VZCZCXRO8453
PP RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0635/01 1291153
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081153Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7814
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM  PRIORITY
RHFJUSC/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC PRIORITY
RUSKGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADRO/HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIAO/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEVFXZ/IRS WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSJGA/USCG WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 OTTAWA 000635 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KJUS KCRM CA
SUBJECT: THEMES FROM THE 10TH CROSS-BORDER CRIME FORUM 
 
REF: A. OTTAWA 436 
     ¶B. OTTAWA 440 
     ¶C. OTTAWA 444 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the 10th Cross-Border Crime Forum, 120 
participants led by the U.S. Attorney General and the 
Canadian Ministers of Public Safety and Justice reviewed 
progress in eight areas, received a threat assessment, and 
discussed lessons learned from three case studies.  From 
Mission Canada's perspective, the issues that deserve the 
most further attention are: information and intelligence 
sharing; further development and synchronization of cross 
border law enforcement architecture (IBETs); finalization of 
Shiprider agreement; exploration of what principles of 
Shiprider could apply to land enforcement models; increased 
placement of liaison officers to enhance information sharing 
and joint operational effectiveness; and cross border weapons 
carriage.  End Summary. 
 
10TH ANNIVERSARY MEETING SHOWCASES VALUE AND PROGRESS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Cross-Border Crime Forum (CBCF) met March 18-19 
in Quebec City under the leadership of U.S. Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey, Canadian Public Safety Minister Stockwell 
Day, and Canadian Justice Minister Rob Nicholson.  (DHS 
Secretary Michael Chertoff was unable to attend at the last 
minute.)  The principals attended on March 19, following a 
day of working level talks.  Richard Wex, Assistant Deputy 
Minister of the Policing, Law Enforcement, and 
Interoperability Branch of Public Safety Canada, and Bruce 
Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the U.S. 
Department of Justice's Criminal Division, opened the 
working-level meeting on March 18 by reviewing the progress 
since the first CBCF in 1997.  The CBCF started as a very 
limited forum dealing primarily with contraband and 
telemarketing fraud in the East, but has now expanded into an 
inter-agency forum to address counterterrorism, mass 
marketing fraud, human trafficking, organized crime, border 
enforcement, drug trafficking, and firearms violations.  It 
also examines how to improve the architecture of cross-border 
law enforcement cooperation in areas such as prosecutions and 
interoperability. 
 
SUCCESSES 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Wex and Swartz cited a number of successes from the 
Forum, including: 
 
--  enhanced understanding of shared challenges (drugs, 
firearms, human trafficking, organized crime assessments); 
--  joint action plans to address shared threats; 
--  identification of best practices and venue for sharing 
lessons learned; 
--  improved operational collaboration and strengthened 
networking, with Swartz highlighting Shiprider as a model for 
close U.S.-Canada cooperation and the integration of 
cross-border law enforcement efforts; and, 
--  joint public outreach on key issues such as phishing and 
identity theft. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Wex and Swartz highlighted a number of lessons 
learned from the CBCF over the past decade.  First, political 
leadership must provide clear direction and offer leverage 
Qleadership must provide clear direction and offer leverage 
and resources to implement its decisions.  Second, input from 
front-line field officers is essential to keep the CBCF's 
work relevant.  Third, there is a broad array of interests 
represented and the agenda must reflect the shared priorities 
of all parties.  Fourth, the CBCF must have continuity in its 
core organization along with sufficient adaptability through 
ad hoc groups to deal with specific issues as they arise. 
 
CHALLENGES 
 
OTTAWA 00000635  002 OF 008 
 
 
---------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The co-chairs laid out their vision of the 
challenges the CBCF faces in order to stay relevant: 
 
--  how to manage front-line expectations? 
--  how to resolve cross-border impediments while respecting 
both countries, legal frameworks? 
--  how to identify appropriate partners on complex issues 
involving multiple jurisdictions and mandates? 
--  how to ensure the appropriate legislative and policy 
framework supports operational collaboration?  and, 
--  how develop a shared vision among the partners? 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The group also discussed whether the CBCF is fully 
integrated with other similar fora, and how best to leverage 
the work of other groups to inform its work.  Significantly, 
participants discussed how to continue to adapt the CBCF, 
especially the composition of its sub-groups, to meet the 
changing realities of cross-border law enforcement. 
 
