VZCZCXRO8195
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0530/01 1290735
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080735Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0447
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0922
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DAKAR 000530 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT PASS TO KCC 
PARIS FOR DHS/ICE 
ECOWAS POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC KSTC KCOR SG
SUBJECT: DAKAR FRAUD SUMMARY - SECOND QUARTER FY2008 
 
REF: A. 07 STATE 171211 
     ¶B. 07 STATE 2417 
 
¶1.  Following is Embassy Dakar's quarterly fraud reporting cable for 
the second quarter of FY 2008. Responses are keyed to Ref A. 
 
¶2.  A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Senegal is a secular republic with a 
strong presidency, weak legislature, a compliant judiciary, and 
multiple weak political parties.  The country is predominantly rural 
with limited natural resources.  Between 60 and 70 percent of the 
Senegalese workforce relies on agriculture, either directly or 
indirectly, to earn a living.  In 2007, Senegal recorded an 
estimated five percent growth rate, but its economy is highly 
vulnerable to variations in rainfall and fluctuations in world 
commodity prices.  As a result, increasing numbers of young 
Senegalese are moving to the cities to seek employment.  With a 45 
percent unemployment rate (and a very high underemployment rate), 
many Senegalese seek work opportunities in the U.S. and Europe.  In 
2007, over 30,000 Africans - including many Senegalese - attempted 
to migrate to Europe via clandestine fishing boats bound for Spain's 
Canary Islands. 
 
Reports during the previous quarter indicate possibly serious food 
shortages in rural Senegal.  While food supplies remain normal in 
Dakar and other big cities, increasing prices for imported food and 
basic commodities are having a negative impact on the disposable 
income of the urban working class and poor.  For Senegal, which is 
heavily dependent on imports, high and increasing international 
prices for cereals such as rice and wheat will exacerbate problems 
of access to affordable food.  On March 30, two Senegalese consumer 
associations organized a demonstration against this steady rise of 
costs, a demonstration that was forcefully broken up by riot police. 
 On April 26, more than 1,000 people also marched through central 
Dakar to protest rising food costs.  President Wade has announced 
new programs to address concerns about food supplies and prices and 
has claimed that there will not be famine in Senegal.  International 
organizations continue to closely monitor the situation. 
 
In 2007, formal sector remittances from Senegalese living and 
working overseas were estimated at almost USD 1 billion, and the 
flow of money to Senegal through informal channels is estimated to 
equal or surpass that amount.  A single Senegalese worker in Europe 
or the U.S. can provide significant disposable income for an 
extended family, or even a small village.  Consequently, many young 
adults are encouraged to emigrate illegally by heads of household or 
community leaders. 
 
There is growing concern that high volumes of illegal narcotics are 
transiting through West Africa, perhaps including Senegal.  This 
dynamic also raises concerns about increasing levels and 
sophistication of corruption, money laundering, and other financial 
crimes which could exacerbate consular-related fraud in the region. 
 
Dakar is a high fraud post.  Senegal serves as a regional airline 
hub for West Africa, has daily direct flights to New York, 
Washington, and Atlanta, and is used by many West Africans to 
transit to the U.S.  Airport and airline officials frequently 
intercept travelers with legitimate documents, but whose identities 
they question. 
 
It is easy in Senegal to obtain fraudulent civil documents, such as 
false birth and marriage certificates. Senegalese are also able to 
easily obtain genuine documents, including Senegalese passports, 
using false identities.  Imposters with authentic travel documents 
are a recurring problem. 
 
In general, Senegalese place a high value on extended kinship 
networks.  It is common for families to take in their nieces and 
nephews and to treat these children as their own.  Affluent family 
members are expected to share their wealth, influence, and 
opportunities with all those who ask.  Many Senegalese, including 
wealthy ones, view travel to the U.S. as an opportunity to earn 
money to send home and/or obtain free medical care. The obligation 
to family and friends trumps all other obligations in the Senegalese 
value system.  Many Senegalese see nothing wrong with submitting a 
fraudulent visa application or with assisting a family member or 
friend with a fraudulent application. 
 
