Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM725, UPDATE ON SITUATION IN KHARTOUM AND DARFUR AND EMBASSY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM725.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM725 2008-05-13 11:49 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2895
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0725/01 1341149
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131149Z MAY 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0797
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000725 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/EX MEG KEETON AND 
STEVE TOY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UNSC SU AMGT ASEC CASC
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SITUATION IN KHARTOUM AND DARFUR AND EMBASSY 
SECURITY POSTURE 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000725  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
A) KHARTOUM 724 
B) KHARTOUM 718 
C) KHARTOUM 716 
D) KHARTOUM 710 
 
1. (SBU) Following the bold JEM raid on Omdurman May 10, the 
situation in Khartoum appears to have normalized as of May 13. 
There were numerous military police check points in downtown 
Khartoum May 11 and 12 in neighborhoods with sensitive government 
buildings and major roads and arteries.  The Government lifted the 
curfew for Khartoum on May 11.  However, the curfew in Omdurman 
remained in place May 12.  On May 13, a curfew was still in place in 
the Omdurman neighborhood of Umm Bedda, a predominantly Zaghawa 
residential area where much of the May 10 fighting occurred. 
 
2. (SBU) There are numerous verified reports of arbitrary arrests 
and beatings of ethnic Zaghawa in Khartoum and Darfur.  Many of the 
arrests in Khartoum have targeted Darfurian youth and single 
laborers living in group houses in Omdurman; the absence of family 
witnesses to verify detentions thus make exact figures difficult to 
determine.  Omdurman remains tightly controlled with numerous 
checkpoints at which civilians presenting identity cards indicating 
Darfurian heritage are arrested.  The UN Human Rights Office 
indicated on May 13 that the number detained does not exceed 400. 
Neither the UN nor any other local Sudanese or international 
contacts have received any reports of extrajudicial killings, 
however the UN asserts that it cannot make a final assessment until 
it is able to investigate the circumstances of civilian deaths 
during and after the rebel assault.  (Note: Multiple sources have 
reported that the GOS forces that provided the primary defense of 
Omdurman and Khartoum were not SAF military but rather NISS Special 
Forces and the Central Reserve Police. End note.)  Based on Sudan's 
human rights record and past response to security threats, the UN 
suggested it has "every reason to suspect people will be tortured 
and beaten in the course of their interrogations."  Local sources in 
Khartoum report that the majority of detainees have been released 
after 24 hours, often following violent interrogations.  Human 
Rights Watch issued a report May 13 indicating 57 civilian 
casualties resulted from the attack.  At a meeting of the diplomatic 
corps with the MFA May 13 (septel) CDA Fernandez publicly warned MFA 
U/S Mutriff Siddiq that Sudan would lose any support it currently 
has as a result of the JEM raid if the GOS responds aggressively 
with human rights violations or attacks that result in civilian 
casualties. 
 
3. (SBU) UN Human Rights has not been able to enter Omdurman since 
the rebel attack because of its own security restrictions and 
political friction with the Government.  Prior to the JEM incursion, 
the UN Human Rights office was negotiating with the Government to 
secure regular and free access to detention facilities.  The UN and 
the Sudanese Government had agreed that the UN will provide advance 
notification of which personnel would participate in visiting 
detainees but would not be obligated to announce a date or time for 
the visits in advance.  This agreement received the backing of the 
official Advisory Council for Human Rights, chaired by Vice 
President Ali Osman Taha's brother.  The UN asked for U.S. 
intervention with the Government to secure UN human rights officers' 
free access to Omdurman and access to detention facilities in 
greater Khartoum based on the negotiated procedures. 
 
4. (SBU) GOS security services detained Popular Congress Party 
leader Hassan al Turabi May 12 for questioning but released him 
later that evening.  (Note: The GOS assumes that Turabi is 
coordinating with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, as both are former 
hardline leaders of the National Islamic Front movement who are now 
opposed to the NCP-controlled regime. End note.)  His son, Siddiq al 
Turabi, told Polchief May 13 that prior to his questioning, Turabi 
remained "in solitary confinement" but that he had not been 
mistreated in any other way.  Turabi said that 16 other members of 
the PCP party had been detained May 11 and 12, and that as of May 
13, ten of them remained in custody.  He said that as of May 13 the 
GOS continues to hold ten PCP members without charges in Kobar 
prison and periodically moves them to National Intelligence and 
Security Service (NISS) controlled locations for questioning. 
Turabi reported May 12 that the GOS took over the PCP headquarters 
office in Khartoum, but several hours later reported that GOS 
officials called PCP leaders to request the party to resume control 
of the premises. 
 
5. (SBU) Khartoum international airport has been open since the day 
of the JEM raid May 10, when it only closed for 12 hours. 
International flights are again arriving and departing and seats are 
available on most flights.  As of May 12 the airport in Darfur is 
open for selective flights only (i.e., some PAE and UN flights were 
 
KHARTOUM 00000725  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
in operation).  UNAMID's Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai told 
fieldoff May 13 that he and Joint Special Representative Rudolphe 
Adada plan to protest the current airport operations and flight 
constraints with the GOS as a violation of UNAMID's Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA).  Agwai told Fieldoff that the GOS informed him the 
airports in Darfur are closed to prevent Libya and Chad from 
evacuating JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim from Darfur.  Agwai and other 
contacts in Darfur believe the GOS plans to conduct bombing 
operations on JEM locations.  INGOs operating in Darfur canceled 
site visits to IDP camps May 12 and 13 due to the airport closures. 
 
 
6. (SBU) The Embassy remains on stand-fast with a 7 pm - 6 am curfew 
with most employees working from home, but intends to return to 
relatively normal operations May 14.  The Emergency Action Committee 
will reconvene May 14.  Current staffing level at post is 95 
official Americans (STATE: 34, RAO 5, DLO 4, CCE 2, USAID 11, JUBA 
6, JUBA TDYERS 12, KHARTOUM TDYERS 19).  There are 71 official 
Americans in Khartoum, 18 in Juba, 2 in Nyala, and 4 in El Fasher. 
 
 
7. (SBU) Post has adequate supply of MREs and water for approx. 72 
hours on hand at the Chancery and RAO compounds.  MREs and water 
supply will be established for the same period at USAID.  Post has 
fuel storage to cover 96 hours at the Chancery, 72 hours at RAO, 24 
hours at USAID, and 96 hours at GSO.  Fuel storage tanks have been 
topped off.  Throughout the current crisis, city utilities have been 
continuously available and gasoline and diesel fuel have been 
available from local distributors.  Post has no reason to believe 
that fuel or electricity will become unavailable. 
 
8. (SBU) Post is implementing a plan to procure 15 additional 
Thuraya satellite phones for the Mission to expand our network. 
Post is also verifying that a telephone line is in working order at 
each residence.  Currently information for staff is being 
disseminated via post's radio network.  Email also has been used and 
the internet access was never interrupted in Khartoum throughout the 
crisis. All staff has been requested to regularly monitor the radio 
and to carry one with them when traveling about town.  Weekly radio 
checks are also being carefully monitored. 
 
FERNANDEZ