VZCZCXRO1659
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0722/01 1331036
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121036Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0790
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0209
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000722 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/CC 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO AU SU ASEC CD UNSC
SUBJECT: RESPONDING MORE EFFECTIVELY ON SOFA VIOLATIONS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 691 
 
¶B. KHARTOUM 710 
¶C. KHARTOUM 716 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Responding to reports of GOS aerial bombardments 
in North Darfur (ref A), the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) opened 
investigations into the attacks on Um Sidir, Shegag Karo and Ein 
Bissaro.  Although these investigations are ongoing, initial reports 
confirm that the attacks did occur and that they resulted in 
considerable damage and loss of life.  UNAMID has been hamstrung by 
its own lack of capacity in its ability to respond, but it is not 
only lack of helicopters that prevents the peacekeeping operation 
from doing its job - it is also the Government of Sudan (GoS), 
which, on May 5, refused to let UNAMID fly to Shegeg Karo, the site 
of the worst attacks.  This refusal constitutes a violation of the 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed by UNAMID and the GoS, yet 
UNAMID leadership, fearing the PNG fate that has befallen others 
such as former UNMIS SRSG Jan Pronk, has remained close-lipped about 
the violations.  This silence handicaps the UNAMID military, which 
admits it has no plan for a response to the bombings.  This silence 
also leaves the door open for the GoS to continue to act with 
impunity, which can be expected given the brazen JEM rebel attack on 
Khartoum.  GOS officials have already claimed that the North Darfur 
bombings were targeted at the same group of JEM fighters who 
attacked Khartoum and this accusation makes sense.  They claim to 
have tracked JEM from the Chad border, but lost track of the JEM 
column as it headed across the vast sandy abyss toward Khartoum.  In 
the interests of mitigating the carnage, the US must push hard for 
UNAMID to investigate and condemn SAF military actions, but this 
goes both ways, and the US must push UNAMID to investigate and 
condemn rebel military actions as well - including the JEM attack on 
Khartoum, which also resulted in civilian casualties. END SUMMARY. 
 
----------- 
SHEGEG KARO 
----------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) A CFC team that visited Shegag Karo on May 8 found that 
three bombs, centered around the marketplace, had hit the village in 
a May 4 attack [NOTE: A civilian member of the team noted separately 
that four craters were observed, one approximately 1.5 meters deep. 
END NOTE].  The market was completely destroyed and a water point 
had evidently also been targeted; the carcass of a camel was 
observed in the area where the strike took place. One team member 
reported seeing 30 shrapnel rounds, head scarves covered with blood 
and "human tissue" hanging from damaged trees.  Notably, the team 
confirmed that contrary to news reports and local rebel propaganda, 
no schools had been hit. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The CFC team divided into two groups to conduct interviews, 
and the two teams received conflicting information on the incident. 
One team member reported that 11 people were killed in the attack, 
with five who died 24 hours after the bombing.  Armed rebel groups 
on the ground had reported casualties upwards of 19, but the UNAMID 
Humanitarian Liaison assessed the Sudan donors' conference in Oslo, 
attended by Joint Special Representative Adada, was the catalyst for 
inflated figures to garner media attention.  Local villagers showed 
the CFC team three fresh graves, which they claimed contained the 
bodies of eight people.  The team estimated that there were likely 
four to six injuries. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a violation of the Status of Forces Agreement signed in 
February by the GoS and UNAMID, the GoS did not clear a UNAMID 
emergency flight to Shegag Karo on May 5 to evacuate the wounded, 
which could explain reports from villagers that several casualties 
had been transported across the border to Bahai, Chad, for 
treatment. [NOTE: This information has not been confirmed by 
organizations on the ground in Bahai.  END NOTE].  The flight was 
subsequently cleared on May 6, but by the time ICRC got a surgery 
team on the ground to meet with what it expected to be a high number 
of wounded, it found only four people in need of treatment.  ICRC 
speculated that others with injuries may have already moved to other 
locations. 
 
