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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM701, EASTERN SUDAN - IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, IT WOULD BE THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM701 2008-05-07 11:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7307
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0701/01 1281155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071155Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0754
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000701 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN SUDAN - IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, IT WOULD BE THE 
CRISIS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 446 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY: Charge Fernandez traveled to Kassala, in eastern 
Sudan, May 4-5 to meet with local political representatives and tour 
two locations ripe for USAID help: the flood-prone Al Gash River and 
the horrifically rundown Kassala hospital.  This was the first trip 
to Kassala by a U.S. chief of mission in years.  As noted in reftel, 
there continue to be loud rumblings of discontent and renewed talks 
of war among members of the Eastern Front.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) BACKGROUND: The poverty in eastern Sudan is striking, even 
compared to other parts of the country with malnutrition, health and 
education levels worse than war-torn Darfur and undeveloped South 
Sudan.  The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), signed in 2007, is 
often overshadowed by the CPA and the crisis in Darfur.  The 
agreement, signed in Asmara between the Government of Sudan and the 
"Eastern Front" rebel group, promised USD 600 million in development 
over five years, the approximate amount that had been spent on war 
in the east, but little of that has appeared.  END BACKGROUND. 
 
3. (SBU) On May 4, Charge Fernandez began his visit to Kassala by 
meeting with Mohamed Salih Abid, the deputy governor of Kassala 
State and the State Minister of Health and Ali Awad Mohamed Musa, 
State Minister of Finance.  Abid immediately noted that "90 percent 
of the ESPA" has been implemented, and that USD 35 million of the 
East Construction Fund will soon to be awarded for building schools 
and medical centers. 
 
4. (SBU) Next up was the meeting with the local NCP representatives, 
Zohair Abu Sin and Ali Awad Mohamed Musa, Chair of the Consultation 
Council.  Abu Sin and Musa reiterated the NCP's "commitment to fully 
implement all peace agreements" and said their party had "no benefit 
or interest being an enemy of the U.S." 
 
5. (SBU) As expected, this meeting with the NCP contrasted sharply 
with the Charge's next two meetings, with the local DUP and SPLM 
representatives.  Mohamed Medani, Chair of the SPLM for Kassala 
State, and Mustafa Hassan Mustafa, Minister of Culture and 
Information for Kassala State, said there was "no coordination 
between the NCP and the SPLM" on the rebuilding of the region and 
made specific mention of the NCP's "policy of deception and 
mockery."  "The NCP gave us half a Ministry - only the Minister and 
his car - we are deprived from any resources to deliver services to 
the people."  The SPLM representatives did note, however, that they 
had "excellent relations" with the Eastern Front and voted together 
in local councils but underscored that the NCP had given the Eastern 
Front nominal control while retaining firm control on the region's 
purse strings. A particular complaint is how the NCP has rigged the 
membership of the board that will decide how to spend the chimerical 
600 million dollars in its favor. 
 
6. (SBU) May 4 ended with a meeting with the Eastern Front.  Salah 
Barkwin, the Eastern Front Secretary of Kassala State, was adamant 
about the "real political conflict between the NCP and all the other 
parties."  Also in attendance were other local representatives from 
the Beja Congress and the Free Lions Movement who make up the front: 
"from 1958 (when the Beja Congress was founded) until now, we have 
had the same complaints about poverty and marginalization and 
nothing has really been addressed.  The conditions that have led to 
war in the past are still with us."  Speaking to the urgent need of 
development, the representatives of the Eastern Front focused on the 
basics: health care, education and infrastructure.  (As if on cue, 
the power then cut out and the rest of the meeting was lit by the 
headlights of a truck.) 
 
7. (SBU) Of particular concern to the Eastern Front are the DDR 
concerns of their former fighters. The NCP now says that "the donors 
didn't come up with the money for reintegration" and Khartoum can't 
do anything. "We didn't read the fine print," noted one chagrined 
leader. Rebels who staked everything on a political cause now face a 
future of poverty and marginalization, while their former oppressors 
wax fat on State-sanctioned corruption that is remarkable by 
Sudanese standards. In the former rebel-controlled enclave of Hamesh 
Koreib, the NCP and Sudanese intelligence have reinstalled 
traditional sheikhs with resulting plummeting education rates: one 
percent of girls in the region attend school and 4 percent of boys. 
"What progress we made in liberated zones is erased," one mourned. 
 
8. (SBU) Like the SPLM, the Eastern Front fears it is being "set up" 
to fail by the NCP. It has authority but no real power and no 
resources to deliver a tangible development dividend to desperate 
people. Many of its leaders, both in Khartoum and in the East, feel 
trapped. The Eastern Peace Agreement is indeed being fulfilled but 
it has also not definitively changed the balance of power. Barkwin 
noted to CDA, "we have peace and we are not arrested or prevented 
speaking by the security services, but in the end, is not enough." 
All meetings with political parties were attended by the jovial 
local NISS representative, a level of monitoring not seen even in 
Darfur. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000701  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
9. (U) Beyond the political meetings, the American delegation also 
toured the banks of the Al Gash River, where rising sediment creates 
crippling annual flash floods in a usually parched landscape.  A 
visit to Kassala's teaching hospital was also part of the agenda; a 
very basic, dirty and forlorn facility, it is nonetheless the best 
in the state. Education, flood control, health and creating 
livelihoods dominated the discussion and dialogue between local 
officials and USAID. 
 
10. (SBU) COMMENT: In any other country, the status of Kassala and 
the rest of the east would easily be considered an emergency-level 
humanitarian crisis.  This being Sudan, however, eastern Sudan gets 
only 3rd billing, when it is remembered at all.  Largely ignored by 
the international community but relatively stable, for the moment, 
the region presents a unique opportunity for development.  Done 
quickly and done well, a reinvigorated East could serve as a model 
for the rest of war-torn Sudan. Such support would also have a 
significant political dimension, it would empower former rebels - 
allied with the SPLM - in a much needed electoral and political 
alliance of Sudan's marginalized peoples. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