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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM762, MAY 18 ABYEI UPDATE: SPORADIC FIGHTING AMIDST EFFORTS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM762 2008-05-19 04:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7215
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0762/01 1400400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190400Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0852
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000762 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID MOPS KPKO SU
SUBJECT: MAY 18 ABYEI UPDATE: SPORADIC FIGHTING AMIDST EFFORTS TO 
END STRIFE 
 
REFS: A. KHARTOUM 737 
B. KHARTOUM 745 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The situation in Abyei remained quiet as of 
mid-day May 18, after renewed fighting on May 16-17.  SAF remains in 
the town, despite a UN-brokered mutual withdrawal agreement with the 
SPLA "police forces," which departed the town May 17.  The Ceasefire 
Joint Monitoring Commission (CJMC) will fly to Abyei May 18 to 
attempt to disengage the forces.  Despite assurances to VP Kiir, 
President Bashir appears either unable or unwilling yet to restrain 
SAF units in Abyei.  The UN has begun a humanitarian relief effort 
for the estimated 106,000 affected people, 50,000 of which are IDPs. 
 A USAID assessment team is traveling to the region, but USAID 
already has begun to plan relief operations, based on information 
currently available.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Abyei:  Fighting on May 16 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU) Despite a May 15 agreement by the SAF and the SPLA on 
mutual withdrawal of forces -- and the presence in Abyei of senior 
SAF and SPLA/SPLM officials along with the UNMIS Deputy Force 
Commander -- to attempt to resolve the crisis, intense mortar and 
small arms fire broke out again late May 16, lasting into the early 
hours of May 17.  UNMIS staff reportedly spent a cold, rainy night 
sheltered against the berm surrounding their camp to avoid shell 
fire that was falling inside.  Zambian peacekeepers in Abyei were 
reinforced from Kadugli mid-day May 17.  The situation remained 
quiet as of mid-day May 18. 
 
3.  (SBU) Despite the mutual-withdrawal agreement, Embassy has 
received reliable reports that the SAF 31st Brigade remains in Abyei 
town, while the SPLA has withdrawn south of the Kiir River. 
According to SPLM sources in Juba, the SPLA unit that came under 
attack is assigned to the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) that was to 
remain in the town.  Several observers in Juba blame the fighting on 
irregular forces such as the renegade Southern Sudan Unity Movement, 
which reportedly receives support from Khartoum to confront the SPLA 
and SSPS in and around Abyei. SSUM is an SPLM splinter group with 
years of bad blood between the two organizations.  Irregular 
Misseriya Arab militia supported by Khartoum also regularly confront 
SPLA along the river outside of Abyei town. 
 
Efforts to Restore Calm Flounder 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU) On May 17, the EU Special Envoy told Acting CG Juba that 
President Bashir and First Vice President Kiir had spoken by phone 
twice during the previous 24 hours.  On May 16, Bashir committed to 
restrain the SAF and remove the 31st SAF Brigade from Abyei town, 
but the outbreak of fighting that evening and the result of the May 
17 telcon left Kiir "extremely dissatisfied" and pessimistic about a 
speedy resolution to the crisis.  Kiir used a May 17 meeting to 
request the "joint" AU/Arab League delegation to press Bashir to 
meet his May 16 commitments. To date, the SAF has not withdrawn from 
Abyei, and GOSS Presidential Affairs Minister Luka Biong Deng 
reports the JIU/SAF contingent has become "integrated" with the 
independent SAF force splitting the JIU along political lines. 
 
5  (SBU) The Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC) met early May 16 
and produced "decisive and comprehensive remedies and confidence 
building measures," according to the UN Regional Coordinator.  Later 
that same day, the SPLM sent a joint civilian/military negotiating 
team led by GoSS Minister of Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng 
(himself an Abyei native) and SPLA JIU Commander LTG. Thomas Cirillo 
Oteng to Abyei to meet as a Joint Defense Board (JDB) with Cirillo's 
SAF counterparts.  Accompanying the SPLM were two unofficial Amcit 
advisors.  It was following the JDB meeting, as fresh orders were 
being relayed to troops in the field, that the SAF renewed its 
attack, and Cirillo and company fled Abyei to the safety of Agok. 
 
6. (SBU) The UN Regional Coordinator's office is extremely concerned 
that the renewed fighting indicates a deterioration of the 
rank-and-file respect for two quite well-established mediation 
mechanisms:  the AJMC and JDB.  The CMCJ was to fly to Abyei on May 
18 to try to defuse the security situation and try to disengage the 
opposing forces. 
 
Humanitarian Response 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
7.  (SBU) Abyei town is reported to be partially destroyed, looted 
and deserted, with columns of displaced people headed both north and 
south (more heading south than north).  20,000 are reported to have 
congregated in Agok to the south of the river and 13-14,000 in each 
of two other villages along the river.  The UN estimates a 
population of 50,000 will need immediate assistance and that 56,000 
additional persons have been affected by the violence and will 
 
KHARTOUM 00000762  002 OF 002 
 
 
require humanitarian relief.  Weather has been cold and rainy, 
making a rapid response urgent to prevent outbreaks of disease. 
 
8.  (SBU) A UN assessment mission left Khartoum on May 17, spending 
the night in Wau and proceeding to Turalai on May 18 from where the 
humanitarian response will be launched.  Coordination of the 
Abyei/Agok response is being handled by the UN Southern Sector out 
of Juba. 
 
9.  (SBU) According to UNMIS humanitarian officials in Juba, there 
are significant humanitarian supplies already available for the 
response including: 390 MT of food pre-positionied in Turalei by WFP 
with an additional 2,500 MT in Wunruk and 8,000 household kits 
available through UNICEF in Aweil. Trucking of supplies from the 
various storage points will begin on May 18. Local staff from NGO 
partners are on the ground in Agok ready to assist in the 
distribution. 
 
10.  (SBU) USAID staff in Khartoum are in regular touch with the 
Abyei/Agok partners, which include WFP, OCHA, UNICEF, UN Joint 
Logistics Center, Save the Children/US, GOAL, Mercy Corps, PADCO, 
and PACT.  NGOs have staff in the field who can support the 
emergency response.  A three-person USAID team is scheduled to 
depart May 19 to Aweil, and from there will travel to Turalai to 
follow up on the humanitarian response and report back on additional 
requirements. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
11.  (SBU) The situation in Abyei remains tenuous.  Reports indicate 
that the fighting began spontaneously over a localized incident 
between SPLA police (also known as SSPS) and a SAF soldier.  Given 
the prolonged ethnic and political tensions in the region, another 
such spark could easily ignite renewed fighting unless the two sides 
can be separated.  CDA Fernandez will continue to press the GOS to 
withdraw the SAF in accordance with this most recent brokered 
agreement as well as previous JDB and CJMC agreements.  We suggest 
that Abyei should be high on the agenda for the upcoming visit of 
the Special Envoy, as the GOS should be eager to resolve this crisis 
given how badly it has tarnished their image.  We also need to 
aggressively demonstrate that the US is fully committed to the Abyei 
Protocol of the CPA, which we drafted and brokered in Naivasha. 
 
FERNANDEZ