VZCZCXRO4821
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0428/01 1360607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150607Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7994
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000428 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 05/02/08 - TEAM BUILDING: 20TH MEETING OF THE 
JMG TASK FORCE, FIELD TRIP 2, 02 MAY 2008 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  On May 2, Task Force members traveled by road to 
the Headquarters of the 6th Integrated Brigade (FARDC) in Kiwanja, 
Rutshuru Territory, which has responsibility for keeping FDLR troops 
away from the Uganda border. The brigade's operations netted a 
high-profile commander last month, Jean-Claude Bahati, but members 
of the Rwandan Delegation doubted his importance and focused their 
questions on the numbers and activity of remaining FDLR elements. 
Brigade Commandant Mishimba said that there are few "real FDLR" in 
his territory, but rather FOCA and RUD dissidents, along with 
Congolese recruits; his staff could only estimate their numbers at 
less than 220 "very mobile" fighters. The Task Force went on to meet 
the civilian Territory Administrator, who insisted that uniformed 
Rwandan army troops fight alongside CNDP units in Rutshuru, 
eliciting a strong denial from Rwanda Delegation Chief Franco 
Rutagengwa.  The Administrator asserted that Rutshuru is 
simultaneously the most negatively impacted territory in the DRC, 
and the least supported by Kinshasa, with a population of one 
million, including 700,000 displaced persons who are terrorized by 
home-grown bandits and foreign fighters.  He appealed to the 
international community for help in governing, especially for a 
vehicle for his office, never having received one despite two years 
of asking.  End summary. 
 
A Clean-Up Mission 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Earlier this year the Joint Monitoring Group criticized the 
performance of Col. Mishimba, commandant of the 6th Integrated 
Brigade.  Gen. Mayala, 8th MR Commander, redefined the unit's 
mission and ordered its leader to carry out sweeps against the FDLR, 
forcing them away from the Uganda border and back into the DRC. 
Mishimba greeted the Task Force confident that the brigade's 
successes since that time are sustainable.  The new tactic allowed 
Mishimba to arrest and "sensitize" FDLR commander Jean-Claude Bahati 
and six other Rwandans, along with 64 Congolese fighters that 
Mishimba calls "naive FDLR." Rwandan TF members, who themselves 
interviewed Jean-Claude last week, discounted Mishimba's profile of 
the captive, and concentrated their questions on remaining FDLR 
elements in the territory.  High on the list is Col. Soki, who told 
the 6th IB on May 1 that he is willing to come in, though only with 
guarantees of security and the benefit of an intra-Rwandan dialog 
before returning home.  Otherwise Soki will "hide in the bush." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Col. Mishimba believes that most of the remaining fighters 
are FOCA dissidents, who are open to leaving the DRC sooner or 
later.  The balance are RUD, a group Mishimba views harshly, calling 
them extremists and dissidents from FOCA ("rebels from rebels"), 
probably unwilling to leave the DRC under any conditions.  The 6th 
IB G-2 thinks these elements number between 200-220 men. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Rwandan delegation neither confirmed nor disputed Col. 
Mishimba's assessment, but said it believes the Congolese who remain 
in FDLR units are really Mai Mai. Mishimba appeared to agree. 
According to his information, the only exclusively Rwandan units 
remaining in North Kivu are in Walikale territory. "In fact, most 
Rwandans are ready to go home, if there is security for them," he 
finished. 
 
Administrator Under Pressure 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Rutshuru's civilian Administrator, Dominique Bofondo, 
invites FDLR members to his office, makes the sensitization 
arguments and urges them to go home, but says he cannot get past 
their so-called conditions: an intra-Rwandan dialogue, and exemption 
from genocidaire status.  His exasperation extends to CNDP and the 
Rwandan government.  He claims to have been present at many clashes 
in which Rwandan soldiers fought alongside CNDP elements; he even 
collected cell phones and photographs of women from the bodies of 
these soldiers, telephoned the home numbers and spoke with the new 
widows, who live in Rwanda.  The Administrator gave these photos as 
evidence to the Goma Peace and Security Conference, but to no avail. 
 "We could throw everyone out in one week with the 6th IB," he said, 
"but our own government holds us back." 
 
¶6. (SBU) Rwanda's chief delegate made a categorical denial that 
Rwandan regulars are present with the CNDP or any other force, and 
the Administrator refrained from arguing.  Rather he appealed to the 
delegations and the TF President for the funds and equipment he 
needs to deal with the FDLR, especially vehicles and soldiers. 
Bofondo said that the FDLR are brutes and murderers, but in an 
effort to afford the population some protection from them, he spends 
his own money to buy the enemy sugar, milk and cell-phone units to 
keep lines of communication open. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000428  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment:  The field trip proved useful in two ways: First, 
it helped to develop a pattern of joint interviewing among the 
members, with the Rwandans displaying courtesy and restraint in 
their dissenting points.  Second, it made clear to the members that 
some procedural improvements are essential.  The TF adheres to a 
policy of bilingual deliberation, and is continually plagued by 
inadequate interpreters.  On some occasions the bi-lingual members 
pitch in to clarify points, but more often than not the points are 
lost.  This was the case when Rwanda asked the battalion commander 
important questions (Who do you use to sensitize Hutus?  What can 
the international community do to assist you now?) that were garbled 
by inept translation and ultimately left without clear answers as 
the pressure of time intervened.  Talking later among themselves, 
the members agreed to raise translation issues as an internal matter 
at their next meeting.  End comment. 
 
BROCK