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Viewing cable 08KABUL1223, UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR TAKES AIM AT THE COALITION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL1223 2008-05-19 14:00 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXYZ0049
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #1223/01 1401400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191400Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3963
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS KABUL 001223 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, PRM 
PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PREL AF
SUBJECT: UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR TAKES AIM AT THE COALITION 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY:  Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, concluded a 12-day 
fact-finding visit to Afghanistan May 15.  The main themes of his 
preliminary report are:  increasing the transparency of 
international military forces' investigations of collateral casualty 
incidents; increasing the accountability of "campaign forces" 
responsible to intelligence agencies; reforming the Afghan police 
and the judicial system; curbing Taliban and other anti-government 
elements' abuses; and addressing the often-overlooked extrajudicial 
killing of women.  His final report will be released several months 
from now, after it is sent to the IRoA for comment and to the UN. 
 
Preliminary Report Summary 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Alston's preliminary report notes no evidence that 
international forces commit widespread intentional extra-judicial 
killings.  He confirms international forces' efforts to respect 
international human rights and humanitarian law.  He focuses on 
accountability and transparency issues surrounding the estimated 200 
unintentional civilian deaths associated with international forces' 
military operations in 2008.  Alston complains that the many 
distinct chains of command, the continual rotation of troops and 
commanders, and the fact that prosecuting crimes of individual 
soldiers is the responsibility of their home country leads to a 
complicated, opaque system in which ordinary Afghans have little 
hope of identifying who may have killed an innocent family member. 
No one in Afghanistan, either at ISAF or in the government, tracks 
the outcome of investigations and prosecutions.  Lack of 
accountability is especially pronounced, according to Alston, with 
regard to "campaign forces," which, he says, appear to be controlled 
by foreign intelligence services. 
 
3. (U) The police are the face of the government to the people, 
Alston argues; therefore, legitimacy of the government depends on 
their behavior.  Because the police are often drawn predominantly 
from one tribe, they tend to act to promote the interests of their 
kin at the expense of competing tribes.  No one in the government 
has any interest in investigating, let alone prosecuting, police 
officers responsible for abuses, Alston charges.  Elders in the 
south repeatedly told Alston that police abuses are causing people 
to support the Taliban.  Senior IRoA and international officials 
told Alston that ensuring government security forces' respect for 
basic human rights is prerequisite to ensuring security and 
stability. 
 
4. (U) According to Alston's preliminary report, the criminal 
justice system is deeply flawed with endemic corruption and is 
incapable of ensuring respect for due process rights.  Carrying out 
death sentences on this basis clearly violates international legal 
standards, he says.  The problems in the criminal justice system are 
multiplied exponentially for women.  A roomful of women in Kandahar 
laughed when Alston asked with whom they could lodge a complaint if 
they encountered abuse within the home.  They noted that even 
leaving the home would be difficult and complaining to the police 
would only lead to further punishment and imprisonment for running 
away.  The often overlooked affect of armed conflict on women leads 
to disaster; when men are killed the women left behind are usually 
destitute.  Many women are not even aware of the possibility of 
receiving monetary assistance from government or ISAF for their 
losses.  While honor killings are very common, they are rarely 
reported or investigated. 
 
5. (SBU) Alston's preliminary report charges Taliban attacks on 
military targets with killing hundreds of civilians bystanders 
"unlawfully" in 2008.  He is highly critical of the Taliban's 
targeted assassinations of civilians.  Alston advocates contact 
between human rights actors and insurgents to impress upon the 
latter their responsibility to uphold international human rights 
standards.  He acknowledged privately to us such contact risks 
conferring political legitimacy on the insurgents. 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
--------------------------- 
 
7. (U) International Forces:  Ensure that any directly affected 
person can go to a military base and promptly receive answers to 
such questions as who was responsible for a particular operation and 
what the status is of any investigation or prosecution. 
 
Police:  Recognize that training alone will not prevent abuses that 
are driven by the links between police officers and particular 
tribes, commanders, and politicians.  These links must be broken. 
All efforts to supplement the police by establishing or legitimizing 
local militias should be abandoned.  The police must play both a law 
enforcement and paramilitary role; continued debate on this is 
counterproductive.  Establish a strong national police investigative 
task force.  Strengthen the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission's (AIHRC) investigative powers; impose an obligation on 
the government to respond to AIHRC findings within a set time 
limit. 
 
Judicial Reform:  Establish an independent anti-corruption agency 
and endow it with the necessary powers and resources to prosecute 
important cases at all levels.  Make the criminal justice system 
accessible to women, including through support to initiatives such 
as the Jalalabad and Parwan women's referral centers.  Have the 
Attorney General establish a special office for female victims. 
Treat honor killings as murders. 
 
Taliban and other armed groups:  Serious efforts should be made to 
pressure and persuade the Taliban and other armed groups to respect 
human rights and humanitarian law, even at the risk of conferring 
political legitimacy on them. 
 
8. (U) We expect Alston's nine-page preliminary report to be posted 
on the UN webpage shortly.  Once it is posted we will provide the 
Department with the Internet address. 
 
WOOD