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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM772, SPLM TAKES THE HIGH ROAD IN ABYEI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM772 2008-05-19 15:18 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7738
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0772/01 1401518
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191518Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0871
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000772 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID KPKO SU
SUBJECT:  SPLM TAKES THE HIGH ROAD IN ABYEI 
 
REFS:  A. KHARTOUM 737 
B. KHARTOUM 745 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The SPLM is using the current humanitarian and 
security crisis in Aryei town"tk highlighd NCQ intrajsigefce"of thQJAbiai kssue"ane pmucD gvrnbu3t$~dg^qsvQh4 eQu)ktfb&'bl$XalQ 
ibmtneIa.aAa%jQjnQwxo 'cYb@,aQhd]cm"~7Qkdf.oth+,sFQ_px(hV\Q^"G"ldtr ies to 
respond to the humanitarian crisis, and engaging the Government of 
South Sudan to do the same.  With insecurity still present North of 
Abyei town, and fresh SAF deployments reported by UNMIS, the South 
also is becoming the operating base for relief to Abyei.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) One day after returning from touring the disputed area, GOSS 
Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng and SPLM 
Administrator for Abyei Edward Lino briefed assembled foreign 
nationals on the evolving Abyei situation.  GNU Minister for 
Humanitarian Affairs Haroun Run Lual, GOSS Minister for Regional 
Cooperation Barnaba Benjamin, and Southern Sudan Rehabilitation and 
Relief Commissioner Simon Koon also participated. 
 
Extended Humanitarian Crisis 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU) Presidential Affairs Minister Deng forecast an extended 
humanitarian crisis exacerbated by continued SAF presence in and 
near Abyei town, the coming rainy season, and because the majority 
of the estimated 106,000 affected people (an estimate shared by the 
UN) are predominantly Southerner returnees to Abyei (the majority 
women and children) with weak social networks in the surrounding 
areas.  Logistical challenges exacerbated by inclement weather have 
placed IDPs along the River Kiir momentarily out of reach of any 
humanitarian assistance, according the Lino.  He worried that they 
may move northward in search of better conditions and find 
themselves entangled in fresh SAF deployments to the region. 
 
SPLM Takes the Lead 
- - - - - - - - - - 
4. (SBU) SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir excused (SPLM) GNU Ministers of 
Health and Humanitarian Affairs from the May 18 session of the SPLM 
National Convention in order to galvanize their ministries and curb 
what Humanitarian Affairs Minister Haroun termed "a resistant civil 
service."  Haroun has ordered that relief flights are to receive 
immediate clearances into Abyei and Kadugli, Southern Kordofan.  He 
is working with the NCP Governor of Southern Kordofan state to relax 
the "security bottleneck" along the Kharasana/Heglig corridor, and 
HAC Commissioner Hassibo has been ordered to coordinate closely with 
the Southern Sudan Rehabilitation and Relief Commission (SSRRC). 
SSRRC Commissioner Simon Koon briefed NGO workers on SSRRC response 
efforts to date, and on a planned GOSS monetary contribution to 
relief efforts.  Haroun stated that SPLM pro-activeness within the 
GNU may be hampered by the depth of distrust and anger at the North 
by Abyei's IDPs.  Ministers fear Northern support may be rejected. 
However, Lino noted that while people will remain suspicious "they 
will be grateful for any assistance." 
 
Assistance Needed Now 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
5. (SBU) All five SPLM officials pressed for immediate deployment of 
humanitarian assistance, arguing against additional assessments and 
GZ!9pQon with Darfur. 
"Khartoum actively kills the civilian population while saying 
nothing is happening," he maintained. "We are accused of 
exaggerating the situation, but it is time the international 
 
KHARTOUM 00000772  002 OF 002 
 
 
community pushes for an overarching political settlement for Abyei, 
to include the full implementation of the CPA's Abyei Protocol." 
 