----------- 
EIN BISSARO 
----------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) CFC Acting Chief of Staff said that he had tasked the 
Sector North sub-CFC team to investigate reported May 4 attacks in 
Ein Bissaro (150 km east of Malha in North Darfur), attacks 
subsequently confirmed by the Joint Operations Center.  A first 
attempt by UNAMID to reach victims in the area proved unsuccessful 
when it was established that the wounded were in a location for 
which UNAMID had neither the UNDSS clearance nor the fuel to fly. 
The second mission was aborted, however, when GoS officials denied 
clearance for the team to enter the area due to insecurity from 
 
KHARTOUM 00000722  002 OF 002 
 
 
fighting between JEM and other factions on the ground.  UNDSS 
reported that the newer, richer and stronger Chadian-supported JEM 
rebels are trying to convert smaller factions to its ranks, 
including SLA/Unity and URF, both of whom were still on the fence as 
to whether or not to join.  On May 7 UNDSS reported that it had been 
waiting for clearance from the GoS Division Commander in El Fasher 
to gain access the victims but that the Division Commander had 
balked, saying those wounded were combatants, like the two arrested 
after the Um Sidir bombing (ref A).  It was unclear when the team 
would make another attempt to reach Ein Bissaro.  A medical 
evacuation planned by UNICEF with air support from the UN 
Humanitarian Air Service has not taken place. 
 
-------- 
UM SIDIR 
-------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) CFC officials told fieldoffs on May 8 that a CFC team had 
visited Um Sidir (northeast of Kutum in North Darfur and in Sudan 
Liberation Army/Unity territory), and confirmed that three bombs 
appeared to have hit the village during a May 1 attack.  Two people 
were killed in the attacks, and between six and eight others 
injured, two reportedly seriously.  The casualties were all civilian 
herders who had been guarding a water tank, where one of the bombs 
fell.  The CFC team reported seeing livestock carcasses, including 
sheep and donkeys, littering the scene.  Residents claimed that the 
proximity of the bomb to the water reservoir had polluted their 
drinking supply. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Per ref A, there has been no word on the two individuals 
evacuated from Um Sidir and brought to El Fasher who were arrested 
by GoS Security for being "combatants."  UNAMID Human Rights and 
ICRC are following these cases, and UNAMID is requesting that UN 
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) officers be on site when 
flights carrying war-wounded arrive in El Fasher in order to witness 
and report such arrests. 
 
-------------------------- 
COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: It is not UNAMID's fault that the peacekeeping 
operation cannot respond to these bombings.  The Deputy Force 
Commander and the Chief of Staff acknowledge UNAMID's logistical 
shortcomings (including tactical military helicopters) that prevent 
it from having a quick reaction capability for events such as these 
North Darfur attacks.  The Force Commander has twice said that he 
will not direct the mission to react to every incident received on a 
daily basis and has urged flexibility in his deployment plan to cope 
with UNAMID's missing assets.  However, the Deputy Force Commander 
also acknowledges that "there is no plan" to address the bombings or 
to classify them as SOFA violations, largely because there is no 
political will among UNAMID leadership to do so, given the fear of 
the GoS' declaring them persona non grata, as it did former UNMIS 
SRSG Jan Pronk.  Joint Special Representative (JSR) Adada's own 
staffers have admitted that he will never speak out publicly against 
the violations because "he prefers the path of least resistance." 
 
¶9. (SBU) Recommendation: Given the likelihood of more bombings 
following JEM's brazen attack on Khartoum, post recommends that USUN 
take advantage of JSR Adada's presence in New York during the week 
of May 12 to demarche him privately on the need to call out the GoS 
on its SOFA violations, and to be more aggressive in investigating 
both SAF and rebel military actions, especially when they result in 
loss of civilian lives.  The JSR useful could engage the GoS 
privately at first (to avoid the pitfalls of Pronk's blogging 
criticisms), then include his findings in the briefing on the 
Secretary-General's 30-day report to the Security Council.  But 
again, to be balanced and accepted by the GOS, it must include 
specific language about rebel actions as well.  Once these findings 
are then briefed to the Council, it will be up to the UNSC to 
determine subsequent action. 
 
FERNANDEZ