VZCZCXRO9944
PP RUEHBC RUEHBW RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHPW
DE RUEHLO #1311/01 1301618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091618Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8557
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001311 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR IZ AF UK
SUBJECT: UK REAFFIRMS LONG-TERM PRESENCE IN IRAQ; PRAISES 
PM MALIKI'S NEW CONFIDENCE 

REF: LONDON 1241 

Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. During their meetings with Secretary 
of State for Defense Des Browne and FCO Political Director 
Mark Lyall Grant, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and 
the Commanding General of MNF-I General David Petraeus were 
reassured that the UK was in Iraq "long-term" and had 
temporarily halted its drawdown from Basra. Both sides 
expressed satisfaction with developments in the south and 
PM Maliki's improving confidence, and the Council of 
Representative's focus on pressing issues of elections and 
hydrocarbons legislation. The U.S. and UK will continue to 
coordinate on Strategic Framework/SOFA negotiations with the 
Iraqi government. Joining Browne was Chief of Defense Staff 
Jock Stirrup and UK Ambassador to Iraq Christopher 
Prentice. Ambassador Tuttle and the DATT accompanied 
Petraeus and Crocker to the meeting with Browne, and the 
DCM accompanied Crocker to the meeting with Lyall Grant. 

Overview of Basra 
----------------- 

¶2. (S/NF) Defense Secretary Browne noted that "after a shaky 
start" in the wake of the recent offensive by Iraqi security 
services, the situation in Basra is beginning to stabilize. 
Petraeus 
agreed that the speed with which the decision was reached 
to begin the offensive left little time for coalition 
preparation, and expressed appreciation to Browne for the 
UK's role in enabling Iraqi success in the operation. 
Petraeus 
emphasized that there were a number of lessons to be drawn 
from the Basra operation, most notably the value of 
transition 
teams and armed UAVs. Brown returned the thanks for U.S. 
military 
support, and emphasized the need to sustain momentum and 
build upon 
the security gains in the province. Brown was hopeful that 
investors 
would start to look more closely at the south, citing 
interest 
expressed by a number of business executives during a recent 
HMG sponsored investors conference tied to the Basra 
Development 
Fund program. Browne said oil industry executives in 
particular are not 
averse to operating in high-risk environments, but the 
security situation needs to be quantified more precisely 
for their decision-making processes. Petraeus concurred, 
adding that a key step would be for the Iraqi Ministry of 
Finance to underwrite some of the risk to compensate for 
the lack of protections under the current legal system. 

¶3. (S/NF) Looking forward, Browne said the UK will be 
focusing on enhancing its divisional headquarters, completing 
the training and generation of the Iraqi Army 14 Division, 
continuing naval training, and sustaining and improving 
security operations at Basra Airport and the Contingency 
Operating Base. He noted that the British "remain committed 
to a long-term presence in Basra," and that the military 
drawdown had "paused" at 4,100 personnel, but that the 
commitment, particularly force levels and tasks after 
the expiration of the UNSCR at the end of the year, 
would need to be "revisited" with an eye to the future 
prior to the UK Parliament's recess in late July. 

Maliki's Confidence 
------------------- 

¶4. (S/NF) Browne said that the U.S. and UK will need to 
temper PM Maliki's "new confidence" to keep his focus on 
consolidating gains in Basra, as opposed to launching 
sudden new military operations elsewhere, such as in 
Maysan. Crocker concurred, noting that Maliki came back 
from Basra determined to launch an operation in Mosul 
concurrent with ongoing efforts to take control of Sadr 
City. Maliki has been talked out of it for now, but will, 
for political reasons, feel the need to revisit the 
possibility soon. 

¶5. (S/NF) Crocker said that the perception of Maliki as a 
decisive leader improved across all spectra of Iraqi 
society after the Basra operation. The fact that he was 
willing to come down hard on Shia militia has broadened his 
support base. Recent Sunni opposition to Al Qaida in Iraq 

LONDON 00001311 002 OF 002 


(AQI) has built Shia confidence, allowing the legitimate 
political process to gain momentum, and the Council of 
Representatives to focus more closely on much needed 
legislation and the fall elections. Crocker also noted 
that talks with the government on post-UNSCR/SOFA and 
Strategic Framework issues were proceeding, and added that 
it would be difficult to predict an end date for such 
complicated and technical negotiations. Lyall Grant and 
Crocker reaffirmed the commitment for close U.S.-UK 
coordination as the negotiations proceed. 

Regional Considerations 
----------------------- 

¶6. (S/NF) Petraeus outlined efforts for retraining and 
strengthening the Iraqi Army 14 Division, noted that some 
of the units that performed poorly at the start of the 
operation 
were already back in the line with new replacements, and 
underlined 
the confidence close air support gives the troops. He also 
complemented 
MND-SE on the speed at which it reoriented its headquarters 
and force 
to support operations in Basra. He noted that an Iraqi-led 
operation 
in Maysan to address arms and insurgent activity on the 
Iranian 
border may be possible. He related that PM Maliki has 
sent a delegation to Tehran armed with U.S. intelligence 
and evidence of Iranian arms and insurgent training -- the 
results of that visit will play a part in decisions on how 
to deal with Iran's involvement in Iraq. Crocker added that 
he believes, and Maliki agrees, it is more productive to deal 
with Iran-Iraq issues separately from other Iran-West 
issues, such as nuclear weapons ambitions. 

¶7. (S/NF) Lyall Grant emphasized the differences between 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, including malign Iranian 
influence. He said that in Iraq, Iran had a true strategic 
interest in influencing political and security 
developments, while in Afghanistan, its goal is more 
tactical -- an effort to disrupt Coalition efforts. 
Therefore, Lyall Grant continued, there may be more 
opportunities to convince Iran to alter its behavior 
vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Crocker added that it may be more 
beneficial for Iraqi officials, rather than the U.S. or UK, 
to appeal to Tehran to halt Iran's destabilizing impact. 
Lyall Grant agreed, noting the recent groundswell of 
negative Iraqi public opinion against Iran may have an 
impact on Tehran's behavior. 

¶8. (S/NF) Crocker said the U.S. is working hard to 
encourage Iraq's neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia, to 
provide more economic and political support, including an 
exchange of ambassadors. Joint UK and U.S. efforts to 
engage with Kuwait on border and trade issues will also 
hopefully pay off soon, particularly on reduction of trade 
barriers. 

¶9. (U) Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus have 
cleared this cable. 
Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom 
TUTTLE