PROSECUTION SUB-GROUP 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The various sub-groups described their work over the 
past year.  The Prosecution Sub-Group (PSG) highlighted the 
core challenge of lining up the two countries' legal systems 
in order to make the MLAT and extradition processes work 
efficiently and effectively.  The PSG continues to work to 
improve these processes.  The PSG is also developing a more 
streamlined process for obtaining third-party records in a 
timely manner.  Working Guides explaining the MLAT process in 
Canada and in the U.S. were available in paper and CD-ROM 
formats for distribution at the CBCF, for use as a training 
tool for prosecutors and investigators on both sides of the 
border.  The PSG is preparing a working guide to explain the 
process for obtaining Internet Service Provider records in 
the U.S.  Finally, the PSG is revising its work plan, with a 
renewed focus on concerns relating to the extradition process 
between Canada and the U.S., and encouraging broader 
participation in the workings of the subgroup and enhanced 
opportunities for consultation on issues of concern. 
 
 
MASS MARKETING FRAUD SUB-GROUP 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) The sub-group completed and released a report on 
mass marketing fraud with five year trends, which it made 
available at the meeting.  It will receive broader 
distribution (especially in Canada) after translation into 
French.  The sub-group issued a joint public advisory on 
counterfeit checks, which has a different focus than the 
joint advisory on counterfeit checks released at CBCF 9. 
U.S. co-chair Jonathan Rusch pointed out the importance of 
fraud surveys as an analytical tool; one participant pointed 
to this area as one of the "real triumphs" of the CBCF.  The 
subgroup cited several challenges for the future, including: 
 
--  harmonizing strategies and ensuring a commitment to 
interagency enforcement; 
--  synchronizing seizure and forfeiture procedures for 
proceeds of crime; 
--  improving information sharing (especially better methods 
of face to face info sharing); and, 
Qof face to face info sharing); and, 
--  coordinating training more and improving cross-border 
training techniques. 
 
FIREARMS TRAFFICKING SUB-GROUP 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) The co-chairs reviewed progress to date on the issue 
of firearms trafficking.  With the connection of the Ontario 
Provincial Weapons Enforcement Unit (PWEU) and the Canadian 
National Firearms Tracing Center to the e-trace system of 
ATF, some 1700 traces took place in 2007.  The MOU that 
Minister Day and AG Gonzalez signed at CBCF 9 linked the 
 
OTTAWA 00000635  003 OF 008 
 
 
Canadian Integrated Ballistics Information Network to the 
U.S. National Integrated Ballistic Information Network, but 
to date no cross-border hits have been detected because the 
current system deals with a very low volume of exchanges. 
The Firearms Reference Table (FRT) that the RCMP created and 
shared with U.S. agencies is increasingly in use by U.S. 
agencies; Interpol has adopted the FRT as a model for 
identifying firearms.  Finally, ATF has expanded its work 
with Canadian agencies, hosting cross-border trainings, 
conducting a joint awareness campaign with posters at border 
crossings, and increasing its attache support in Canada with 
new positions in Toronto and Vancouver.  Canadian 
interlocutors also cited strengthened gun laws in Canada as a 
positive move to enhance cross-border gun trafficking 
enforcement. 
 
COUNTER-TERRORISM SUB-GROUP 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The sub-group highlighted two cases -- Ahmed Ressam 
case (Millennium Bomber, 1999) and the Charlotte Hizballah 
Case (1996) -- in its publication "Best Practices in the 
Development and Prosecution of Cross-Border Terrorism Cases," 
released at CBCF 10, to review lessons learned in 
cross-border counter-terrorism cases.  Most of the issues 
raised from analyzing these cases have to do with 
information-sharing between Canada and the U.S., which is 
further complicated by the challenge of sharing information 
between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  The 
publication also made a series of recommendations for future 
cases, again with a special emphasis on information-sharing. 
Notably, it recommended that "communications should focus on 
the timely exchange of information without regard to whether 
such information is of potential evidentiary value," and 
urged that information exchanges should "include relevant 
national security intelligence."  It suggested that relevant 
agencies "consider cross-border co-location of CT personnel 
to promote effective situational awareness on both sides of 
the border."  According to one of the co-chairs, there is an 
MOU in progress that would facilitate personnel exchanges 
between RCMP INSETs and FBI JTTFs.  The U.S. Attorney for the 
Northern District of New York made the case for robust 
information-sharing, stating that "seemingly insignificant 
pieces of information can take on greater importance when put 
together with other pieces of information."  The U.S. 
Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington expressed 
concern that much information-sharing takes place at the SBU 
level and is not as robust as it might be. 
 
