VZCZCXRO1524
PP RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0720/01 1330848
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120848Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0786
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000720 
 
FOR SE WILLIAMSON AND AF/SPG 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EAID SOCI KPKO SU
SUBJECT: ORPHANS OF THE CPA - SUDAN'S NUBA MOUNTAINS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 630 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  One of Sudan's "Three Areas," the Nuba Mountains 
region of South Kordofan state hosts SPLA enclaves north of the 1956 
dividing line between north and south Sudan.  According to a 
high-ranking SPLM and GNU official who hails from the area, the 
region continues to host 16,000-17,000 SPLA troops and the SPLM acts 
as the de facto government, in the absence of any support from South 
Kordofan state, the GNU in Khartoum, or even the GoSS in Juba. 
Without the option of voting in the 2011 referendum, the local 
population prefers a unified Sudan, but it remains an open and 
troubling question how they will respond if, as expected, the South 
votes for independence and they find themselves stranded north of 
the border.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On May 7, Emboffs met with Ismail Khamis Jallab, an SPLM 
member of the Government of National Unity (as State Minister of 
nimal Resources) and former Brigadier General in the Sudan Peoples 
Liberation Army (SPLA).  A native of the Nuba Mountains region of 
South Kordofan, Jallab served there during the civil war and was 
later the SPLM-appointed governor of South Kordofan state.  (Note. 
Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the South Kordofan 
state government rotates between the SPLM and the NCP.  Currently, 
the NCP controls the South Kordofan government.  End note.)  Jallab 
provided several useful insights into the situation in his native 
region. 
 
SPLM Enclave in the North 
------------------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) Jallab noted that during the civil war, Nuba Mountains was 
one of three SPLA strongholds (along with Abyei and southern Blue 
Nile state) north of the 1956 border, collectively referred to as 
the "Three Areas."  The 2005 CPA specified actions to be taken to 
resolve the conflicts in these regions.  While the CPA provides that 
Abyei will participate in the 2011 referendum on Southern 
independence, neither the Nuba Mountains nor Blue Nile state have 
that option, and are to remain part of Sudan whatever the 
referendum's outcome. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Although technically situated in South Kordofan, Jallab 
said that residents of the Nuba Mountains do not receive government 
services from the NCP-controlled state government.  Neither are they 
supported by the Government of South Sudan in Juba, leaving the 
local SPLM/SPLA as the de facto local administration.  Jallab 
confirmed that these areas are essentially administered by the SPLM, 
secured by the SPLA, and that services are provided primarily by 
INGOs.  (Note:  This corresponds with the observations that a USAID 
officer made during a recent visit to the region (reftel).  End 
note.) 
 
Significant SPLA Presence North of the Border 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶5.  (SBU) According to the CPA, SAF forces are to withdraw to the 
north and SPLA forces to south of the 1956 border.  However, Jallab 
estimated that 16,000 - 17,000 SPLA troops remain in the Nuba 
Mountains region.  (Note:  This number is close to the estimated 
total number of Darfur rebels.  End note.)  Of these, 13,000 - 
14,000 are regular SPLA, while an additional 3,000 SPLA are enrolled 
in the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) established under the CPA. 
These soldiers are natives of the area, according to Jallab, and 
thus unwilling to leave their homes and withdraw south if the South 
voted for secession in 2011.  According to Jallab, a complicating 
factor is the failure so far to implement DDR, which has made it 
difficult for many long-time SPLA soldiers to transition back to 
civilian life.  Jallab confirmed that there also are SPLA units 
north of the Nuba Mountains that he said will withdraw to the south 
once the border is officially demarcated. 
 
Support for a Unified Sudan 
--------------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU) Jallab confirmed that the population of the Nuba Mountains 
strongly supports keeping Sudan united.  Given that South Kordofan 
does not have option to vote to join the South should it vote for 
independence in 2011, the alternative is to find itself cutoff in 
the North.  The Nuba people are a natural constituency for the SPLM, 
inspired by John Garang's vision of a united "New Sudan" and the 
region will vote in support of the SPLM in the 2009 elections with 
that in mind.  According to Jallab, support for unity is very strong 
among the SPLM north of the 1956 border, but less so in the South, 
where many instead look forward to the 2011 referendum as the 
opportunity to attain southern independence.  What will be the 
response among the SPLM in the Nuba Mountains should Southerners 
vote for independence in 2011 is open to speculation.  Jallab 
demurred when asked to predict what the Nuba would do if the South 
secedes.  Instead, Jallab focused on the fact that many in the SPLM 
(including President Salva Kiir, he claimed) is still for the unity 
 
KHARTOUM 00000720  002 OF 002 
 
 
if Sudan.  Jallab said that he and all other northern members 
(including powerful members such as Deputy SG for the Northern 
Sector Yasir Arman, GNU Presidential Advisor Mansour Khalid, and 
Blue Nile Governor Malik Agar) of the SPLM would strongly support 
Kiir at the SPLM convention this week since he is for unity. 
Optimistically, Jallab predicted that one of the outcomes of the 
SPLM convention would be a confirmation that the SPLM party as a 
whole is for the unity of Sudan. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶7.  (SBU) The Nuba Mountains draws far less public attention than 
does nearby Abyei, and lacks a dynamic leader like Blue Nile's Malik 
Agar, but it clearly has the potential to become a major flashpoint 
sometime in the future given the uncertain status of its 
inhabitants.  The lingering presence of many SPLA soldiers and the 
lack of an established government that can provide public services 
are ingredients for conflict.  Likewise, that the region may be left 
unwillingly in the North if the South decides to secede in 2011 
provides a dangerous potential source of renewed conflict. 
 
FERNANDEZ