VZCZCXRO7958
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0448/01 1401802
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191802Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8017
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000448 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE
SUBJECT: NKUNDA PUSHES FOR ACTION ON AMANI, NAIROBI 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  At a meeting in Kitchanga (Masisi Territory) on 
May 17, Laurent Nkunda told U.S. Goma Rep and Facilitation members 
that he wants to be fully involved in the success of the Amani 
Program, that the Kinshasa government is moving too slowly on 
amnesty legislation and financial support for the Goma process, and 
that the U.S. should be "more visible" in implementing the Nairobi 
Communique and the Goma Agreement.  Nkunda was in Kitchanga for 
"sensitization" (awareness campaign) and was speaking especially to 
IDP's who had been displaced from the area, of whom (he says) about 
30% (around 12,000) have now returned.  He pushed for the immediate 
staffing of implementation cells at the provincial level to prepare 
for disengagement and "brassage," and said he was ready immediately 
to clear land at Kimoka for the meeting center/peace camp.  He had 
derisive words for President Kabila, PARECO and the FARDC, but did 
not raise the sensitive topic of Bosco, and was for the most part 
relaxed and congenial. End summary. 
 
Saturday House Call 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Nkunda had called U.S. Goma Rep Nicholas Jenks on May 13, 
and requested a meeting at Kilolirwe on May 17.  Jenks invited the 
Facilitation to come along, but   logistical errors and poor 
communications delayed the mission, which Nkunda finally directed to 
Kitchanga.  He was gracious and inclusive, raising issues tailored 
to the full Facilitation:  Jan Edward Craanen (Dutch Special Envoy), 
LTC Jean-Luc Covolan (EUSEC), Niklas Bennwik (Sweden), Archibald 
Moiwo (MONUC), and Jenks and Jim Panos (U.S. Goma Office).  CNDP's 
humanitarian coordinator, Dr. Alexi, and political cadres Kambasu 
and Betrand and Major Seraphin flanked the Chairman. 
 
Organizing on the Ground 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Nkunda said he was satisfied with the CNDP's active 
sensitization that brought him to Kitchanga at the head of a march 
of 30,000 people a few days ago.  This bore no resemblance to the 
tame "sensitization" of actual CNDP troops that Facilitation reps 
observed last week in Mushaki, Mutanda and Bihamwe, but Nkunda's 
vision of the Goma process heavily implicates the civilian 
population.  He said that the main obstacles to IDP return are: (1) 
roadblocks (GDRC/FARDC does not want them to return); (2) hostile 
propaganda from the GDRC; and (3) PARECO (which does not want them 
to return either).  For these reasons Nkunda is creating "comites de 
base" incorporating both returning IDP's and the local population, 
to facilitate their reinsertion. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Nkunda is impatient that the provincial cells provided for 
by the JTCPS Commission are not yet remotely functional, and said 
that they need to be stood up immediately to start doing their jobs. 
 His version of the cells differs from the simple "execution" role 
that the Commission talked about for the provincial commissions and 
their dependent "cells."  He envisages empowered cells that feed 
information and recommendations up to the JTCPS, and do the real 
work on the ground; he even intends to lead one of the cells, so far 
unspecified.  By his own admission, this activism is compensation 
for his physical absence from Goma that security conditions 
dictate. 
 
