VZCZCXRO1772
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0723/01 1331241
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121241Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0792
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0211
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000723 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KPKO SOCI UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID STRUGGLES TO BRIDGE GAPS WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 333 
 
B) 07 KHARTOUM 1172 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. As local civil society institutions begin to 
emerge in Darfur, tensions between traditional government-supported 
institutions and newer donor-funded non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are rising.  Resentment and distrust have hampered the 
development of a cohesive civil society movement and raise questions 
about who, if anyone, will have both the credibility and capability 
to represent civil society interests at future peace talks. 
UNAMID's Civil Affairs unit, which should be well-placed to fill the 
leadership gap, has instead positioned itself as a passive 
moderator.  UNAMID's hands-off approach has not allowed civil 
society groups to find common ground or build trust, and risks 
deepening existing divides.  Without leadership, the civil society 
movement in Darfur is likely to suffer a fate similar to that of the 
rebel movements - fractionalization and marginalization - and may 
eventually become a spoiler to the peace process in which it has 
fought so hard to participate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
UNAMID Acknowledges Divide, Pushes "Organic" Process 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) According to local NGO sources, civil society institutions 
that existed in Darfur before the current conflict began in 2003 
were largely used as mechanisms for directing financial and material 
support to GOS supporters.  As such, those organizations that still 
exist today, such as local trade and labor unions, are viewed with 
skepticism by the fledgling group of independent NGOs that have 
sprung up in the past 5 years.  The GOS, both directly and through 
the civil society organizations it sponsors, is equally skeptical of 
the new civil society movement, carefully monitoring NGO staff, 
activities and influence.  The resulting mutual distrust has created 
a disjointed civil society environment in which it is difficult to 
identify community leaders and the interests they represent. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Wariara Mbugua, head of the UNAMID Civil Affairs (CA) team, 
is acutely aware of the divisions within civil society.  She admits 
that her early efforts have focused disproportionately on 
interaction with GOS officials and organizations.  "The government 
made it clear early on that it would not accept the Civil Affairs 
office engaging in any activities designed to undermine the 
government, or to incite civil society groups against it," Mbugua 
said.  As such, CA has had to walk a fine line, promoting 
independent civil society development, while carefully managing its 
own relationship with the GOS and dispelling lingering suspicions. 
"The key is transparency - everyone is invited to all of our 
events," she said. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Mbugua admitted that her open-door policy had meant that 
many early participants in CA activities were "briefcase" NGOs - 
groups that were less interested in real civil society activities 
and more interested in advancing their own political agendas. 
However, she hoped, as the Political Affairs office gains traction, 
those political parties will be drawn away from civil affairs and 
into legitimate political activities.  Mbugua said it had been 
difficult to avoid being sucked into societal fractures. However, 
she claimed that the CA team's approach had been successful, and 
that GOS interference had declined as more officials participated in 
CA activities. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The most visible of CA sponsored activities is a weekly 
meeting open to all NGOs.  CA's Mbugua explained that her office 
does not dictate agendas for these meetings, but instead allows the 
NGOs themselves to "raise issues organically, the issues that are 
important to them."  Mbugua emphasized that it was important for 
local groups to dictate the agenda, to ensure that issues which 
affect them are kept in the public dialogue. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Independent NGOs Critical of UNAMID 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) While CA may be effectively managing its relationship with 
GOS, it has not fared as well within the independent NGO community. 
Independent NGO leaders visibly bristle at the mention of the CA 
office, and many no longer participate in CA-sponsored activities. 
The respected Ahmed Adam Yousif, head of the Ajaweed Organization 
for Peace and Reconciliation, told fieldoff that he had attended a 
few of the initial UNAMID Civil Affairs organized events.  However, 
he claimed that the CA team did not distinguish between the "real" - 
i.e. independent - NGOs and those supported by the government.  In 
fact, most of their events and meetings were dominated by GOS-backed 
organizations, including other NGOs and the university peace center. 
 Yousif claimed that the CA team was "a partner to the GOS - it has 
no interest in hearing other voices."  If UNAMID continues down this 
 
KHARTOUM 00000723  002 OF 002 
 
 
path, he warned, they would fail. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Mansour Osman, head of the Sudan Social Development 
Organization (SUDO), called CA's organic approach "amateur."  He 
noted that effective NGOs do not work in all areas of civil society, 
but rather focus on a particular element or issue.  "How can I know 
if a meeting will be interesting or useful to me if I have no idea 
what is on the agenda?" he wondered.  With so many GOS 
representatives present, and such a high degree of skepticism 
between them and independent civil society groups, Osman also 
questioned how open or honest any dialogue could actually be.  He 
speculated that the only independent local groups who would attend 
such meetings were new NGOs which hadn't yet established their 
mission or goals, and were only looking for funding. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Identifying Civil Society Leaders 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Mbugua said that beyond encouraging dialogue, the weekly 
meetings had a more important goal.  As key issues began to emerge, 
she reasoned, so also would local leaders.  CA could then work with 
those leaders to develop the skills necessary to effectively 
participate in peace talks, Mbugua said.  "We have worked with JMST 
to identify specific issues that will arise in any future peace 
talks," she noted, and CA plans to organize workshops and seminars 
for leaders to discuss these topics in more detail.  (Comment: This 
approach will force Mbugua to develop an agenda, which will appeal 
to the independent NGOs but will raise alarms for the GOS. End 
comment.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Mbugua admitted that the older, government-supported groups 
had a leadership advantage, as they tended to have better internal 
organizational structures.  CA had shied away from targeted 
assistance to independent NGOs, citing transparency concerns, but 
Mbugua hoped to push the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund 
(DCPSF) to help support the development of weaker NGOs, and to even 
out capacity levels between the two groups.  The newer independent 
groups, after all, are "stronger on substance," she added. 
 
--------- 
Comment 
--------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) CA clearly does not want to be seen as a leader on civil 
society issues, but rather as a mediator.  It suffers from the same 
weaknesses, passivity and careerism of much of the entire UNAMID 
operation in Darfur.  Given the internal political dynamics, this 
may be the only role that is acceptable for the office to play under 
the watchful eye of the GOS.  However, CA must become more assertive 
in using its position to shape the development of the civil society 
community by setting the parameters for discussion - especially if 
it is to regain the confidence of the independent NGOs.  Few issues 
in Darfur are not politicized, though perhaps Mbugua could start 
with merely controversial issues such as education, then move on to 
explosive issues such as water access, before touching on 
radioactive issues such as governance that will link slightly better 
with organized JMST efforts. 
 
FERNANDEZ