VZCZCXRO5090
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0683/01 1260802
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050802Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0722
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0197
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000683 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: INCONSISTENCIES FORCE AGWAI TO CHANGE HIS UNAMID 
PRIORITIES 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 650 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai lamented in a May 2 conversation 
with FieldOff that "inconsistencies are forcing me to change my 
priorities" with regard to UNAMID deployment, as articulated reftel. 
 The most damaging of these inconsistencies from Agwai's perspective 
is UN Headquarters' preoccupation with numbers versus quality of 
incoming troops to the mission.  Equally deleterious in Agwai's 
opinion is the current tendency of troop-contributing countries to 
pick and choose how and where to deploy.  Agwai assessed that if the 
trend currently exhibited by the Egyptians and the Ethiopians on 
deployment of their second battalions continues, "then this mission 
will be ineffective."  It may be too late to do anything about the 
Egyptian and Ethiopian deployment, but it is not too late to ensure 
that this practice does not happen again.  We need to deliver the 
message to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that even if he refuses to 
listen to his DPKO advisers in New York, he cannot ignore his Force 
Commander on the ground.  END SUMMARY. 
 
"THERE ARE FACTORS BEYOND MY CONTROL" 
------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) In a sobering two-hour meeting with FieldOff on May 2, 
United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Force 
Commander (FC) Agwai admitted that as much as he tried to stop them, 
inconsistencies in deployment expectations and practices were 
forcing him to re-evaluate his priorities for UNAMID deployment, as 
reported reftel.  In particular Agwai singled out the focus by the 
UN, especially the Secretary-General (SYG), and the international 
community on quantity instead of "quality and capacities" for 
incoming troops to the mission.  Agwai reiterated the message he 
delivered to the Security Council on April 22, that the focus should 
be on boosting the capacity of the ten existing UNAMID battalions 
and of the existing camps to accommodate them.  He noted that 
current efforts seemed geared towards giving resources to additional 
battalions which, if brought in, would exceed the troop ceiling 
allowed under UNSCR 1769. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Agwai also lamented the focus on the issue of 
self-sustainability of incoming troops.  He noted that except for 
the current Nigerian battalion rotating (NIBATT 1), all previous 
UNAMID rotations in the recent past have been of AMIS troops, which, 
he pointed out, have never been and which are not now 
self-sustaining.  "These inconsistencies," he stated, "are forcing 
me to change my priorities."  The FC said he no longer knew what 
battalion was arriving when or at what force strength level. 
UNAMID's inability to receive 800-man battalions was due, in Agwai's 
estimation, to the absence of the Heavy Support Package of engineers 
and other assets meant to lay the groundwork for expanded 
battalions.  "Where is the Dutch Level II hospital in El Fasher?" 
Agwai demanded.  "And where is the Pakistani Level III hospital in 
Nyala?" [NOTE: These are both valid questions; the only talk of 
field hospitals has been of the incoming Nigerian Level II.  END 
NOTE]. 
 
¶4. (SBU) FieldOff pointed out that Department of Field Support 
Under-Secretary-General Jane Holl Lute, even after her visit to 
Darfur, had herself been pushing numbers into Darfur, saying that 
she expected 15,000 troops on the ground by December 31.XQK&Q3noted that Holl Lute "has always qualified this statement" and 
conditioned it on "many ifs" - namely, if there are air 
capabilities, if there is accommodation and if supply roads are 
maintained. 
 
NUMBERS OBSESSION CAUSING BAD DECISIONS ON TCCS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶5. (SBU) FC Agwai blamed the "numbers obsession" for SYG Ban's 
decision, against the advice of Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations Under-Secretary-General Guhenno, to accept a second 
Egyptian battalion for UNAMID.  "I don't know what I am going to do 
with this battalion," Agwai admitted, since Egypt refuses to split 
it into companies to deploy to Shangil Tobaye and to Um Kadada, per 
Agwai's initial deployment plan, so it will now be8XQ{Q}{ flimsy promise that its forces would patrol to Silea.  Agwai 
insisted there was "no way to change Ethiopia's mind" on this point, 
adding that all he could do in response was to remind the Ethiopian 
Defense Minister that the Ethiopian battalion would have an area of 
responsibility to dominate and that how it chose to do so would be 
up to the Commanding Officer. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Agwai noted that Ethiopia also planned to send a Brigadier 
General with its battalion, based on the MOU it struck in New York 
with UN Headquarters.  Agwai said that there was no place at the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000683  002 OF 002 
 
 
moment for this BG but that Ethiopia was content to let him idle in 
the mission until a job was created for him.  He confided that a 
competition had already begun between Ethiopia and Egypt, given 
their relatively equal number of contributions to UNAMID, for slots 
as Sector Commander or for Chief of Staff.  Because these two TCCs 
can produce enough troops (though of questionable quality) to 
satisfy New York's number obsession, they are deemed acceptable. 
Meanwhile Senegal has sent only quality troops, though not a great 
quantity of them, and will accordingly lose the battle for mission 
leadership.  "If this practice continues," Agwai declared, "this 
mission will be ineffective." 
 
¶7. (SBU) "My major concern," said Agwai, "is that other TCCs will 
now start picking and choosing where they want to deploy."  He 
lamented that UNAMID military leadership lacked the freedom and 
autonomy to move troops to where it needs them, as was his 
experience under UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone.  He explained that Force 
Generation in New York was too wedded to a classical troop-to-task 
model of peacekeeping to be able to provide UNAMID with the 
necessary mobility. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶8. (SBU) It is a sad state of affairs when the commanding officer of 
a peacekeeping mission cannot have the last word on how to deploy 
the troops committed to his charge and when he is forced to change 
his mission priorities accordingly.  Agwai has a proven track record 
in UN peacekeeping missions, as well as in the Nigerian armed 
forces, and he has a stated commitment to seeing through the bulk of 
UNAMID deployment (he told FieldOff that despite some second 
thoughts in late 2007, he has no plans to leave UNAMID before 2009). 
 Nonetheless, Agwai's decision-making authority is being usurped the 
SYG's political expediency considerations in New York.  Agwai's 
hands are further tied by a Department of Field Support (DFS) that 
has been making promises it cannot keep since the Heavy Support 
Package.  While we understand the need to support the SYG in getting 
boots on the ground, an equally important objective is ensuring that 
UNAMID is an effective peacekeeping force with quality troops in the 
right places.   Post again suggests that USUN intercede to ensure 
that the SYG respects the Force Commander's ability to make military 
decisions and that the SYG does not makes any more deals on TCCs 
that give them vetting rights over deployment options, per ref B 
recommendation.  We must also take DFS to task on unanswered 
deployment questions, particularly with regard to outstanding 
enabling assets. 
FERNANDEZ