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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW1420, HHS DELEGATION HEARS RUSSIAN VIEWS ON JOINT SMALLPOX

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1420 2008-05-20 12:54 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO8610
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBW RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1420/01 1411254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201254Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8176
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 5269
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0169
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0820
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4389
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 1543
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0445
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0297
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAFM/DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD//MA-1//
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//CT//
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001420 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USDA FAS FOR OSTA/MACKE, WRIGHT, ROSENBLUM; 
-  OCRA/FLEMINGS; OA 
HHS FOR OGHA AND ASPR 
FAS PASS FSIS AND APHIS 
SECDEF FOR OSD 
STATE FOR ISN/CTR, G/AIAG, EB/TPP/ATP, EB/TPP/BTA, OES/STC 
VIENNA PASS APHIS/TANAKA, BRUSSELS PASS 
- APHIS/FERNANDEZ 
USDOC 3150/DAVID FULTON/MOLLY COSTA/ITA/CS/OIO/EUR 
GENEVA PASS HEALTH ATTACHE 
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR GH/RCS/EE/ROSENBERG 
CDC ATLANTA PASS SEPRL FOR DAVID SUAREZ AND INGER DAMON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KFLU EAGR PREL PGOV WHO RS
SUBJECT: HHS DELEGATION HEARS RUSSIAN VIEWS ON JOINT SMALLPOX 
RESEARCH AND AVIAN AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
 
REFS:  A. Moscow 1000 
   B. Vladivostok 39 
   C. 07 Moscow 3379 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: A Department of Health and Human Services  (HHS) 
Delegation led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness Gerald Parker visited Moscow and St. Petersburg May 4-7 
to meet with senior GOR health officials to discuss the current 
state of smallpox research and avian and pandemic influenza 
surveillance and preparedness.  Gennadidy Onishchenko, Russia's 
Chief Medical Officer and Head of the Federal Surveillance Service 
for Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being 
(Rospotrebnadzor), stated that the GOR would approve at least two of 
three proposed U.S-Russian joint smallpox research projects, but 
would not commit to a timetable for approval of the projects.  While 
the GOR agrees with the USG view that the two declared smallpox 
repositories in the United States and Russia should not be 
destroyed, Russian health officials did not share our sense of 
urgency about restarting joint research and appeared unconcerned 
about the growing chorus of nations at the World Health Assembly 
calling for destruction of the smallpox repositories.  GOR officials 
welcomed collaboration with U.S. officials and health specialists on 
avian and pandemic influenza preparedness.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
Smallpox Research 
----------------- 
 
2. (SBU) An HHS Delegation led by HHS PDAS Parker visited Moscow and 
St. Petersburg May 4-7 to discuss the status of smallpox research 
and avian and pandemic influenza surveillance and preparedness with 
Rospotrebnadzor Head Onishchenko, Deputy Minister of Health and 
Social Development Ruslan Khalfin, the Director of the Ivanovskiy 
Institute of Virology Dmitriy L'vov, and the Director of the 
Research Institute of Influenza Oleg Kiselev. 
 
3. (SBU) Onishchenko stated that the GOR would approve at least two 
of the proposed joint U.S.-Russia smallpox research projects, but 
refused to say when the projects would be approved, even when 
pressed by the HHS delegation.  Onishchenko noted that the GOR had 
concerns about the third project, research on smallpox antivirals, 
but he refused to elaborate on the concerns, and stated that the 
project was still under GOR review. 
 
4. (SBU) After the World Health Assembly May 19-24 in Geneva, 
Onishchenko stated that the GOR would like to begin discussions with 
the United State on a joint resolution commemorating the 30th 
anniversary of the eradication of smallpox in 2010 and the WHO-led 
scientific review of smallpox research.  Onishchenko also invited 
PDAS Parker to visit the Vector State Research Center for Virology 
and Biotechnology near Novosibirsk later this year, after the 
inauguration of President-Elect Medvedev but before the United 
States' political transition in January 2009.  PDAS Parker invited 
Onishchenko to visit both the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention in Atlanta (CDC) and HHS headquarters in Washington to 
discuss continued collaboration on live smallpox research and other 
matters of public health preparedness.  Onishchenko noted that while 
he would like to visit both HHS and CDC, he was unsure when that 
 
MOSCOW 00001420  002 OF 002 
 
 
could occur. 
 
5. (SBU) Deputy Minister of Health and Social Development Khalfin 
confirmed that Onishchenko had the authority to address the smallpox 
research agenda and joint projects with the United States.  He 
stated that the GOR shared the USG view that destruction of the 
smallpox repositories was  premature and should not be placed on the 
WHO agenda. 
 
---------------------------- 
Avian and Pandemic Influenza 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Rospotrebnadzor Head Onishchenko briefed PDAS Parker on the 
GOR's application to establish Vector as a WHO reference lab and 
collaborating center for avian influenza (Ref C).  He noted that 
Vector's location in central Siberia placed it at the "epicenter of 
migratory bird patterns" and, unlike other WHO Collaborating 
Centers, Siberia was not an "accidentally chosen" location for avian 
influenza (AI) research.  Regardless whether Vector ultimately 
achieves recognition as a WHO collaborating center for AI, the GOR 
would be interested in fostering collaborative AI research projects 
between leading U.S. institutes and Vector, but Onishchenko did not 
mention the potential for collaboration with Russia's other two 
established national influenza centers in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. 
 
7. (SBU) Ivanovskiy Institute of Virology Director Dmitriy L'vov 
warned that the latest AI outbreak in the Russian Far East (Refs A, 
B) indicates that AI is now circulating among migratory birds in the 
Pacific Ocean region, raising the potential that AI could reach 
Alaska within the next several months as migratory birds from Russia 
cross the Bering Strait to Alaska.  L'vov expressed a strong desire 
to collaborate with the United States in AI research. 
 
8. (SBU) Research Institute of Influenza Director Oleg Kiselev 
stated that a private Russian firm was investing in the institute to 
build vaccine production capacity for manufacturing its proprietary 
H5N1 AI vaccine.  Kiselev stated that the GOR had not yet finalized 
its draft national pandemic influenza preparedness plan, and he 
understood that approval of the draft plan had been pending with 
Onishchenko since 2006.  Kiselev also expressed a strong interest in 
collaborating with the United States on AI research and pandemic 
preparedness. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) The GOR's unwillingness to commit to a timetable for 
approving the proposed joint smallpox research projects indicates 
that leading health officials are not concerned by the growing 
chorus of nations at the World Health Assembly calling for the 
destruction of the declared smallpox repositories in the United 
States and Russia.  They also do not share our sense of urgency 
about restarting joint smallpox research as the best way to present 
a strong argument against smallpox destruction. 
 
RUSSELL