VZCZCXRO3083
RR RUEHBW RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1280 1471240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261240Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4104
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS KABUL 001280 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: MUSA QALA POLITICAL UPDATE: MULLAH SALAM'S LEADERSHIP 
WAVERING 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Efforts to improve governance capacity in the 
northern Helmand town of Musa Qala face mounting challenges. 
District administrator Mullah Salam increasingly clashes with the 
local Afghan security leadership, and area residents have publicly 
expressed frustration at his leadership style.  The District Shura 
is demanding salaries for their service and most have returned to 
Lashkar Gah.  The Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) are maintaining order within the town, but the 
May 17 attack on the governor's helicopter (septel) and a suicide 
attack on a police checkpoint openly increased tensions between 
security forces and Salam.  Increased involvement from the 
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) is needed soon 
to improve the situation in Musa Qala.  The district remains 
important as a symbol to Helmand's Pashtuns of the Karzai 
government's willingness and ability to earn their trust and their 
support in the struggle against a resurgent Taliban. 
 
Musa Qala Politics 
------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) Mullah Salam continues to dominate security, governance and 
development activities in Musa Qala; however, he is clerly 
politically weaker than just a few months ago.  His long absence in 
Kabul distanced him from city residents, and his refusal to control 
his private militia, which includes his son, has angered many 
people.  On May 20, 50 people from Shah Kariz, Salam's home village, 
gathered outside Musa Qala and demonstrated against his militia, 
accusing them of illegal tax collection and unlawful land seizures. 
When elders presented a letter stating their grievances, Salam 
refused to see them and instead sent his son.  This only angered the 
group and eventually ANA Colonel Riahimi stepped forward, listened 
to the group and defused the situation.  Salam was incensed that 
Riahimi interfered in his affairs, and threatened to call the 
Defense Minister to have him removed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Salam's rift with the security forces was already 
aggravated after the attack on Governor Mangal's helicopter on May 
17, and a suicide bombing at an ANP checkpoint the following day. 
Salam held the district ANP Chief, Commander Koka, and the local 
state security officials accountable for the attacks, saying they 
could have done more to prevent them.  Salam is convinced the 
suicide attack was meant for him and insists he needs more men and 
equipment for his protection.  His growing interference in security 
isses angers Koka and complicates UK efforts to mentor the Afghan 
police and army. 
 
IDLG Required 
------------- 
¶4. (SBU) A mounting problem is the absence of most of the Musa Qala 
Shura.  They are upset they are not being paid and want the IDLG to 
send a representative to discuss appropriate compensation for their 
services.  Haji Zahir, the Shura's deputy, remains in the city and 
continues to work well with the UK-led PRT's security and 
stabilization officers.  However, without the assistance of the 
other Shura members, he is unable to coordinate development 
activities and manage Salam's interaction with the public.  PRT 
officers in Musa Qala believe IDLG should decide on the future role 
and responsibilities of the Shura and offer sufficient compensation 
to bring them back to the city.  The Shura would then be available 
to support governance and development and to encourage Salam to 
improve his relationship with the public. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Salm has become more difficult to work with, and hs once 
good relationship with the public is filing.  The absence of the 
Shura and lack of involvement by IDLG have removed important checks 
on Salam's actions.  He increasingly relies on his own men, 
regardless of the consequences.  It appears that Governor Mangal or 
the IDLG will need to engage Salam and encourage him to focus on 
district management and public relations. 
 
WOOD