VZCZCXYZ0001 
PP RUEHWEB 

DE RUEHNR #1294/01 1411201 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
P 201201Z MAY 08 
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5829 
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC 
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC 
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC 
RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC 
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

UNCLAS NAIROBI 001294 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/EPS, EEB/IFD/OMA, S/CRS 
DOL FOR MICHAL MURPHY 
TREASURY FOR DAN PETERS 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USTR FOR BILL JACKSON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON SOCI PGOV KE
SUBJECT: KENYA'S YOUTH BULGE: A TICKING TIME BOMB 
 
Ref: 07NAIROBI1981 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Other valid explanations aside, one of the key 
under-appreciated drivers of the unrest and violence that gripped 
Kenya in early 2008 was the country's "youth bulge," a potentially 
destabilizing demographic phenomenon that in Kenya has generated a 
large pool of disaffected young men, angry over their exclusion from 
the political and economic mainstream. Channeling the power of this 
youth bulge into productive vs. destructive ends will require an 
investment and reform effort so massive and cross-cutting that it 
looks a lot like the one envisioned in Vision 2030, Kenya's 
extremely ambitious long-term development plan. It is a daunting 
task for the new coalition government. The economy has already lost 
ground this year, and there are reasonable estimates that given 
current trends, Kenya will need to produce 8-10 million new jobs for 
young people between now and 2012. In the absence of focused 
leadership to address the problems caused or exacerbated by the 
youth bulge, Kenya could be in for a protracted period of 
instability and even violence in the years ahead. End summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Background: Arm-Chair Analysts 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) During and after Kenya's two month descent into near-civil 
war in January and February, much has been written and said about 
the causes of the violence and on what Kenya must do to prevent a 
similar scenario in the future. In addition to analyzing the spark 
provided by the disputed election results themselves, politicians, 
journalists and arm-chair analysts have been thorough in analyzing 
the underlying causes: Seething ethnic tensions based on real or 
perceived unfairness over how resources - especially land - have 
been allocated in Kenya over the decades. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Too Many Young Men of "Fighting Age" 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (U) Fewer observers and policymakers, however, have addressed 
the demographic tinder that fueled the explosion of violence in 
early 2008: the surfeit of young, angry Kenyan men. Indeed, Kenya 
continues to experience a "youth bulge", a demographic phenomenon 
that can destabilize a society. With falling mortality among 
children during the past three decades, the pool of sons ready to 
inherit farms and jobs from their fathers has grown. The 1999 
Census of Kenya showed that for every man aged 50-54 there were 
almost four men aged 20-24, and the situation has gotten worse since 
then. The German sociologist Gunnar Heinsohn, who coined the phrase 
in the 1990s, recently wrote in the International Herald Tribune 
(January 17, 2008) that "Kenya provides a textbook example of 
domestic violence that is driven by what I call a youth bulge." 
 
¶4. (U) Heinsohn defines the youth bulge as "a period of rapid 
demographic growth in which 30 to 40 percent of all males are aged 
15-29," a period in life he dubs the "fighting age." This large pool 
of unemployed, landless (and hence unmarriageable in many ethnic 
groups) males is prone to crime and violence, particularly in a 
context of widespread poverty and weak political institutions. In a 
context of inter-ethnic tensions, such young men are easily 
manipulated by promises of land and jobs that they can wrest from 
"outsiders." (Note: A demographic corollary to this grim scenario 
is the "demographic dividend," as best seen in some Asian countries. 
A vigorous family planning program can reduce the number of 
children under age 15, and hence the dependency ratio. Coupled with 
better education and other improvements in productivity, these males 
in the 15-29 cohort can both produce and save more, and thus help 
fuel economic development instead of violence. End Note). 
 
--------------------- 
The Numbers Don't Lie 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Writing in April in the Nation, Kenya's largest daily 
newspaper, Kinuthia Murugu, Kenya's Permanent Secretary for Youth 
Affairs, also rang the alarm bell: "Kenya is heading for a youth 
bulge of such magnitude that it has the capacity to seriously 
destabilize our social order as we know it today." Heinsohn and 
Murugu paint this disturbing picture in numbers, as well as words: 
 
-- In only 80 years, Kenya's population has jumped from 3 million to 
37 million. 
-- Kenya is among the world's top 40 high-growth population 
countries. 
-- In 2007, Kenya's total fertility rate still stood at an average 
of five children per woman (in the U.S., it's two). 
-- Kenyan men have a median age of 18 (vs. 35 in the U.S.). 
-- 75% of Kenya's population is below 30 years of age. 
-- 42% is below the age of 15; of these, 7.5 million are male. 
-- Of the 11 million Kenyans aged 18-35, three million are 
unemployed. 
-- 45% of the unemployed in Kenya are below 24 years of age 
-- 90% of the unemployed youth do not have appropriate vocational or 
professional training. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Kenya is in "demographic armament," according to Heinsohn, 
and as both he and Murugu note, Kenya's current generation of youth 
is far better educated and more aware of events and trends in the 
wider world than predecessor generations were. As a consequence, 
they are much more ambitious than their seniors, and thus much more 
likely to become disillusioned if their heightened economic 
expectations are not met, as they so often aren't in Kenya. This in 
turn explains the scale of violence in early 2008. In earlier 
electoral cycles, there was also heightened political and ethnic 
tensions, and often violence. But it was never to the degree 
experienced in 2008 due to the youth bulge. 
 