¶B.  NONIMMIGRANT (NIV) FRAUD: The most common type of NIV fraud 
involves applicants submitting fraudulent documents as part of their 
B1/B2 visa applications.  These documents include false bank 
statements, invitation letters, employment letters, hotel 
reservations, and passport stamps.  The quality of the fraudulent 
documents is generally poor and, therefore, relatively easy to 
detect.  Consular officers routinely refuse these cases under INA 
section 214(b) rather than refer them to the Fraud Prevention Unit 
 
DAKAR 00000530  002 OF 005 
 
 
(FPU). 
 
NIV applicants often obtain genuine, but backdated Senegalese 
immigration entry and exit stamps in order to cover up previous 
overstays in the U.S. or to create fraudulent travel histories.  As 
a result, adjudicating officers must carefully scrutinize applicants 
with previously issued NIVs.  We have recently seen fake Chinese and 
Indian visas as well; however, they were of very poor quality and 
easy to detect.  Applicants often present passports with fake entry 
and exit stamps from Dubai, Morocco, Senegal, and - increasingly - 
China. 
 
Post has encountered several genuine Senegalese passports issued 
with false biodata.  Interviewing officers refused all these cases 
under INA section 214(b), and discovered the identity fraud upon 
reviewing the subsequent IDENT check.  A significant number of these 
cases involve applicants who were first refused an NIV using a 
Gambian identity.  Ref B describes this trend in detail. 
 
Post also sees a number of unqualified applicants added to 
legitimate delegations or performance groups. 
 
Senegal has seen few indications of terrorist and criminal 
activities. 
 
¶C.  IMMIGRANT VISA (IV) FRAUD: Post processes IVs and Fiance Visas 
(K1 Visas) for the following countries: The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.  Post 
processes Asylee/Refugee Following-to-Join family members (V92/93) 
for residents of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.  Adjudicating officers 
refer approximately 40 percent of these applications to the FPU.  Of 
the cases referred to the FPU, approximately 50 percent involve 
fraud. 
 
Relationship fraud is rampant in IV and K1 applications.  In all 
seven countries listed above, applicants can easily obtain genuine 
civil documents with false information.  As a result, DNA testing is 
often the only means to confirm a biological relationship.  In 
addition, the FPU conducts extensive interviews, CCD and LexisNexis 
checks, document verifications, and field investigations.  The FPU 
often relies on other posts to conduct field investigations. 
 
Some CR1 and K1 applicants attempt to hide previous marriages to 
someone other than the petitioner, either by representing themselves 
as single or by producing false divorce certificates.  Fraud by 
applicants claiming to be single can sometimes be detected when a 
spouse is indicated in a previous NIV application.  Those with false 
divorce documents often fail to terminate a marriage with an African 
spouse before petitioning for entry based on a relationship with an 
American spouse or fiance.  This is particularly problematic in this 
region, where polygamous marriages are common. 
 
An added wrinkle to this trend is the difficulty of determining the 
validity of a previous marriage - and thus whether the current 
marriage constitutes bigamy - when the only evidence for that 
marriage is the beneficiary's prior NIV application form.  Our 
applicants often assert that the "NIV marriage" was invented in 
order to improve their "ties" at the time,  but that they were not, 
in fact, previously married.  This leaves us in the difficult 
position of looking for proof of the legal termination of a marriage 
which the beneficiary claims never occurred. 
 
Post rarely sees fraud by applicants for employment-based IVs. 
 
Many IV and K1 applicants attempt to hide previous overstays in the 
U.S. by obtaining genuine, but backdated entry and exit stamps from 
Senegalese immigration officials.  It is very easy to obtain genuine 
backdated entry and exit stamps, with some Senegalese immigration 
officials providing them free of charge as a favor to friends and 
family.  As a result, adjudicating officers cannot rely on 
Senegalese entry and exit stamps as evidence of travel to and from 
the U.S. 
 
