VZCZCXRO1520
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0718/01 1330846
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120846Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0783
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000718 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NCP "AFRAID OF ITSELF" IN JEM INCURSION INTRIGUE 
 
¶1. (SBU) The day of the JEM attack on Omdurman May 10, on the 
margins of party discussions in preparation for the second SPLM 
General Conference, CDA Fernandez caught up with party leaders to 
discuss fears and intrigue in Khartoum caused by reports of the 
(then rumored) attack by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led 
by Darfur rebel Khalil Ibrahim and related issues. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The SPLM were highly amused by the NCP's unusual discomfort 
at the thought of a JEM attack deep inside Sudan. FM Deng Alor told 
CDA that what really concerns the NCP is not so much Khalil but "the 
enemy within. They are afraid of themselves" and worry that Ibrahim 
could have allies inside Khartoum from the large Darfuri community 
in the capital, the tight-knit network of Zaghawa merchants and 
traders in Omdurman who are part of the livestock trade, or even 
worse, among the NCP and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). "There are 
factions within the NCP and SAF who may still have a relationship 
with JEM," he noted "and the NCP leadership fears that Khalil would 
not have attempted this without a fifth column." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Alor noted that FVP Salva Kiir had been called by VP Ali 
Osman Taha early on the morning of May 10  to come to Khartoum "to 
take over defense of the area" as acting President in the absence of 
President Al-Bashir who is on an unannounced visit to Saudi Arabia 
(due to return later on May 10).  Taha had also requested that a 
joint SPLA-SAF Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) should be used in a 
possible defense of the capital. Incredibly, he added that the SPLA 
might want to move their more mobile units north from Unity and 
Upper Nile states to assist in the defense. Jonglei State Governor 
Kuol Manyang, a daring former SPLA commander, laughed that the SPLA 
should move into Kosti in White Nile state (a traditional military 
marshalling area for invading the South) in preparation for "helping 
our brothers in the North." 
 
¶4. (SBU) SPLM Abyei rep Edward Lino gleefully chimed in expecting 
that the NCP's former patron Dr. Hassan al-Turabi could be arrested 
at any time (Al-Turabi - who was in fact arrested May 12 as reported 
septel - has claimed for several years now to have no relations with 
his erstwhile protege, Khalil Ibrahim). Alor retorted "he may be 
arrested, or he could be the one arresting them!"  The consensus of 
these seasoned adversaries of the NCP was that nothing scares the 
usually disciplined NCP as much as internal division and infighting 
and that, even if this threat is exaggerated or blunted, there is a 
certain level of dissatisfaction within the region who feel that the 
NCP is either too corrupt, too Islamist or not Islamist enough, too 
soft towards the Americans or too tough on the Darfuris and that 
Al-Bashir is allowing Sudan and the regime to slowly drift towards 
the abyss.  The SPLMers, who admitted to being in contact with 
Chadian President Deby, claimed that the Chadians are indeed helping 
Ibrahim but "this is not a foreign invasion, these are Sudanese." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Eventually changing the subject after much laughter at the 
NCP's expense, Alor said that the NCP had still made another interim 
solution proposal for the disputed region of Abyei which excluded 
Meiram, Nyama and Heglig. While the SPLM is willing to exclude the 
all-Arab area of Meiram, they want the two other areas for the South 
and the latest proposal will be rejected. Kiir himself has decided 
that if Abyei is not solved in the next round of US-Sudanese talks 
to the SPLM's satisfaction, they will have nothing more to do with 
this initiative to improve relations between the U.S. and NCP. CDA 
Fernandez responded that the USG sees fulfillment of the CPA, 
especially the Abyei Protocol, as an essential element of a possible 
improvement in Sudanese-American relations.  The exclusion of 
oil-rich Heglig was a deal-breaker for the SPLM in earlier 
discussions. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In an earlier meeting with acting CG Tariot,  SPLA Deputy 
Chief of Staff BG Salva Mathok thought that JEM could not 
successfully threaten the capital "unless they have support from the 
inside." Mathok, a former SAF officer who maintains ties with 
recently purged officers from the Northern military, described the 
potential JEM threat as a case of chickens coming home to roost. He 
thought Al-Turabi will be arrested within the coming days (which 
turned out to be correct - but after the JEM attack) as a 
precautionary measure.  Mathok emphasized that SAF is becoming 
increasingly factionalized, not along tribal lines but along 
political factional divisions. "There is a feeling by some that 
Al-Bashir is not doing enough to preserve the regime's status and 
that others could better represent their interests." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Mathok said that as a precaution, the SPLA had placed its 
forces on stand-by alert along the South Darfur and South Kordofan 
borders.  GOSS President Kiir directed the action, noting to Mathok 
that while the SAF must fight their own problems alone "we need to 
be prepared in case JEM is chased southward."  Mathok emphasized 
that currently the SPLA intended to remain neutral but anyone who 
vanquished the NCP must also recognize "SPLA superiority."  He added 
 
KHARTOUM 00000718  002 OF 002 
 
 
that the JEM force was too small to account for the unease evinced 
publicly by Khartoum. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: The SPLM's glee at the NCP's fears was a welcome 
respite to the usual concern about a monotholic North seeking to 
crush the plucky but outnumbered South. Alor and company were 
absolutely right that Ibrahim's Zaghawa raiders alone could not 
really threaten the regime, and ultimately the JEM incursion was 
defeated quickly.  However, this attack led by the cagey Islamist 
(and former NIF hardliner) Khalil Ibrahim, combined with former NIF 
founder Hassan al Turabi, and possibly joined by disaffected members 
of the regime - if they really exist - is a clear danger to the NCP 
and the arrest of Turabi May 12 proves this point (septel).  Whether 
a paranoid Khartoum is actually in danger over the longer term 
remains to be seen - Embassy Khartoum will offer its analysis of the 
regime's options and likely response over the coming days. 
Meanwhile the SPLM will watch and wait, for once feeling relatively 
safe in its southern redoubt. 
 
FERNANDEZ