7. (SBU) Benjamin contended that UNMIS is unable to control the SAF, 
and is constrained by Khartoum's violation of SOFA provisions 
governing UNMIS movement.  Benjamin stressed, with emphatic 
agreement from all SPLM officials in the room, that unfettered 
access from Abyei to Muglad and beyond to Baba Nousa was a right 
enshrined in the CPA. "Yet SAF is reinforcing as we speak, and we 
cannot come in without being characterized as a belligerent party," 
he said. 
 
Unmet Security Commitments 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
8. (SBU) Presidential Affairs Minister Deng reviewed the security 
status of Abyei following the May 15 and 17 Area Joint Military 
Committee (AJMC) meetings.  In UNMIS presence, the SAF and SPLA 
agreed that only Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) forces should monitor 
and protect the town, and should be the only armed elements in 
Abyei.  "SPLA police" and SAF forces were to move South and North 
respectively, establishing a buffer zone of at least 18 kms on 
either side of the town.  These decisions followed a commitment by 
President Bashir that the 31st SAF Brigade would be removed from 
Abyei for the first time 1964. 
 
9. (SBU) SPLM Abyei Administrator Lino maintained the reality has 
not matched SAF commitments.  In accordance with AJMC directives, 
the "SPLA police" withdrew five kms south of the River Kiir, and now 
are serving as a de facto protection force for IDPs in the area.  In 
contrast, SAF have remained in Abyei town, and according to Deng and 
Lino, the JIU/SAF contingent looted the main market square before 
joining fellow SAF in the "barracks" (a former school) in the center 
of the town.  Additionally, UNRC's office reported that, in addition 
to SAF troops remaining in the town, SAF and alleged Misseriya 
reinforcements were sighted traveling south towards Abyei from Baba 
Nousa.  According to Deng, JIU Commander LTG. Thomas Cirillo told 
him that Cirillo's SAF counterpart said he no longer controlled 
SAF/JIU soldiers operating in Abyei. 
 
"Extremely Fragile" Security Situation 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
10. (SBU) Deng asserted that the SAF 31st Brigade remains in Abyei 
town illegally, because the CPA holds that only JIU forces are 
permitted in the region.  He termed the situation "extremely 
fragile," and allowed that he believed there could be "imminent 
confrontation" should the SAF fail to move out of Abyei.  GOSS 
President Salva Kiir has worked "tirelessly to restrain SPLA troops 
who have been forced to sit and watch their citizens suffer," Deng 
stated.  Regional Cooperation Minister Benjamin underscored the 
point, "A second Darfur is about to occur in Abyei - where Khartoum 
actively kills the civilian population while saying nothing is 
happening.  In the meantime, the international community treats 
Khartoum like a spoiled child, while the SPLA - which has done 
nothing - must defend itself from unsubstantiated rumors." 
 
Putting the Onus on the SAF 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11. (SBU) Privately, Deng and Lino told CG Juba that that Kiir has 
been actively engaged in restraining the SPLA JIU force as well, 
micromanaging command decisions within the SPLA made by JIU 
Commander Thomas Cirillo.  Per Deng, Kiir has decided to resist SPLA 
deployment to prevent the SPLA from being mistaken as one of the 
belligerent parties.  The SPLM's desire to highlight the SAF role in 
the current conflict also precipitated the withdrawal southward of 
"SPLA police" from Abyei town.  The decision has been decidedly 
unpopular.  The May 16 Convention session ended abruptly as it 
deteriorated into a shouting match, imploring the SPLM Chairman to 
prevent the "butchering of the innocent." 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
12. (SBU) The May 18 briefing demonstrated the level of SPLM 
frustration ad impatience with the NCP, but also with the 
international community.  For three years, the NCP has effectively 
voided the CPA's Abyei protocol through procrastination - rejecting 
the Abyei Boundary Commission report while failing to implement an 
alternative administration for the region.  The SPLM believes that 
this has happened with nary a murmur of protest from an 
international community distracted by Darfur.  While the SPLM is far 
from blameless in playing games in Abyei, it now appears to be 
taking the highroad to highlight the NCP's failings and to marshal 
international support for its cause.  Embassy Khartoum encourages 
greater engagement on Abyei linked to our bilateral talks with the 
NCP. 
 
FERNANDEZ