VZCZCXRO3043
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0727/01 1341416
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131416Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0801
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0213
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000727 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF/C 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE MFA BRIEFS KHARTOUM DIPLOMATIC CORPS 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 716 
B) KHARTOUM 717 
C) KHARTOUM 719 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  On May 13 at 11:00 A.M. (local time) Mutriff Sadiq, 
the Undersecretary at the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
accompanied by a Sudanese Army General, briefed Khartoum's 
Ambassadors on the Justice and Equality Movement's attack on 
Omdurman, across the Nile from the Sudanese capital.  Throughout the 
briefing, Sadiq aggressively emphasized Chad's support for the 
operation.  Sadiq also stated that the GoS will not use this as an 
opportunity to unfairly detain Darfuris, attack rebel groups, or 
change the GoS's stance on negotiations with rebel movements.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
RECAP OF JEM OPERATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2. (SBU) Sadiq opened the session calling JEM's operation a 
"suicidal attack."  He stated that the MFA warned the diplomatic 
community about the impending JEM attack on May 9, and "this is 
exactly what happened as we expected."  He stated that the Sudanese 
Armed Forces, in order to avoid bloody street fighting in heavily 
populated sections of Khartoum's sprawling suburb, directed the 
fighting to two of the least populated areas in Omdurman: 1) 
Al-'Arda Street (between Street 40 and Mua'arid Street) and 2) The 
Inqaz bridge.  Sadiq implied that some JEM fighters may have made it 
to the half-way point of this bridge across the Nile.  According to 
Sadiq, the JEM fighters incorrectly expected additional support from 
SAF defectors and the general population in Omdurman. They failed 
utterly to take any military objective in Omdurman such as the Wadi 
Sayidna Base or Military Engineers Unit. 
 
CHADIAN LINK 
- - - - - - - 
¶3.  (SBU) Sadiq stated that the JEM fighters relied upon cell phones 
for the communications, and that this enabled the GoS to intercept 
and gain valuable intelligence. When the local populace failed to 
rise, JEM called the Chadian Embassy. According to Sadiq, the 
Chadian Embassy in Khartoum was "an important point of contact for 
JEM."  He stated that contacts within the Chadian Embassy encouraged 
JEM fighters to cross over into Khartoum and capture the Mogran 
water station and the Central Bank of Sudan.  "After we intercepted 
these communications we directed our forces to prevent this from 
happening, and we gained decisive battles to stop this," stated 
Sadiq.  Sadiq stated that the GoS acquired Chadian passports, 
identity cards, communications equipment, and weapons from the 
fighters - all of which is evidence for Chad's support of this 
operation.  (Note:  Approximately ten Chadian passports, identity 
cards, birth certificates and other documents were on display 
following the briefing.  End Note). Sadiq noted that the Chadian 
Ambassador departed Sudan prior to the attack, and claimed the 
Chadian security attach in Khartoum was directly involved in the 
operation. 
 
THE CURRENT SITUATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4.  (SBU) Sadiq stated that all JEM fighters have been captured, 
except for those who fled and a small number who attempted to 
incorporate themselves into the civilian population in Omdurman. 
With respect to the latter, he stated that "every hour we catch more 
of the fighters who have left their weapons and taken off their 
uniforms." He stated that GoS security caught two such individuals 
in central Khartoum on May 12.  He stated that this incident was 
complicated by the involvement of many different GoS police, 
security, and military groups, and that the number of forces on the 
street has been reduced since then (one report we have heard is that 
GOS units mistakenly fired on each other) and checkpoints eliminated 
in Khartoum.  He stated that fleeing JEM fighters "have scattered 
all over," with some moving into White Nile and North Kordofan 
states, running out of gas and being swept up in small numbers. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Sadiq said that he could not discount that JEM would 
attempt to fall on UNAMID or SAF units in Darfur, or even on other 
Darfuri rebel movements. Some rebels had taken advantage of JEM's 
absence to raid its bases in Darfur and, in any case, "JEM wants to 
be the only rebel group in Darfur." He did admit that the movements 
of the Sudanese Army had been "slow and the chain of command, long" 
and that the more nimble rebels had taken advantage of this. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Sadiq boasted that more GoS military and security forces 
were ready for action, but that "we did not need all the forces to 
crush JEM."  He stated that the JEM attack has had an effect on 
Omdurman's civilian population, with a number civilian causalities. 
He stated that many buildings were damaged or destroyed (including 
one mosque) and that four banks were taken by the JEM fighters. 
Sadiq emphasized the attack's impact on the civilian population, 
stating that "the number of causalities and wounded for the military 
 
KHARTOUM 00000727  002 OF 003 
 
 
were normal and what one would expect."  Sadiq stated that by the 
afternoon of May 14, movements should entirely return to normal in 
Omdurman.  He noted that May 13 will be a "crucial day" for 
returning life to normal in Omdurman and Khartoum, but warned that 
"we should not exclude the possibility of other attacks by JEM," 
especially as they attempt to prove that they are still alive and 
well. 
 
