VZCZCXRO7749
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0774 1401522
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191522Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0875
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000774 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID MOPS KPKO SU
SUBJECT: GOSS CALLS FOR USG INTERVENTION ON ABYEI 
 
¶1. (SBU) Government of Southern Sudan Ministers Barnabas Benjamin 
(Regional Cooperation) and Luka Biong Deng (Presidential Affairs) 
requested US assistance on Abyei at a GOSS/UN/USG coordination 
meeting on Abyei relief efforts May 19.  More specifically, they 
called for direct and immediate engagement on Abyei by Special Envoy 
Williamson.  Deng is not satisfied with the results of the May 18 
Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) meeting in the destroyed 
town.  A visibly irritated Deng admitted that the SPLA was poorly 
represented at the meeting and dismissed the decision to release NCP 
detainees as one "not applicable to the present context," and 
denounced the documents as "rife with language that is out of touch 
with the greater political situation." 
 
¶2. (SBU) Regional Cooperation Minister Benjamin claimed that the May 
16 decision, announced publicly at the SPLM Convention, by GOSS 
President Kiir to restrain SPLA forces along the 1956 border and 
disallow SPLA engagement in Abyei was "politically destabilizing in 
the South."  "We cannot continue this posture without assurances 
from the international community that it will act," demanded 
Benjamin.  Benjamin said that Kiir's decision to withhold troops 
from Abyei, despite the level of destruction and direct attacks on 
SPLA JIU forces, shows the SPLA's adherence to the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement.  He contrasted this with the actions of the SAF, 
which resulted in skirmishes the evening of May 18/19 that killed 
two SPLA. (NOTE: The CPA states that only the Joint Integrated Unit 
should be deployed in Abyei.  The SAF maintains both a JIU force and 
the 31st Brigade. END NOTE).  Deng was considerably more direct. 
"The time has come where we will have to do something about this," 
said Deng, with a dismissive wave across the CJMC minutes.  "A 
confrontation is inevitable, this cannot stand." 
 
¶3. (SBU) CG Juba defended Kiir's decision to exercise restraint, 
pointing out that isolating the SAF role would bolster support for 
the SPLA/SPLM in reaching an agreement on Abyei.  Moreover, space 
remained for action within the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) 
and it behooved the SPLM to come to the meeting well-prepared.  CJ 
Juba advised that a detailed briefing to the diplomatic and press 
corps should be considered.  UNMIS David Gressly proposed troop 
redeployments at the regional level, a reduction in SAF numbers 
within the CPA, deployment of a fully functional JIU, and freedom of 
UNMIS movement throughout Abyei and the former Western Kordofan 
ceasefire zone.  Gressly and Acting CG further stressed the need for 
precise timetables.  Deng enthusiastically accepted these points, 
and Benjamin committed to gathering a "planning group" following the 
close of tonight's national convention session. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Returning to the USG role on Abyei, Deng requested calls by 
Special Envoy Williamson to both President Bashir and First Vice 
President Kiir on the matter, and suggested that immediate pressure 
must be applied to counter the "recklessly provocative SAF." 
Despite SAF comments during the CJMC, SAF Headquarters released a 
press statement on May 19 noting that SAF deployment to Abyei was 
required as a result of SPLA presence in the town, and would remain 
until SPLA soldiers were withdrawn.  CG Juba promised to pass this 
message and briefed Deng on the Charge's considerable efforts on 
Abyei since the crisis first broke, and plans for the May 30 SPLM 
meeting with Williamson.  Deng was grateful for the information, but 
reiterated his call for direct approaches to Bashir. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment: Benjamin and Deng have hourly and direct access to 
President Kiir (although no SPLM leader seemed to be talking to him 
about Abyei on May 15 when CDA and acting CG raised concerns on this 
very topic with Deng, Lino, and FM Alor).  While passing detail of 
the Charge's efforts plus forthcoming initiatives by the Special 
Envoy has relaxed Deng's stance, and momentarily restrained an 
impassioned Benjamin, contact at higher levels would be appropriate, 
given Kiir's propensity to make snap decisions from which he rarely 
retreats. 
 
FERNANDEZ