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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM748, UNDERCOUNTING, INTIMIDATION MAR DARFUR CENSUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM748 2008-05-16 11:10 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6084
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0748/01 1371110
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161110Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0832
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0219
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000748 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KPKO SOCI UNSC SU
 
SUBJECT: UNDERCOUNTING, INTIMIDATION MAR DARFUR CENSUS 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. With the census officially completed, 
international organizations are taking stock of census results. 
While UNAMID, with support from the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), is preparing a detailed analysis of the exercise and 
expected results, preliminary observations indicate significant 
undercounting of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 
intimidation perpetrated both against and by the civilian population 
in Darfur.  The census sample should be large enough to produce 
fairly accurate results; however, the resistance encountered 
throughout the process makes de-linking the census and upcoming 
elections a top priority over the next year. END SUMMARY. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - 
IDPs, Movements Undercounted; Arab Nomads Overcounted 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (SBU) In a May 12 meeting, UNAMID Civil Affairs (CA) Chief 
Wariara Mbugua called census participation in the IDP camps 
"predictable," with about half of the camps in Darfur refusing to 
participate at all, some partially enumerated and a few that 
cooperated fully.  She said that OCHA had camp residency statistics 
from 2007 which could be used as a guideline; however, she 
acknowledged that "those numbers will have increased due to 
continuing displacement."  She noted that the majority of camps 
which refused to participate were those populated by SLA-Abdul Wahid 
supporters.  Demonstrations were organized in Kalma camp, where 
between 4000 and 5000 IDPs marched against the census, and in Zam 
Zam and Abu Shouk in El Fasher. 
She characterized the numbers of IDPs who were not enumerated as 
"substantial." 
 
3. (SBU) In general, the movements also resisted the census, and GoS 
enumerators were not allowed into rebel controlled areas.  CA and 
UNFPA estimate that such areas make up 20% of the region; however, 
they admit that those lands are not mapped, so the actual percentage 
could be higher. 
 
4. (SBU) To make matters worse, Mbugua claimed that the census had 
actually started a few days earlier in areas heavily populated by 
nomadic (i.e. Arab) groups.  "It was part of a GOS strategy to both 
assure full enumeration and inflate actual numbers," she said. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Intimidation of Civilians, Intimidation by Civilians 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (SBU) Mbugua confirmed that GoS soldiers had surrounded the IDP 
camp in Zalingei during the second week of the census in an attempt 
to pressure the IDPs into cooperating with enumerators.  After two 
tense days, CA staff managed to broker an agreement whereby the GoS 
would not enter the camp, and the IDPs were not counted. 
 
6. (SBU) By the second week of the census, Mbugua continued, 
citizens had grown increasingly wary of the process, refusing to 
take part and threatening enumerators.  As a result, some 
enumerators refused to go into certain neighborhoods, including 
outlying areas of El Fasher, for fear of being attacked.  She 
confirmed that two teams of enumerators had been abducted south of 
Nyala, and that no one had heard from them since.  In Sector West, a 
grenade was thrown into the house of an enumerator, and several 
others reported being threatened with knives during the course of 
their duties. 
 
 
7. (SBU) Because of these incidents, Mbugua, who has a background in 
statistics and practical experience conducting censuses, suspected 
that there had also been "significant undercounting in urban areas." 
 However, she was confident that the large sample size would help to 
show the areas that were undercounted, and produce fairly accurate 
results. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Central Bureau of Statistics Refuses to Meet 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (SBU) Fieldoffs attempted to discuss the issues raised by UNAMID 
and UNFPA with the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).  However the 
director of the North Darfur CBS office refused to meet, saying that 
she would not meet with any international personnel to discuss the 
census unless directed to do so by the CBS head office in Khartoum. 
(Note: In the past, local CBS officials have willingly discussed 
issues, including the census, with fieldoffs. End Note.) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
De-Linking Census from Elections 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
KHARTOUM 00000748  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) Mbugua worried that the problems encountered while 
conducting the census did not bode well for next year's elections. 
"Darfuris don't participate - they don't participate in the 
Ceasefire Commission or in restarting the stalled political process, 
and they didn't participate in the census," she complained.  Given 
this history, and the fact that elections are a benchmark for the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), not the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA), Mbugua said that it would difficult to convince them to 
participate in the elections.  It was important, she said, to 
de-link the issue of the census from the upcoming elections.  The 
census had nothing to do with voter registration, and "we should all 
do everything in our power to ensure that people are not confused." 
 
 
9. (SBU) Mbugua continued that a strong focus on civic education, as 
well as international pressure on key community leaders, would be 
essential to persuade Darfuris to participate in the elections. 
"They have disenfranchised themselves from all other mainstream 
participation.  What's left for them but the elections?" she mused. 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
9. (SBU) Although it did not lead to the violence that some feared, 
the census was clearly unpopular in Darfur.  It is also true that 
Darfuris generally link the census and elections together as part of 
a package "deal-we-didn't-get," and have little interest or concern 
for perceived CPA benchmarks.  It will be crucial to engage IDP and 
other community leaders in the run-up to the elections, and 
significant public and civic information campaigns will have to be 
mounted to convince Darfuris that their own stakes in election 
results are as high as or higher than those of their Southern 
compatriots.  IDP reaction to the census-elections package will be 
reported septel. 
 
FERNANDEZ