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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018 
TAGS: PGOV EFIN PREL TU
SUBJECT: CHIEF EDITOR SPEAKS CANDIDLY AMIDST NEWSPAPER'S OWNERSHIP CONTROVERSY 
 
REF: A. 07 ANKARA 1006 
     ¶B. ANKARA 0513 
     ¶C. 07 ANKARA 0778 
 
Classified By: Consul General Sharon A. Wiener for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary and comment.  Turkish daily Sabah's editor in 
chief Ergun Babahan conducted a surprisingly candid tour 
d'horizon with the Consul General a day after the 
controversial financing of his new parent company Calik 
Holding's purchase of Turkey's third most circulated 
newspaper came to light.  Babahan spoke frankly about the 
change in ownership, US-Turkey relations and Turkish domestic 
political issues, speculating AKP would ultimately lose the 
closure case against it but would live on as a fragmented 
movement whose followers would ultimately press the country's 
democratization agenda forward after a likely two-year delay. 
 Claiming to be close friends with President Gul, Babahan 
predicted that should PM Erdogan be forced to step down, Gul 
would use his presidential powers to appoint current FM 
Babacan as the new Prime Minister.  Perhaps most strikingly, 
he asserted Turkey would break up over the Kurdish issue 
unless the government began to pay attention to the claims of 
a significant portion of its citizens.  End summary and 
comment. 
 
----------------------- 
In the Eye of the Storm 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Sabah's editor-in-chief Ergun Babahan appeared 
un-fazed as he spoke candidly on April 24 about the 
controversial purchase of his newspaper by Calik Holding (see 
paras. 9-11 for background) and the state of Turkish domestic 
politics with the Consul General, whose call on him 
coincidentally occurred the day after the acquisition's 
financing details came to light.  Babahan expects problems in 
the short term, acknowledging the public perception 
challenges the Calik Group's ties to the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) create for the paper.  The 
"ownership's base doesn't match with the readership base," he 
explained, describing the latter as mostly urban, middle 
class, secular and afraid of AKP and its policies.  Still, 
Babahan believes business interests would trump political 
ties in the long run and doesn't expect the new ownership to 
make changes to the newspaper's staff or editorial policies. 
He was not surprised to learn about Qatar's role in the 
financing, pointing out the Gulf State had expressed interest 
in the Sabah/ATV investment long before Calik Holding won the 
bid. 
 
¶3.  (C) Dismissing reported allegations that the paper had 
already begun demonstrating a pro-government bias while under 
the control of the Turkish Savings Deposit Insurance Fund 
(SDIF), Babahan asserted he had not felt any pressure on his 
editorial policies.  He noted his record as a columnist shows 
he has always supported headscarf liberties and that he is 
not necessarily pro-AKP but rather pro-democracy and against 
military supremacy.  Brandishing Sabah's mainstream 
credentials, Babahan proudly pointed out it had dared to say 
"no" to a military coup following the April 2007 
"e-memorandum" (ref A).  Acknowledging it was true the 
newspaper doesn't criticize the government much, he proffered 
that neither do its competitors.  Hinting at the extreme and 
often bitter competition that characterizes Sabah's 
relationship with its Dogan Group rivals, Babahan argued the 
Dogan media took a largely anti-headscarf stance because it 
"knew what was coming," referring to the AKP closure case 
(ref B). 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked what would happen if the Calik Group tried to 
impose its government ties on Sabah's editorial policy, 
Babahan responded he would try to direct the ownership in the 
right direction.  Pondering the challenge of such a scenario, 
Babahan explained AKP is not very democratic; in Turkey, it 
is not easy to run a party democratically since politicians 
too frequently incur obligations to different organizations 
to support their own interests.  AKP does not know the media 
and feels threatened by it, concluded Babahan.  "In three to 
four months, we'll see if we can make it together (with Calik 
Holding) or not."  Citing the current, volatile, domestic 
political circumstances, he stressed the importance of 
resisting attempts by owners to engage in a press war, as has 
happened in the past, because, "in the end everyone loses." 
 
------------------ 
Democracy on Hold? 
 
ISTANBUL 00000225  002 OF 003 
 
 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Regarding the AKP closure case, Babahan believes the 
Constitutional Court has likely already decided against the 
ruling party.  He expects PM Erdogan and 25 or so other party 
members to be banned from politics but AKP followers would 
succeed in the end, though probably not as a single entity. 
Without Erdogan, AKP's successor would become more democratic 
- and as a result, more populist/nationalistic - but also 
more difficult to keep together.  Other center-right 
alternatives to AKP are in the works, he argued asserting 
that Turkish Chamber of Commerce Chairman Rifat 
Hisarciklioglu and former Prime Minister (now independent 
parliamentarian) Mesut Yilmaz are trying to start new 
parties.  AKP will still control the presidency, and with PM 
Erdogan out of the picture President Gul becomes the most 
powerful figure in Turkey, with the power to appoint a new 
prime minister.  If it comes to this, Babahan believes Gul 
would appoint current Foreign Minister Ali Babacan as PM 
because he would listen to the president, is not corrupt and 
would continue to pursue Turkey's EU membership. 
 
