VZCZCXRO8700
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0779/01 1411400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201400Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0880
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000779 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/CC 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU SU CD UNSC
 
SUBJECT: JEM 
BREAKS SILENCE AND AGREES TO MEET ENVOY 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. After days of relative silence, Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim contacted FieldOff to 
accept the Special Envoy's proposal for a meeting in Ndjamena May 
¶29.  Khalil made clear that "Darfur is not the goal," but that 
regime change in Khartoum remains not only the primary goal but a 
real possibility.  Khalil's field commanders alleged that Khalil is 
in North Darfur but is willing to travel to N'djamena to meet with 
the Special Envoy on May 29, as long as the Government of Chad 
blesses such a meeting. END SUMMARY. 
 
MILITARY SOLUTION STILL THE ANSWER 
---------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) On May 19 JEM field commander Mohamed Beshir contacted 
FieldOff to provide an update on JEM's activities in the wake of its 
May 10 offensive on Omdurman outside Khartoum.  Beshir, a former JEM 
representative to the Ceasefire Commission before his arrest in El 
Fasher in December 2007, noted that he had not been involved in the 
Omdurman operation.  At the time of the Omdurman attack he was 
fighting in Jebel Moun against the JEM/Collective Leadership (CL) 
faction, led by Abdalla Banda (he said Banda was supported by 15 
vehicles).  Beshir added that JEM was also fighting against 
Government of Sudan (GoS) forces in Jebel Moun and that the GoS had 
moved 30 vehicles into the region [NOTE: UNAMID also reported 70-80 
GoS vehicles in Malha; humanitarian missions and travel to that 
location have been suspended. END NOTE].  The level of violence in 
Jebel Moun, Beshir noted, is such that no travel to this region is 
safe at the moment.  The United Nations-African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) Deputy Force Commander told fieldoff that he plans 
to task the Mission to look into the JEM/Khalil - JEM/CL violence. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Beshir told FieldOff that contrary to rumors, such as those 
which brought El Fasher to a veritable standstill on May 16, JEM has 
no plans to attack Darfur, which he acknowledged would result in 
civilian casualties.  It was easier, Beshir said, to target instead 
the GoS, and he boasted that a "second wave" of attacks on Khartoum 
was coming, something that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim reiterated in a 
subsequent phone conversation with FieldOff.  Claiming to be 
speaking from somewhere between Kutum and Kabkabiya in North Darfur, 
Khalil asserted that "it should be very clear that our interest is 
not in Darfur, it is in Khartoum" (Note: GOS officials claim that 
Khalil is actually in Chad already). Consistent with similar press 
statements to news agencies, Khalil said JEM saw only two ways of 
"terminating the suffering of the Darfur people: peace or war." 
"With more than six million people living as IDPs, refugees and 
among the diaspora," Khalil explained, "we don't have many 
alternatives." 
 
GoS, UN-AU MEDIATION NOT SERIOUS 
-------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Khalil said as long as the GoS failed to take seriously the 
"window for peace" in Darfur, JEM would continue its push for 
Khartoum and for regime change, which he deemed within the realm of 
possibility.  He noted that "peace is still our first priority," 
although he acknowledged it was still too soon after the May 10 
Omdurman attack for the GoS to talk peace with JEM.  "The Government 
is not stable now, and it does not know what to do," Khalil 
asserted, adding that he considered it more important for JEM to sit 
down with the USG than with the GoS at this point. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Khalil had little faith in the UN's and AU's ability to 
mediate in the Darfur conflict, accusing those mediators of "abusing 
UN assets" by entertaining consultations with "bandits" like Sudan 
Liberation Army commander Suleiman Marjan and Sudan Liberation Army 
faction leader Abdulshafie.  "They aren't main players," Khalil 
declared, and he accused the UN-AU mediation of having created 
factions out of groups that had neither credibility nor force 
strength on the ground.  "They don't want peace," Khalil insisted, 
"They are only a danger to non-governmental organizations and are 
more dangerous to Darfuris than the Government is."  Individual 
interests, according to Khalil, had no place in the Darfur peace 
process, and the UN-AU mediation's propensity for inclusiveness was 
undermining this reality and accordingly prospects for viable 
peace. 
 
HIGH HOPES FOR USG ROLE 
----------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) In Khalil's estimation, the only country that can play a 
role as an effective mediator in the Darfur conflict is the United 
States.  "It is more important for us to sit with the U.S. than with 
the Government of Sudan," Khalil declared.  He was very receptive to 
the idea of meeting with Special Envoy Williamson in N'djamena on 
May 29 and plans to bring a delegation with him (likely Victor 
Gibril Ibrahim and Abdullah Osman al-Tum).  He insisted, however, 
that given the current sensitivities between the GoS and the GoC, 
the USG must obtain express permission from the GoC for JEM to come 
to N'djamena for this meeting.  Both Khalil and Beshir asked 
 
KHARTOUM 00000779  002 OF 002 
 
 
FieldOff for any "advice" that the USG could offer to JEM for the 
coming days.  FieldOff made clear that the USG would not condone 
ceasefire violations, regardless of the purported motivations, and 
that for every such infraction, the peace process which JEM claimed 
to support took a step backward.  Apparently unconvinced by this 
piece of advice, Khalil laughed and agreed to disagree on this 
point. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Beshir flagged for FieldOff the continued detention in 
Cairo by Egyptian intelligence officers of three JEM members, 
including Ahmed Tougod, JEM's chief negotiator.  Beshir appealed to 
FieldOff for USG intervention with the Government of Egypt for these 
members' release (NOTE: UNAMID reported in its May 20 Media Brief 
that the GoE had shot and killed one of the JEM members in custody, 
but this is unconfirmed and unlikely.  Polchief spoke with the 
Egyptian DCM May 19, who confirmed the continued detention of the 
JEM members to prevent them from issuing "propaganda" from Egypt. 
He said the GOE may deport JEM members if they do not agree to cease 
issuing statements from Egypt, but that no decision has been made 
"until the current situation calms down." END NOTE.) 
 
COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION 
-------------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) JEM is still riding the wave of "success" after its 
attention-grabbing stab at Khartoum.  Given the proximity with which 
it neared the capital the first time around, any threat to make a 
second go should not be totally discounted although President 
Al-Bashir's generals have stated that the operation cannot be 
repeated.  A meeting with Khalil Ibrahim, as long as it is 
pre-cleared with the GoS and used as an opportunity to criticize 
Ibrahim in the meeting and in the press afterward, could be useful 
in driving home messages already conveyed by the Department in the 
wake of the May 10 Omdurman attack.  JEM needs reminding that no 
ceasefire violation goes unpunished, and while it may be allegedly 
fighting in the name of Sudan peace, it is nonetheless fighting and 
killing innocent civilians - in addition to JEM's aggressive action 
against other rebel factions like JEM-CL and the GOS. 
 
¶9. (SBU) JEM also needs reminding that while it may show contempt 
for the ceasefire, it needs to respect other mechanisms already in 
place to address the concerns of peace and war it purports to 
champion.  JEM must be reminded that until stated otherwise, the UN 
and the AU maintain the lead of Darfur peace mediation and that like 
it or not, there are other parties to the Darfur conflict.  JEM also 
needs to make good on its private promises that UNAMID, including 
its Egyptian contingents, will be regarded as part of the Darfur 
solution and not part of the problem.  These messages could also be 
reinforced in a face-to-face meeting with Khalil. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Department may wish to instruct Embassy N'djamena to 
inform Government of Chad of the proposed meeting between the 
Special Envoy and Khalil Ibrahim May 29. 
 
FERNANDEZ