INTEROPERABILITY SUB-GROUP 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The sub-group reported that it had completed a 
joint comparative analysis of the similarities and gaps 
between the Canada Public Safety Information Network (CPSIN) 
data standards and the U.S. National Information Exchange 
Model (NIEM), and had concluded that the framework of current 
standards are adequate.  It made recommendations for 
Qstandards are adequate.  It made recommendations for 
developing and completing cross-border data exchanges.  The 
co-chairs briefed the sub-group on various pilot projects to 
pursue, including several related to the 2010 Olympics in 
Vancouver.  Specifically, representatives will review the 
range of options possible to implement a LInX pilot in the 
region. 
 
DRUGS & ORGANIZED CRIME SUB-GROUP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The sub-group tabled the U.S.-Canada Border Drug 
Threat Assessment at CBCF 10.  The co-chairs provided an 
overview of the assessment,s key findings, including: 
--  despite best efforts, significant drug trafficking still 
occurs in both directions across the border; 
--  the principal illicit substances smuggled across our 
shared border are MDMA/Ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana; 
--  MDMA/Ecstasy production has increased in Canada, and 
there is increased availability on both sides of the border; 
 
OTTAWA 00000635  004 OF 008 
 
 
--  the U.S. is the primary transit country for South 
American cocaine entering Canada and accounts for 40% of its 
seizures; 
--  cannabis cultivation is thriving on both sides of the 
border, but marijuana seizures at the border have dropped 50%; 
--  both countries have significantly enhanced bilateral 
cooperation on drug trafficking issues and will continue to 
do so. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  The co-chairs also briefed the group on 
assessments of the Asia-Pacific corridor of organized crime 
groups and the need for a global approach to tackle a global 
problem.  The participants discussed the need for ongoing 
personnel exchanges between the various law enforcement 
organizations to ensure robust information exchanges and 
better operational capacity.  Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State Christie McCampbell briefed the group on the Merida 
Initiative and suggested a tie-in between the work Canada is 
doing in the Caribbean and the work the U.S. will be doing in 
Mexico and Central America. 
 
BORDER ENFORCEMENT SUB-GROUP 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Border Enforcement sub-group (BEG) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
underscored progress on the Shiprider initiative as the 
highlight of its program this year,  and a model for enhanced 
land based cooperation.  (Negotiations for a Shiprider 
agreement commenced immediately following CBCF 10.)  The 
co-chairs briefed the group on the development of the 
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET), five of which 
(with the recent merger of the Rocky Mountain IBET) are 
co-located; the remaining ten have joint meeting space.  The 
IBET leadership is in the process of evaluating locations for 
four IBET analysts, and has just completed a joint threat 
assessment based on analysis from the IBET.  The co-chairs 
pointed to improving and expanding existing radio 
communications and selecting the site for a one year radio 
interoperability pilot project as key next steps.  The group 
also discussed the issue of weapons carriage by law 
enforcement officers whose duties require them frequently to 
cross the border, a long-standing impediment to effective 
cross-border enforcement. 
 
EMERGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Greg Fyffe, Executive Director of the International 
Assessment Staff of Canada's Privy Council Office delivered a 
speech describing the three drivers in international crime as 
drugs, terrorism, and human smuggling.  He emphasized that 
drugs will continue to be the backbone of international and 
national illegal activity by providing the huge profits that 
fuel other forms of criminality, while corrupting national 
institutions.  Its disruption is long-term and complex, and 
demand will remain consistent.  Terrorism thrives on the 
current breakdown of stable order, which creates safe zones 
for instability, and on the multi-generational transmission 
of hate, which is at the heart of international terrorism. 
Fyffe highlighted the resilience of the al-Qaeda movement, 
QFyffe highlighted the resilience of the al-Qaeda movement, 
pointing out that after five years of aggressive 
counter-terrorism operations, our success in "turning" 
leaders of AQ was zero;  the movement has not been seriously 
degraded.  Terrorism will continue to be a huge driver for a 
generation.  People smuggling is now part of the largest 
movement of people in history, which has gone on for the past 
20 years and will likely continue unabated.  It establishes 
routes that can also be used for other activities. 
 
 
OTTAWA 00000635  005 OF 008 
 
 
¶16. (SBU) Fyffe cited another trend that deserved attention: 
gray corporations, i.e., large multinational companies -- 
either state-supported or tacitly allowed to function by the 
state -- that are involved in criminal enterprises.  They 
have a certain amount of protection under the law due to 
their connection to states (e.g., Russia), and are "morally 
fractured," with many legitimate enterprises masking 
illegitimate enterprises. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Fyffe pointed to four wildcards to watch in the 
future for their disruptive effect: --  pandemics that could 
combine with other disasters to create large openings for 
criminal enterprises; 
--  energy shocks disrupting normal markets and creating 
urgent new demand that criminal syndicates can fill; 
--  climate change that creates water challenges and 
disasters in low lying areas; and, 
--  continued growth of internet use that makes cyber-crime 
and cyber-penetration of national security institutions an 
increasing security issue. 
 
CASE STUDY I -- FIREARMS SMUGGLING INVESTIGATION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶18. (SBU) An Ontario PWEU officer and a Toronto-based ATF 
attache briefed the group on a nine-month investigation into 
a firearms smuggling case as an example of how close 
cooperation can disrupt and distract criminal gangs.  The 
gangs in the Greater Toronto Area are closely connected to 
the U.S., in this case driving marijuana and ecstasy down to 
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and bringing arms and 
ammunition back up to Canada.  This collaborative 
investigation included joint monitoring and tracking devices, 
surveillance units, and drug purchases.  It included 
participation from ICE, ATF, PWEU, and state and local 
police.  The presenters pointed to the "multi-disciplinary" 
(guns, gangs, drugs) and multi-jurisdictional nature of the 
operation as requiring new thinking in dealing with these 
kinds of crimes.  They pointed to a number of investigative 
hurdles: 
 
--  educating counterparts on national protocols and 
procedures; 
--  intelligence and information-sharing; 
--  grand jury proceedings and new and effective tools for 
sharing grand jury information; 
--  GPS across the border; 
--  wiretap procedures and technical specifications; 
--  travel challenges; and, 
--  operational issues, e.g. two different elements of 
probably cause. 
 
DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU)  Another multi-agency cross-border product unveiled 
at CBCF 10 was the "United States-Canada Border Threat 
Assessment 2007," which described several trends in 
cross-border drug trafficking, including: 
--  Canada becoming the largest source of its own MDMA; 
--  the rise of Asian gangs as movers of drugs (primarily 
MDMA and high-potency marijuana) into North America; 
--  the implementation of Canada's chemical watch program; 
--  increasing production of precursors in Canada for both 
the Canadian and U.S. markets; and, 
--  the U.S. becoming the main transit country for South 
Q--  the U.S. becoming the main transit country for South 
American cocaine into Canada. 
 
¶20.  (SBU)  The study also contained a concise section of 
outlooks for cross-border drug projections, including 
judgments on MDMA trends, grow ops, cocaine trafficking, and 
precursor chemicals. 
 
CASE STUDY II -- E-PARAGON/RAMAN NOODLE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) A joint team presented a second case study that 
 
OTTAWA 00000635  006 OF 008 
 
 
involved DEA, FBI, ICE, and IRS on the U.S. side, and 
included participation by the Australian and New Zealand 
Federal Police, the Hong Kong Police, and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police.  The case involved an organized crime group 
with cells in Orange County, Vancouver, and Australia moving 
precursors from Asia to Vancouver, and from Vancouver to Los 
Angeles.  When the case was complete, there were seizures in 
eight countries including drugs, money, and property.  The 
briefers noted four trends that were evident during the 
investigation: 
--  the globalization of the drug trade; 
--  fusion of criminal groups; 
--  increasing sophistication of traffickers; and, 
--  enhanced trafficker technology. 
 