¶6.  (C) Babahan does not expect the AKP to hold early 
Elections in response to the closure case, as some columnists 
have speculated.  If that were their plan, they would hold 
elections immediately but they know they are losing their 
(Fetullah) Gulenist base, which likely blames AKP for 
antagonizing secularists by prematurely pushing through 
headscarf reform.  Babahan wasn't sure who Gulenists would 
support if not AKP, but knew Fetullah Gulen and PM Erdogan do 
not like each other.  Gulen may find it easier to exert his 
influence through different, smaller parties than through a 
Prime Minister who "wants to monopolize power." 
Characterizing Erdogan as no longer Islamist but rather a 
"conservative believer," Babahan thought the two would also 
differ over policy, with Gulen hoping for a more Islamic 
society.  "If you believe in (the literal interpretation of) 
the Koran, you want as a final goal, an Islamic state," 
concluded Babahan. 
 
¶7.  (C) Asked whether the president was more sympathetic to 
Gulen's Islamist views than the Prime Minister, Babahan 
listed his "good friend" Gul's secular credentials: he is the 
most "anti-Iran" political figure in Turkey; he has pushed 
for EU and IMF policies; and he is known to be against the 
madrassa education system.  At the same time, he is a product 
of the Islamic "milli gurus" youth movement, Babahan noted, 
and "sometimes what you believe in youth influences what you 
believe in later." 
 
¶8.  (C) Babahan asserted US-Turkish relations have improved 
since Turkey's cross-border operation in February, which 
demonstrated U.S. support for Turkey's top priority of 
fighting the terrorist PKK.  The man on the street previously 
believed Washington supported the establishment of a Kurdish 
state, Babahan explained, a perception largely resulting from 
Turks mixed feelings toward the Ottoman Empire; they hate it 
for its backwardness but love it for its greatness.  Many 
still believe western powers are trying to fragment Turkey. 
Turkey will eventually break up, Babahan surmised.  "We can't 
continue to ignore a large chunk of the country that has a 
different culture and language." 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Turkish media is largely controlled by a few, 
competing conglomerates with a reputation for interfering in 
their outlets' editorial policies.  While the Dogan Group 
controls the greatest share of readership, it is Sabah 
newspaper and its new owner the Calik Group which has 
monopolized headlines of late.  The current controversy 
concerning Sabah's (and television affiliate ATV's) ownership 
dates back to 2002 when the SDIF seized the assets of the 
newspaper's then owner Dinc Bilgin following the collapse of 
Bilgin's Etibank and sold them at auction to the Ciner Group 
(ref C). 
 
¶10.  (SBU) With a circulation exceeding 440,000, Sabah grew 
to be the Dogan Group's most significant secular-oriented 
rival under Ciner.  Then, on April 1, 2007 the SDIF again 
took control of Sabah and ATV along with the Ciner Group's 
other media assets, claiming it had discovered a secret 
agreement between the Ciner Group and Bilgin which illegally 
permitted the latter a degree of control and ownership over 
his previously seized assets.  The SDIF operated Sabah and 
ATV until the Calik Group purchased them at auction for $1.1 
 
ISTANBUL 00000225  003 OF 003 
 
 
billion in December 2007 in an eyebrow raising deal due to 
Calik Holding's ties to AKP - its twenty-something General 
Manager is married to one of PM Erdogan's daughters and 
Chairman Ahmet Calik is said to be close to AKP and the Prime 
Minister, himself. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Sabah/ATV sale captured headlines again on 
April 23 when the Calik Group secured a combined $750 million 
loan in an 11th hour deal with two public banks - Halkbank 
and Vakifbank - and  attracted $350 million from a little 
known subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority to 
complete the purchase just days before payment was due to 
SDIF.  Columnists speculated about the unusual nature of the 
loan by the two public banks - its size and purpose is 
reportedly unprecedented - and questioned whether Calik's 
close ties to the government were at play.  The Qatari 
investment also fomented conspiracy theories as PM Erdogan 
had just visited Qatar the week before.  The Radio and 
Television Administrative Board (RTUK), which had earlier 
approved of the Calik Group's purchase of Sabah/ATV, 
reportedly intends to challenge the purchase in light of the 
new information concerning foreign financing. 
WIENER