His Enemies 
----------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Nkunda freely cites examples of the hostility surrounding 
him on the eve of disengagement.  Most obvious to him is FARDC-FDLR 
collaboration, and the fact that the GDRC "had troops to attack me, 
but never the FDLR," and the contention that the troops going to 
Walikale stopped in Hombo, a known FDLR center, and spent several 
nights there undisturbed.  CNDP charges that the Kinshasa government 
is "not engaged,"  is not giving Amani enough money, and retains 
political prisoners in jail while the parliament takes its time in 
debating and enacting an amnesty law that will allow the movement's 
members to circulate freely and prepare for brassage and 
reinsertion. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Nkunda at one point tore into Kabila, calling him a kid who 
only knows how to lash out, had hit Bemba even with ambassadors in 
the house, strikes people in Bas Congo for no defensible reason, and 
of course targets Nkunda himself.  He said that going to Kisangani 
while FDLR are running around the DRC with arms is not an option. 
If they were disarmed, even not repatriated but neutralized and held 
in a camp somewhere, his attitude might be different. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Nkunda cited one reported example of nefarious PARECO-FDLR 
collaboration.  The FDLR reportedly told Mugabo (PARECO/Hutu 
faction) that it wanted PARECO to make sure that the FARDC did not 
deploy in Loashi or Kibua; both of these are important military 
 
KINSHASA 00000448  002 OF 002 
 
 
centers for the FDLR, and PARECO reportedly did so. 
 
Private Grief and Public Complaints 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Chairman talked about 50 members of his family who 
were killed en masse in the mid 1990's.  He also talked about his 
son who suffered machete blows to the head that led to traumatic 
epilepsy.  He said that before the FDLR came to Congo, there were no 
real problems being a Tutsi in the DRC.  There was certainly 
harassment, but never killing.  Since 1994, things have been 
different, and in Nkunda's words, it is open season on the Tutsis. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Nkunda believes that it is very important to begin 
construction on the Kimoka meeting site/peace camp.  Once it is 
established, he will be able to go to Kimoka and participate in the 
Amani process, even without an amnesty law and with an arrest 
warrant still over his head.  In addition, it can be a place for the 
JTCPS to work.  He thinks a simple installation will do, with tents, 
latrines, a water pump and generator.  It can and should be set up 
expeditiously.  He offered to bring a battalion to Kimoka to help 
clear the site. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) He and others complained about the Sake road-block. 
Numerous CNDP cadres have been stopped at this roadblock and 
detained.  Kambasu had to call Colonel Delfin to get released on one 
occasion, and there was an incident in which a civilian rode a horse 
from Kirolirwe down to Sake, and the horse and rider were detained 
illegally by the FARDC.  This roadblock and another on the Rutshuru 
road are overdue for removal, he said.  (Note: U.S. facilitation, en 
route to Kimoka tomorrow, will check out this roadblock, which Gen 
Mayala says is not a FARDC but rather a municipality roadblock. End 
note). 
 
The Partners' Roles 
------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The U.S. Goma Rep updated Nkunda on the status of the 
Kalonge investigation and Canada's possible role in it, and also 
talked about Rewards for Justice, the upcoming UNSC sanctions 
resolution, and donors training the RRF.  Nkunda acknowledged that 
these were positive moves, but refrained from discussing them. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) After the group meeting Nkunda commented separately to 
Jenks that "the U.S. is a country with soul, whereas the Europeans 
are more attached to their economic interests. The Europeans are 
playing two agendas in the Goma/Nairobi processes, and trying to 
bring the Americans along unwittingly."  He said that he would have 
preferred to meet with Jenks alone, to talk over some ideas for 
making the U.S. role more visible.  Jenks replied that the U.S. is 
in lock step with the Europeans on Goma and Nairobi, and would not 
deviate.  He understood the point, and said that that was indeed the 
way to go, but that it would also be good if the U.S. were "more 
visible." 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Comment:  This was an engaged, helpful and rational 
Nkunda.  It is clear that one of his intentions was to tell the 
Facilitation that CNDP was taking sensitization and the Amani 
process seriously.  His plan to lead one of the North Kivu "cells" 
is a surprise and a fascinating one.  It also points up the need to 
establish Kimoka as soon as possible, despite resistance to this 
idea within MONUC that must be overcome.  CNDP did show their 
positive engagement in this meeting, and they clearly expect the 
GDRC and the Facilitation to reciprocate on their parts of the deal. 
 End comment. 
 
GARVELINK