VZCZCXRO5495
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0691/01 1261436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051436Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0733
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0199
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000691 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU SU
SUBJECT: GOS BOMBINGS IN NORTH DARFUR 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The last week of April and first week of May 
witnessed a spate of Government of Sudan (GoS) bombings in remote 
parts of North Darfur against rebel positions.  Civilians have been 
the primary victims, sounding alarm bells for the United 
Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which is 
scrambling to determine how best to address the situation. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------- 
THE PLACES HIT 
-------------- 
 
EL-HELIF 
-------- 
¶2. (SBU) According to JEM and UN sources, on April 29 the GoS 
military reportedly bombed for three hours the town of El Helif in 
North Darfur, approximately 135 km north of El Fasher.  The GoS was 
targeting training camps used by Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
rebels.  Due to the remoteness of this location, exact casualty 
figures are unknown, although UNAMID sources indicated that one 
woman was killed.  JEM representatives confirmed this. 
 
UMM SIDIR 
--------- 
¶3. (SBU) According to rebel and UN sources, between April 30 and May 
1 the GoS used Antonov aircraft to bomb the town of Umm Sidir in 
North Darfur, approximately 63 km northeast of Kutum.  Eight 
casualties resulted and were evacuated, in coordination with OCHA 
and ICRC, to El Fasher civilian hospital by two UNAMID helicopters. 
Two of the eight evacuees were detained by GoS forces upon El Fasher 
arrival, as the GoS deemed them to be combatants.  UNAMID 
Humanitarian Liaison Chief had been working to ensure access by 
UNAMID Human Rights and ICRC to these individuals, but as of May 4, 
the GoS denied such access, citing preoccupation with a visiting 
Japanese delegation to El Fasher as the reason behind its refusal 
(the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister came to El Fasher to discuss 
with the Force Commander UNAMID deployment and challenges).  UNAMID 
expects that the other victims will be similarly detained once they 
are released from the hospital. 
 
AIN BISHARO AND SHEGAG KARO 
--------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Beginning at 0830 on May 4 in the North Darfur town of Ain 
Bisharo, 350 km northeast of El Fasher and 150 km east of Malha, the 
GoS again conducted an aerial bombardment using white fixed wing 
Sudan Armed Forces aircraft from El Obeid.  According to reports by 
Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) sources in the area, 
three children of the same family were killed, with a fourth wounded 
and in critical condition.  The injured boy, aged eight, was 
reportedly transported to the UNAMID military site in Malha, North 
Darfur, and was awaiting May 5 evacuation to El Fasher.  UNAMID 
sources later reported that 14 had been killed in the attack, 
including the three children and two women. 
 
¶5. (SBU) More serious reports of casualties came in at 1730 on May 4 
following an alleged SAF bombing in Shegeg Karo, about 50km north of 
Umm Baru in North Darfur.  According to unconfirmed reports from 
UNAMID military reps, ten were killed and between 10-16 injured. 
UNAMID Humanitarian Liaison officer told FieldOff on May 5 that 29 
had been injured, 19 of whom required medical evacuation to El 
Fasher, which ICRC would lead, using UNAMID helicopters, on May 5. 
An ICRC team would be dispatched on May 6 to attend to the other 10 
wounded on the ground. 
 
HATTAN, EL HARA, JEBEL EISA 
--------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) Other areas in remote parts of North Darfur, including 
Hattan, El Hara and Jebel Eisa, experienced similar bombings during 
the time period between April 29 and May 3, with no concrete 
casualty figures due to the lack of international (or even GoS) 
presence in those regions. 
 
 
----------------------- 
THE COMMON DENOMINATORS 
----------------------- 
 
REMOTE LOCATIONS 
---------------- 
¶7. (SBU) It is not by accident that these areas in North Darfur have 
lately become targets for the GoS (which, sources indicate, 
vehemently deny any involvement in these incidents).  Their remote 
desert locations and the absence of any international presence, 
including UNAMID, are contributing factors.  Eyewitness reports by 
victims are the only source of information. 
 
MEDOB TRIBESMEMBERS 
 
KHARTOUM 00000691  002 OF 002 
 
 
------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) The areas bombed, in particular Ain Bisharo, Hattan, El 
Hara and Jebel Eisa, are all predominantly inhabited by members of 
the African Medob tribe.  SLA/MM representatives claimed to FieldOff 
that such targeting constituted "ethnic cleansing," as the GoS wants 
to clear North Darfur of the Medob, starting from the Chad-Sudan 
border and spreading eastward through Jebel Moun into Umm Sidir and 
all the way to An Bisharo.  The SLA/MM reps warned that violence 
begets violence, and in the absence of a concerted international 
response to this trend, "must we become terrorists to deal with 
it?" 
 
REBEL ROUTING 
------------- 
¶9. (SBU) The most likely explanation for this spate of GoS bombings 
across this swath of North Darfur relates to the recent tendency of 
rebel movements in this area, particularly among SLA factions, to 
unite against the GoS.  This region is home to Suleiman Marjan, the 
SLA commander for North Darfur (himself a Medob as well), who has 
reportedly begun to mobilize citizens against the census.  Such 
instigation provides the GoS with a convenient excuse to send a 
warning to Marjan, although not for his anti-census activities. 
Marjan has been involved in efforts to consolidate SLA/Abdelwahid 
and SLA/Unity in this region.  As SLA/MM reps pointed out, "Tragedy 
unites," and they expected movements in the region to unite against 
the GoS' latest aerial activity. 
 
---------------------------- 
UNAMID SCRAMBLING TO RESPOND 
---------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) Initially there was no solid confirmation of the bombings 
and therefore the GOS has received little public criticism. 
However, now that there is multiple-source confirmation, the USG 
needs to condemn these acts and point out to the GOS that this is 
not in keeping with our bilateral discussions.  Post suggests that 
the Department make a statement condemning the bombings and 
especially noting the fact that there were civilian casualties. 
Post also suggests that the Department call in the Sudanese Charge 
d'Affaires to inform him that these actions are not acceptable and 
risk derailing our bilateral discussions. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) These events underscore the need for UNAMID to find an 
effective way to monitor the ceasefire.  UNAMID military is often 
the last to know of the details of these incidents and has 
accordingly been slow to respond.  As of May 5, the Ceasefire 
Commission (CFC) has been activated to investigate, but as of 1730 
on May 4, some of its members had not been made aware of either the 
Ain Bisharo or Shegag Karo incidents.  Investigating these bombings 
provides   an opportunity for the CFC to get back to work, and for 
UNAMID, in whatever monitoring capacity, to be seen by civilian 
populations as carrying out its mission.  Moreover, the UN and the 
international community must remind the GOS that regardless of the 
actions of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, the GoS 
is still bound by the DPA ceasefire mechanisms and should 
accordingly be held accountable for violations. 
 
FERNANDEZ