POLITICAL AND ETHNIC DETENTIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU) Sadiq said the GoS is sensitive to the situation of ethnic 
Zaghawans and other ethnic groups in Darfur and that it had "issued 
a clear statement" that it will avoid ethnically and 
geographically-based detentions.  He stated that the people of 
Darfur have been very helpful in providing information to the GoS's 
security apparatus. CDA Fernandez stated that he appreciated this 
statement and that the international community will continue to 
monitor detentions and any operations which target individuals based 
on ethnicity. He added that there should be no ethnic targeting 
either in Khartoum or in Darfur. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Responding to a question regarding Popular Congress 
leader Hassan Al-Turabi, Sadiq stated that it was very clear that 
"individuals from the Popular Congress Party are sympathizers with 
JEM."  He said that "it was no coincidence that they were outside of 
Khartoum in the city of Sinar for five days, just like the absence 
of the Chadian Ambassador from Khartoum."  He added that the GoS has 
evidence of the PCP's involvement in the operation, and that it 
released Turabi "just so that it will not grab all of the media's 
attention." 
 
GOS RESPONSE 
- - - - - - - 
¶9.  (SBU)  Sadiq stated that the individuals responsible for the 
attack should be "called terrorists as they committed crimes against 
humanity."  He noted that one of the JEM trucks used in the attack 
was a looted WFP truck used for humanitarian assistance, which JEM 
had converted to military use. He stated that the GoS will present 
warrants for the arrest of JEM leaders to countries which harbor JEM 
leaders.  He stated that the GoS has appreciated the statements of 
condemnation made by the international community, including the US, 
and hinted at other countries who "offered more help than just 
condemnations". He then announced that the Ethiopian FM had just 
arrived in Khartoum. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Sadiq stated that the GoS is still committed to 
negotiating with rebel factions (including JEM "if they change their 
ways.")  He said the GoS still plans on participating in JMST-led 
security discussions scheduled for late May in Geneva, and the GoS 
will not try to exploit this opportunity to "liquidate" rebel 
movements.  He emphasized that "if JEM indicates that they are ready 
for peace, we are ready to consider it, but we know that Khalil 
Ibrahim is not for negotiations.  If they change, we will give them 
a chance."  He said that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim is power-hungry, 
an adventurer, isolated from his own people, an agent of the 
Chadians, and a coward who exploited child soldiers.  On the last 
point, he stated that captured child combatants would be handed over 
to the ICRC. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Sadiq said that the GoS does not have any ambitions in 
Chad, "although we could harm the Chadians and remove Deby, if we 
wanted to."  Specifically and harshly addressing the French 
Ambassador, Sadiq said "you know about Chadian involvement in this 
better than anyone, we asked for your help many times and you need 
to alert our neighbor that we hold them accountable." 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶12.  Sadiq said many of the right things on May 13 to assuage the 
concerns of Khartoum's diplomatic community.  He emphasized that the 
GoS directed the fighting to areas with low population density, that 
it will avoid targeting Darfurians, and that it will continue to 
talk with other Darfur rebel movements.  However, some of what he 
said must be taken with a large grain of salt since it obviously 
downplays the serious concerns of the regime at the time of the 
attack, and portrays GOS forces as having been entirely in control 
of events throughout the fighting.  Moreover, although Sadiq opened 
the briefing saying that the attack was both expected and controlled 
by the GoS security apparatus, he conveyed a number of details which 
shows how close JEM was to achieving its very ambitious goals. 
According to Sadiq, JEM avoided a SAF operation to keep them out of 
the city, took over Omdurman's banks, may have made it onto one of 
the bridges leading to Khartoum, and was close to moving into 
Khartoum (were it not for the GoS's victory in several "decisive 
battles.")  Sadiq showed the most emotion while emphatically 
addressing the French Ambassador, encouraging France to convey to 
Chad that Sudan holds Chad accountable. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000727  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
FERNANDEZ