¶22. (SBU) The case study sparked a discussion among 
participants on how to remove barriers to effective 
investigations and prosecutions, how to improve the MLAT 
process, and how to enhance communications between 
multi-agency and international law enforcement.  Minister 
Nicholson suggested that this case highlights the ability of 
criminal syndicates to exploit law enforcement's 
vulnerabilities in legislation, policy, and presence, and how 
their loose organization allowed them to work with great 
flexibility and reconstitute easily.  Minister Day noted the 
trend of small labs for the chemical production, and said 
that, as we break up the larger operation, traffickers move 
to utilize smaller labs.  A DEA rep confirmed that, as state 
and local laws have made super-labs more difficult to manage, 
traffickers have moved to Mexico, where they utilize small 
labs.  From 2001 to today, there has been a 90% drop in super 
labs in the United States. 
 
2008 IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) A final panel focused on the Joint IBET Threat 
Assessment and the collective law enforcement response.  The 
major highlights from the Threat Assessment were that: 
--  organized crime is the single largest threat encountered 
at the Canada/U.S. border, with the greatest concentration of 
organized crime located in large cities close to the border; 
--  illegal migrants are intercepted regularly at the 
Canada/U.S. border, and human-smuggling networks established 
in large cities close to the Canada/U.S. border often use 
smaller groups in border areas to assist them; 
--  marijuana and ecstasy are smuggled into the U.S. from 
Canada, while cocaine is smuggled into Canada from the U.S., 
with the quantity of marijuana and cocaine seized between the 
ports of entry decreasing but the number of seizures 
increasing; 
--  the U.S. is the primary source of firearms smuggled into 
Canada, and the significant majority of all firearms seized 
at Canadian POEs are personal firearms originating from the 
U.S. but, overall, the number of firearms seized between the 
ports of entry increased in 2006; 
--  the quantity of currency (illegal proceeds) seized 
between the ports of entry increased, with the amounts seized 
often large and usually from couriers (most likely the 
Qoften large and usually from couriers (most likely the 
proceeds from illicit drug transactions); 
--  a number of organized crime groups are responsible for 
smuggling contraband cigarettes into Canada from the U.S., 
mainly through Native American/First Nations reserves; 
--  the marine environment is particularly vulnerable, with 
threats including the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, 
currency, tobacco, alcohol, and people; and, 
--  couriers regularly employed by organized crime groups use 
all modes of transportation, including air smuggling, but 
couriers increasingly use sophisticated concealment methods, 
the latest technologies, and counter surveillance techniques. 
 
 
¶24. (SBU) The panel reviewed the conclusions of the 
assessment, namely: 
--  IBETs have made tremendous progress in advancing 
cross-border cooperation between partner agencies; 
--  the continued sharing of criminal information and 
 
OTTAWA 00000635  007 OF 008 
 
 
intelligence has led to the ongoing success of IBET; 
--  investigations to combat cross-border organized crime are 
a critical contribution to overall national security; 
--  successful intelligence-led IBET investigations displaced 
criminal activity to other parts of the border, which 
neighboring IBET units identified and countered; and, 
--  displacement activity is not easy to predict, but 
existing IBET partnerships provide the capacity to respond 
effectively. 
 
SHIPRIDER 
--------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) Coast Guard Rear Admiral Wayne Justice co-presented 
on the status of the Shiprider program, which removes the 
international maritime boundary as a barrier to law 
enforcement by enabling seamless, continuous law enforcement 
operations across the border.  Shiprider represents an 
integrated operational approach to maritime law enforcement 
and security in shared waters (inland and coastal), not just 
information and intelligence sharing.  Several pilot programs 
of Shiprider in the last couple of years have shown it to be 
a successful model.  The panel recommended that Shiprider 
should be established permanently and that: 
--  locations be identified to deploy Shiprider operations 
using joint threat and risk assessments; 
--  costs and logistical issues be assessed with establishing 
permanent Shiprider teams; 
--  Shiprider should be integrated within the IBET framework; 
and, 
--  Shiprider should be expanded to include other law 
enforcement partners. 
 