In the second quarter of FY2008, Post returned 88 petitions to USCIS 
for review with the recommendation that they be revoked.  In the 
first quarter of FY2008, 40 petitions were returned. 
 
¶D.  DV FRAUD: DV applicants frequently present forged high school 
degrees or falsified work records to qualify for DV status.  Because 
the issuance of Baccalaureates (the Senegalese high school 
equivalent) is strictly controlled, the majority of forged and 
counterfeit documents are easily detected. 
 
Other DV applicants claim to be newly married after being notified 
that they were selected to continue the DV process.  In three cases 
this quarter from Guinea, the DV winner married within two weeks of 
 
DAKAR 00000530  003 OF 005 
 
 
notification.  In two of these cases, the applicants married a pair 
of sisters that had previously been refused NIVs. 
 
Post has been unable to verify the authenticity of Gambian documents 
because the Gambian government charges a fee to verify documents. 
As a result, it has been difficult to verify educational credentials 
submitted by Gambian DV winners.  DV applications from Guinea also 
pose special problems; all requests for baccalaureate verifications 
that have been sent to Guinea have been positively verified.  In 
addition, some Guinean DV applicants present an attestation of 
examination results rather than the actual bacclaureate diploma 
itself.  As a result, Post takes greater care to interview these 
applicants thoroughly to confirm that their level of knowledge is 
consistent with their claimed education.  Recently, Post has also 
been able to verify recent baccalaureates online, although this 
service is limited to only those receiving their degrees during the 
past school year.  Guinea appears to be making progress in 
controlling and making transparent true recipients of the 
baccalaureate. 
 
In the first half of FY2008, post issued 21 DV1s and their families, 
and refused 25 cases.  12 of these were refused under INA Section 
212(a)(5)(A)during the initial interview, and 9 were referred to the 
FPU for further investigation. 
 
¶E.  ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD:  The most common form of passport fraud 
encountered is the attempt to document imposter Senegalese children 
as American citizens.  During the first two quarters of FY2008, no 
applications for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) were 
refused due to a false claim of a biological relationship by an 
American citizen.  However, DNA testing was recommended and has not 
yet been performed in 5 cases (13 percent of CRBA applications in 
the first half of FY2008).  This is roughly the same percentage as 
was seen in FY2007. 
 
In FY08 Post denied a passport application as the child applicant 
was born to a diplomat dependent who was listed on the Blue List. 
 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD: While post processes IVs for adopted orphans 
from seven West Africa countries, most of our adoption cases 
originate in Sierra Leone.  Adoption fraud is rampant in Sierra 
Leone.  The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's 
Affairs determines whether a child is adoptable and provides a 
written recommendation to the High Court of Sierra Leone.  The 
Ministry appears to have no guidelines for making these 
determinations and has done little to force orphanages to adopt 
transparent procedures for selecting children who should be eligible 
to be adopted abroad.  Although Sierra Leonian law requires the 
Ministry to investigate the whereabouts of biological parents 
alleged to have disappeared, the Ministry appears not to do so. 
 
Sierra Leone birth and identity documents are extremely unreliable. 
As a result, Freetown's local fraud investigator has to interview 
individuals in villages to confirm factual information. 
 
Since April 2005, the Mission has requested that the U.S.  Embassy 
in Freetown conduct field investigations when an orphan adoption 
case has one or more fraud indicators.   In the majority of these 
cases, the investigation has revealed that the children were not 
orphans.   In several cases, birth parents were not aware their 
children were being adopted, or they believed their children were 
going to the U.S. for education and would return at age 18. 
 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING:  Post uses DNA testing most frequently in 
IR2, family preference IVs, V92s, and CRBA cases.  Legitimate 
documents based on fraudulent information are easily obtained, and 
therefore we cannot rely heavily on local birth certificates.  Panel 
physicians in Dakar collect DNA samples locally, and the results are 
sent directly to us. 
 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Most of post's V92/93 cases 
involve applicants from Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Liberia.  Relationship fraud is rampant, and DNA is often requested 
to confirm the relationship. 
 