---------------- 
Jobs, Jobs, Jobs 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The youth bulge can work as a positive change agent if it 
takes place in the context of sound social investments and strong 
political and economic institutions. Hence Murugu's call for a 
"fundamental shift in our planning paradigm and resource allocation 
framework" in Kenya. Like others, he says one vital key is job 
creation. 
 
¶8. (SBU) But on the employment front, the numbers are daunting. 
Murugu estimates that Kenya has three million unemployed youth 
today, and that this number will grow to 4.5 million by 2013. But 
he's probably low-balling his estimate. An analysis prepared by 
prominent Kikuyu businessman Kibby Kareithi and obtained by the 
Embassy attempts to quantify Kenya's "jobs deficit." It estimates 
that there are nearly 2.5 million Kenyans aged 25-34 currently 
looking for jobs, with another 8 million Kenyans aged 15-24 who will 
be in search of jobs over the next five years. If one accepts these 
estimates, then Kenya will need to create a staggering 10 million 
new jobs by 2012 in order to stave off another round of violence and 
unrest at the time of the next national election. This, says 
Kareithi, is the 800 pound gorilla in Kenya's living room, and he's 
working to make policymakers aware of the issue and pressing for 
fresh policies and programs. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Faster Growth Not Matched by More Jobs 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The capacity of the economy to create even a fraction of 
10 million new jobs over the next five years is in doubt, according 
to Murugu. He points out that in 2002, the year the National 
Rainbow Coalition of President Mwai Kibaki came to power promising 
500,000 new jobs per year, the economy barely grew. It still 
managed to create 450,000 new jobs - not bad. But in 2006, when it 
was growing 10 times faster at 6%, it only created an additional 
540,000 new jobs, of which only 50,000 were in the formal sector. 
In short, as Murugu points out, even the more rapid economic growth 
experienced in recent years in Kenya has not generated the needed 
job gains to help obviate the risks of the youth bulge. 
 
-------------------------- 
The Vision 2030 Connection 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Indeed, successfully channeling the awesome force of 
Kenya's youth bulge in a productive vs. destructive direction over 
the coming years will require a massive national, cross-cutting 
development effort that touches on every element of Kenya's 
political, economic, and social reform agenda. Fortunately, that 
sweeping, cross cutting agenda for change already exists in broad 
terms in Vision 2030, the previous government's reform and 
investment roadmap to middle income prosperity by the year 2030 
(reftel). Unfortunately, the economic impact of the political 
crisis and violence probably has set the vision back by a year or 
two. Moreover, it will be difficult for any Kenyan government to 
demonstrate the cohesiveness, focus, political will and 
institutional capacity to enact the sweeping and painful reforms 
required to make Vision 2030 a reality and generate the educational 
and job opportunities needed to stave off the potentially 
destabilizing impact of the youth bulge. 
 
----------------------------- 
Other Ideas: National Service 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) According to Kareithi, a successful businessman with a 
social conscience, there are other big-picture proposals circulating 
amongst policymakers designed to specifically address the impact and 
implications of the youth bulge. A seemingly simple one, in which 
USAID and other USG agencies are currently involved, is to 
strengthen access to free primary and secondary education in Kenya. 
At the same time, others propose re-writing Kenya's primary and 
secondary curricula, with help from the private sector and civil 
society. The goals: To improve the quality and content of education 
and vocational training to make it more relevant to private sector 
skill needs, and to foster a stronger sense of Kenyan national 
identity. Improving access to, and the quality of, education would 
not only keep more young people in school longer, but would also 
impart the skills needed to succeed after graduation. 
 
¶12. (SBU) USAID is also improving productivity and market access for 
staple and high value agricultural products. Agriculture is a main 
driver of the Kenyan economy and a major source of employment for 
youth. Another USAID initiative is strengthening access to credit 
and training for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) since 
SMEs, many in the informal sector, are the biggest source of new 
jobs in Kenya. 
 
------------ 
The USG Role 
------------ 
 
¶13. (U) In addition to these efforts, the U.S. Mission has long been 
addressing youth issues as part of program portfolios, with 
campaigns targeted at youth in terms of HIV/AIDS, education, voting, 
and the like. Post, however, appreciates the need to target 
alienated youth under our peace and security programs. The Mission 
will be using FY 2007 1207 funding to provide job skills training 
and outreach in Northeastern Province. Also, in realization that 
disaffected Rift Valley youth were easily co-opted into nefarious 
activities in the aftermath of the disputed 2007 elections, we have 
submitted an FY 2008 1210 proposal which will address youth issues 
in the epicenter of post-election violence. While such programs 
will not solve the problem, they are expected to provide some degree 
of encouragement and buy-time for the structural reforms and 
reconciliation processes to work. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The destructive potential of Kenya's youth bulge is real 
- the violence that followed December's polls and the subsequent 
outbreak of Mungiki violence prove that. Thus, it would be wise for 
policymakers and pundits both in Kenya and elsewhere to avoid the 
temptation of believing that leadership politics in Nairobi are the 
only thing that matters in Kenya. In the run-up to the elections in 
2012 (or maybe earlier), the fate of the country may hinge more on 
Kenya's large, restless, but largely powerless younger generation. 
Members of the youth bulge in Kenya will face daunting economic 
challenges in the coming few years even under the best scenarios. 
But if on top of this they perceive that the country's political 
elite is indifferent or worse towards their ambitions and 
aspirations, then Kenya is in for some rough times ahead. 
 
RANNEBERGER