¶26.  (SBU)  The panel concluded by stating that Shiprider 
negotiations would be commenced immediately following CBCF 
10, with a view of implementing a Framework Agreement in 
advance of the 2010 Olympics.  (The Shiprider negotiation 
teams met later in the day to agree on the terms of reference 
for the next day's talks, and made significant progress on 
March 20 toward reaching an agreement that would make the 
Shiprider program permanent -- ref A.) 
 
¶27. (SBU) Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz noted that 
there was not enough time for the presentation he had planned 
with Assistant Deputy Attorney General Don Piragoff (Justice 
Canada) on developing a joint legal framework to address the 
many legal issues that arise within the integrated law 
enforcement context.  He mentioned that Shiprider would 
provide a good context to start these discussions, and urged 
that the respective Departments of Justice work together to 
provide advice on the legal aspects of Shiprider and to 
consider adapting the framework agreement to other integrated 
cross-border law enforcement operations in the future.  In 
final comments by the Canadian Ministers and Attorney 
General, Minister Day asked point blank "what is holding up 
the Shiprider negotiations?"  He confirmed that the program 
has full political support from the Government of Canada, 
which would like to see it move forward as soon as possible. 
 
CASE STUDY III -- GALDAMEZ HUMAN SMUGGLING CASE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Q-------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶28. (SBU) The third case study focused on a huge success for 
the IBETs.  The case was co-presented on the U.S. side by 
U.S. Attorney in Vermont Thomas Anderson and ICE Assistant 
Secretary Julie Myers.  The case involved a Montreal-based 
smuggling organization with links to New York City and 
Boston.  Several hundred illegal aliens from Pakistan, India, 
and Central and South America were trafficked from Canada to 
the United States (mainly through New York and Vermont) 
through a scheme that involved dropping them off between 
ports of entry and having them walk across the border and be 
picked up on the other side by members of the trafficking 
organization.  The case was worked by the Stanstead/Derby 
IBET with participation by the RCMP, CBP, CBSA, ICE, Surete 
du Quebec, and Terretons police, as well as the U.S. 
Attorney's Office for Vermont.  Galdamez and his 
 
OTTAWA 00000635  008 OF 008 
 
 
co-conspirators have been indicted in Vermont for conspiracy 
and alien smuggling, and their extraditions from Canada are 
pending.  The net result was the reduction of human-smuggling 
to a trickle in this area. 
 
¶29. (SBU) Discussion of the case revolved around the 
emergence of one-stop shopping for traffickers, where 
criminal gangs are providing housing, movement, and jobs for 
trafficked persons, and the potential for terrorists to 
utilize pre-existing trafficking routes to move people and 
weapons.  One participant pointed out the need for a better 
communications forensics model and another for improved 
cross-border enforcement models. 
 
ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶30. (SBU) In a final presentation on how to improve 
enforcement between ports of entry, the presenter said that 
the goal of cross-border law enforcement ultimately is to 
move from "coordinated response" to "integrated response," as 
exemplified by the IBET and Shiprider models.  With only five 
IBETs co-located and not all agencies represented and with no 
overarching strategy, limitations in terms of technology, and 
use of the Shiprider model only on water, however, gaps 
remain.  The working group suggested discussion of a 
bi-national border enforcement strategy between the Ports of 
Entry at CBCF 11 (in the United States; place and time to be 
determined).  It should answer the following questions: 
 
--  where are the threats and gaps? 
--  what intelligence and enforcement model is best? 
--  how far inland can we move the maritime strategy? 
--  what technical solutions are there? 
--  how do we best allocate resources across the border? and, 
--  what legislative and regulatory amendments are needed? 
 
¶31.  (U)  Ministers Day and Nicholson also met separately 
with Attorney General Mukasey on the margins of the Cross 
Border Crime Forum (refs B and C). 
 
¶32.  (U) DOJ has cleared this cable. 
 
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at 
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada 
 
RODDY