Embassy Dakar sees a steady stream of applicants who claim to have 
lost their I-551s (Green Cards).  In many of these cases, the FPU 
has established that the applicants had abandoned their legal 
permanent residence status by remaining outside of the U.S. for more 
then one year. 
 
When airport security suspects a passenger of document-related 
fraud, they will deny boarding and report the incident to the 
consular section.  These passengers then appear at Post to request 
that the Embassy authenticate their refugee travel documents or 
green cards.  In one such case this quarter, a woman who had been 
 
DAKAR 00000530  004 OF 005 
 
 
denied boarding claimed to have lost her green card and presented a 
questionable I-551 stamp in an alleged Spanish passport.  After 
further research, the woman admitted that the stamp and passport 
were counterfeit, then produced a Cuban passport and requested 
asylum.  She eventually accepted a referral to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 
 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST 
TRAVEL: 
Post has seen little hard evidence of alien smuggling or trafficking 
among visa applicants.  While there are terrorist groups and 
organized crime in the region, this does not appear to effect our 
consular operations. 
 
¶J.  HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS,AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
At the end of December 2007, the Senegalese authorities began 
issuing regular passports containing an electronic chip. The 
consular section has not yet received an official exemplar, but has 
seen the passports regularly this quarter.  Senegal issues four 
types of passports:  regular, diplomatic and official (passeport de 
service), and a special passport that is used exclusively for the 
Hajj (passeport pour le pelerinage).  There are at least two 
iterations of each passport that are currently valid and in 
circulation. Regular, diplomatic, and official passports all contain 
32 pages and an image of the Senegalese seal that is only visible 
under ultraviolet light.  All passports have separate book numbers 
and passport numbers.  A basic description of each passport 
follows: 
 
Regular passports: From 2002 to 2007, Senegal issued biometric 
passports. These passports have a dark green cover and light green 
pages with depictions of African animals and a baobab tree 
watermark, and are usually valid for four years.  The biodata page 
is on page 2.  The cover has a gold seal of Senegal that includes a 
lion and a baobab tree.  The passport should contain a stamp on page 
3 showing that the fee had been paid, and this should be stamped and 
signed by a police official.  The new electronic passports are 
maroon and feature the same seal on the front.  The biodata page is 
on the inside of the front cover and is covered with a hologram that 
says "Republique du Senegal" on the top and includes a series of 
baobab trees, a turtle, and the Senegalese seal. The interior pages 
are blue at the top and bottom and fade to a pink color in the 
middle, include a number of small baobab trees and a watermark on 
each page that is consistent with the front cover.  Post will send 
an exemplar to CA/FPP as soon as one is available.  Prior to the 
green biometric passport, Senegal issued a blue non-biometric 
passport with gold lettering on the cover.  This passport allowed 
for handwritten extensions to be entered on its fifth page. 
Although at the beginning of 2007 some Senegalese missions abroad 
were still extending these passports, the Senegalese government has 
ended this practice.  Beginning this quarter, we should no longer 
see any valid blue non-biometric passports. 
 
Diplomatic passports: From 1997 to 2002, Senegal issued dark blue 
diplomatic passports with a round seal on the front depicting a 
baobab tree. The pages were cream colored with red and brown threads 
that formed a sunburst pattern around a lion watermark.  These 
passports were handwritten and valid for one year, with the 
possibility of multiple annual renewals.  The bearer's photo was 
glued on page 5 and covered with a thin laminate that was dry sealed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Similar to the handwritten 
Senegalese regular passports that are no longer valid, because 
diplomatic passports must be renewed yearly, these non-biometric 
diplomatic passports should no longer be in circulation.  Around 
2002, the government also started issuing biometric diplomatic 
passports that are blue.  These newer, biometric passports are still 
currently in use.  Diplomatic passports are often issued to 
non-diplomats, such as prominent business owners and their families 
and religious leaders.  For example, a recent news story alleged 
that a number of Senegalese religious leaders received diplomatic 
passports in advance of the March 2007 Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) Summit that took place in Senegal.  Post carefully 
interviews B1/B2 applicants holding diplomatic passports to 
determine visa eligibility. 
 
