper with no security 
features and are almost impossible to verify.  Identity cards and 
drivers licenses are basic and can easily be replicated or forged. 
All Surinamese citizens are required to register with the civil 
authority in the area they reside and should be able to obtain a 
declaration of status from this office (the Surinamese Embassy if 
the person is resident abroad).  This declaration contains 
information about the person's marital status, children, and 
address.  The reliability of this document, however, remains 
questionable due to reports of widespread corruption among low level 
civil employees. 
 
¶L. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
 
Host government authorities cooperate with the Embassy in fraud 
matters, and are consistently responsive to the Embassy's consular 
fraud-related inquiries. Working with the regional security office 
and local officials to enhance fraud prevention efforts, the 
consular section provides travel document fraud alert information to 
local immigration officials. The fraud department of the police, 
which is the central point of contact for fraud-related issues in 
the host government, has contacted the Embassy on several occasions 
to verify the authenticity of U.S. travel documents that appeared 
altered or fake, including passports and green cards. These 
documents uniformly turned out to be merely in poor condition, but 
in fact valid. 
 
In the first quarter of FY 2007 and in the second quarter of FY 
2008, the consular officer conducted fraudulent document detection 
training at the National Police Academy with attendees from 
Immigration, Intelligence, Police, Fraud Detection, and Consular 
Affairs. According to the penal code, providing false documents is 
an offense punishable by a prison sentence ranging from 6 months to 
5 years, depending on the seriousness of the violation, and/or a 
fine. The host government consistently demonstrates excellent 
cooperation with requests for verification of civil documents. When 
the Embassy reported a false document provider to the police, the 
police treated the matter seriously; however, the offender could not 
be prosecuted due to a lack of evidence. 
 
In the second quarter of FY 2007, the consular section hosted a 
fraud-focused lunch which members of the local police, intelligence, 
and consular community attended.  The lunch focused on regional 
fraud trends and useful contacts and information was exchanged. 
 
In the last quarter of FY 2006, the local police coordinated with 
the RSO and consular section on an investigation into a visa-washing 
and false document provider in Paramaribo. The arrests effectively 
shut the ring down, but lack of evidence prevented prosecution. 
Information netted in the investigation showed links between this 
ring and other suspected rings in the Caribbean. 
 
¶M. Areas of Particular Concern 
 
The diversity of the population in Suriname allows outsiders to 
easily blend in and bring attention to themselves.  This is 
particularly true for neighboring Guyanese, who come to Suriname to 
live and work, often without legal permission. 
 
Embassy Paramaribo is also responsible for French Guiana, and faces 
several challenges in this area.  Most of the applicants from French 
Guiana are Haitians, supposedly with legal residence status in 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000178  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
France.  Their language skills in French are minimal, their 
documents are suspect and are nearly impossible to verify because of 
post's lack of resources in French Guiana and lack of French 
speaking personnel. 
 
¶N. Staffing and Training 
 
Due to the small size of the consular section, all staff members are 
tasked with fraud prevention responsibilities.  Consular Chief 
Gwendolyn S. Webb attended the Fraud Prevention Managers course in 
June 2006.  Webb and Senior FSN, Anne van Exel, attended the 
regional fraud conference in Georgetown in the second quarter of FY 
¶2007. 
SCHREIBER HUGHES