Official passports: From 1997 to 2002, Senegal issued brown official 
passports with a round seal on the front with a baobab tree. The 
pages were cream colored with brown threads forming a sunburst 
pattern around a lion watermark.  These passports were handwritten 
and valid for one year, with the possibility of multiple annual 
renewals.  The bearer's photo was glued on page 5 and covered with a 
thin laminate that was dry sealed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  Similar to the handwritten Senegalese regular passports 
that are no longer valid, because official passports must be renewed 
yearly, these non-biometric official passports should no longer be 
in circulation.  Around 2002, the government also started issuing 
 
DAKAR 00000530  005 OF 005 
 
 
biometric official passports that have a reddish brown cover.  These 
newer, biometric passports are still currently in use. 
 
Hajj passports: These one-year, reddish passports are rarely forged 
by Senegalese and are used exclusively for travel to Mecca. As such, 
they are very short (fewer than 10 pages).  The passport includes a 
photo that is glued on and covered with laminate. 
 
Genuine documents with false information, including marriage, death, 
and birth certificates, and passports are all easily obtained.  Fake 
documents are easily obtained as well, but are usually of poor 
quality and can be identified due to inconsistent paper quality, 
inconsistencies apparent in the document's information, and the 
"official" stamp. Post has seen several cases of applicants with 
valid passports that are either based on false biodata (i.e. based 
on a fake birth certificate) or inconsistent biodata (i.e. benign 
variations in name and/or date of birth).  In 2006, Senegal began to 
produce national identity cards that include an electronically 
scanned photo.  All Senegalese were compelled to apply for the new 
cards, and anyone claiming to be Senegalese should be able to 
produce this card if he or she has been in Senegal since 2006. 
 
¶K.  COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The host 
government cooperates well in fraud matters and requests for 
document verifications.  However, because of the high incidence of 
fraud, post always submits "blind" verification requests, providing 
authorities with only a minimum of data on the document and 
requesting that the authorities provide the rest.  Senegalese 
authorities do not always have the ability to verify documents due 
to the incompleteness of records. 
 
Not all forms of visa fraud are regarded as serious offenses in 
Senegal, and even government officials are at times willing to use 
their positions to help friends and relatives obtain visas.  While 
the GOS does prosecute serious perpetrators, particularly foreign 
scam artists, it will often drop criminal charges if the perpetrator 
pays restitution to his/her victims. 
 
¶L.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: K-1, CR-1, and IR-1 visa fraud are 
very common in Senegal.  Almost 80 percent of K1 applicants are 
referred to the FPU for investigation, and approximately 30 percent 
are returned to the Department of Homeland Security with a 
recommendation for revocation. Advance fee fraud and dating scams 
are common in Senegal and post regularly receives emails or calls 
from Amcits who have fallen victims of the scam. 
 
¶M.  STAFFING AND TRAINING: 
 
1) Yvane K. Clark, Consular Associate, full-time Fraud Unit 
Coordinator.  She attended the following training courses in 2007: 
the All-Africa Fraud Prevention Conference (Ghana), Fraud Prevention 
for Consular Managers (FSI), and an FBI-sponsored Interviewing 
Techniques Workshop (Cape Verde). 
 
2) Moussa Sy, Locally Engaged Staff, part-time Local Fraud 
Investigator. FSN Fraud Prevention  Course (PC-542, FSI, Nov. 2007) 
 
3) James Loveland, Consular Section Chief, part-time Fraud 
Prevention Manager (FPM).  No formal fraud prevention training. 
 
SMITH