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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000707 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DRL AND IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018 
TAGS: BR PHUM PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN GENERAL BREAKS RANKS ON INDIGENOUS 
POLICY AMID PROTESTS IN RORAIMA REGION 
 
REF: IIR 6 809 0156 08 
 
BRASILIA 00000707  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mission Phillip Chicola for reasons 
1.4 b and d 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C) Brazilian Army General Augusto Heleno, military 
commander of the Amazon region, spoke out on April 16 against 
the GOB's indigenous policy calling it "chaotic," 
specifically in reference to a traditionally indigenous area 
in northern Roraima state planned to become a protected 
reserve.  This challenge came after Brazil's Supreme Court 
stopped federal action to forcibly remove rice farmers from 
the just demarcated indigenous territory.  Both the Supreme 
Court decision and the Army general's statements would seem 
to impede settling the final status of this enormous land 
area.  Further complicating the issue are Brazilian concerns, 
fueled by fears of rising prices because of the widely 
reported on "world food crisis," about the levels of its rice 
production and plans for "rationing" its harvest.  However, 
President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva and Brazil's Indigenous 
Foundation (FUNAI) President Marcio Meiro say that the 
demarcation will go forward.  Heleno's security concerns 
appear overblown, and resolving the Raposa Serra do Sol 
dispute in favor of Brazil's indigenous would send a strong 
message to those who manipulate the demarcation process for 
their own ends.  Demarcation falls short, however, of what 
Brazil's indigenous need: assistance in developing the 
capacity to manage their land, develop it sustainably, and 
relate with the outside world by means of government-provided 
infrastructure. 
 
Supreme Court Interferes, Again 
------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Following an urgent appeal from Roraima's Governor 
Jose de Anchieta Filho to stop Federal Police from forcibly 
removing rice farmers from reservation lands, Brazil's 
Supreme Court ruled that the removals should stop because the 
final demarcation "could put at risk national integrity and 
sovereignty."  The governor called the Court's decision a 
victory for the people of Roraima in the wake of what reports 
from Roraima had described as protests akin to a civil war 
against forced removals of non-indigenous from the area. 
However, Justice Minister Tarso Genro later criticized the 
press coverage as unfairly slanted in favor of the rice 
farmers.  Although obstructionist, setting fires and blocking 
federal authorities passage to the reserves, the protesters 
numbered only about 150 people. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Supreme Court has made similar rulings in the 
past, generally on the side of land and agricultural 
development versus indigenous demarcation of land.  In 2005 
Federal Police forcibly removed 400 members of the 
Guarani-Kaiowa tribe from land in Mato Grosso do Sol state, 
notorious for indigenous killings, after the Supreme Court 
issued an injunction preventing the land from becoming fully 
demarcated.  These cases have raised concerns about the 
politicization of demarcation, especially when the wealthy 
landowners usually get the upper-hand. 
 
The Middle of Nowhere 
--------------------- 
¶4.  (U) The disputed territory Raposa Serra do Sol, located 
on the border with Venezuela and Guyana in Brazil's isolated 
northern state of Roraima, covers 1.7 million hectares, about 
the size of Connecticut and Rhode Island combined.  The 
military is one of the few federal government entities whose 
personnel regularly visit the region, and they do so because 
of the military's national security mandate and border 
control responsibilities.  The inhabitants of the region are 
almost exclusively indigenous, except for agricultural 
workers on a few large rice farms.  The indigenous peoples 
there, numbering approximately 18,000 persons, are from the 
Macuxi, Ingarico, Uapixana, Patamona, and Taurepangue tribes. 
 This final stage of demarcation took almost 30 years to 
accomplish, including numerous studies and congressional 
 
BRASILIA 00000707  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
approval.  The region has little to no development except for 
a few large rice farms, although it is rich in natural forest 
lands and crisscrossed by rivers, giving the area significant 
biodiversity.  To make room for the rice farms, thousands of 
hectares of native grasslands were cleared. 
 
General's remarks (reftel) 
-------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Augusto Heleno, a four-star army general, spoke out 
during a seminar in Rio de Janeiro to military authorities, 
criticizing the final demarcation of the Raposa Serra do Sol 
indigenous reserve.  The seminar, titled "Brazil, Threats to 
its Sovereignty," took place in the Military Club in front of 
an estimated 150 active and retired military officers. 
Heleno said, "The indigenous policy is disassociated from 
Brazilian history and must be urgently reviewed.  I'm not 
against the government organs in the area; I want to 
associate myself with reversing a failed policy -- just go 
there to see what is lamentable, not to mention chaotic." 
This was met with applause from the audience.  He also 
defended the army's independence from the government noting, 
"The Army High Command is an organization that serves the 
Brazilian state, not the government."  (Comment:  Heleno's 
words are not as provocative in the Brazilian context as they 
might appear.  They are backed by historical precedent, as 
the Brazilian military has been in a position to intervene 
when civilian government fails, and its authority to do so 
was written into the previous constitution.  Moreover, the 
Brazilian military apparatus is not accustomed to strong 
civilian leadership since democracy was re-established in 
¶1985.  The Defense Ministry itself dates only to 1999, and 
Nelson Jobim, appointed minister of defense in 2007, has been 
unusually active in managing the military services.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶6. (U) Heleno indicated particular frustration over the GOB's 
agreement to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People (DRIP) because of the provisions for demilitarization 
of indigenous reserves and the nebulous terms that some argue 
grant indigenous peoples direct and sovereign control of 
their lands.  Heleno said that he had no political or 
economic agenda, but rather primarily an interest in national 
security because the territory's demarcation, coupled with 
the potential indigenous perception that DRIP makes 
indigenous territory inviolable by the military even in times 
of national emergency, might expose this sensitive border 
territory to threats.  Finally, Heleno said that, based on 
his experience with the indigenous, after land demarcation 
the indigenous do nothing to develop their lands, 
specifically with regard to necessary infrastructure for 
providing food, education, and health.  (Comment:  The 
demarcation of indigenous lands also runs counter to a common 
Brazilian notion that the appropriate way to "deal" with 
minorities, racial and ethnic, is through cultural 
assimilation with more developed society.  Heleno,s 
perspective challenges government policy as it is 
implemented, as the GOB only provides the indigenous with 
land, not taking into account the need for the capacity to 
manage it, develop it sustainably, and relate with the 
outside world -- most notably with government infrastructure. 
 Of course, both the standard GOB and Heleno's perspectives 
fail to take into account what the indigenous themselves want 
and are able to do with the resources at their disposal.  End 
Comment.) 
 
FUNAI President Rebuts 
---------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) Heleno is a highly-regarded officer in the Brazilian 
military, and although there was a great deal of media 
attention to his remarks, including a summons from President 
Lula to Minister Jobim and Army Commander General Enzo 
Martins Peri to have them explain this public criticism, the 
popular general was simply asked not to discuss the matter 
publicly.  However, during a newspaper interview FUNAI 
President Meira, in a veiled reference to Heleno's remarks, 
said that a conservative backlash of prejudice is returning 
against the indigenous.  He asserted that cultural 
 
BRASILIA 00000707  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
assimilation is a 19th Century concept, and argued that the 
indigenous pose no security threat, noting the close and 
historical relationship between the Army and the indigenous. 
The military was the first to make contact with the 
indigenous in the rough, outlying regions of the Amazon, and 
currently over half of the military personnel in the border 
area are indigenous.  Meira also said that the Army's 
presence on the border is a constitutional obligation, 
indigenous territories have always been open to the Armed 
Forces, and the indigenous peoples have not impeded the 
military's access to them, adding that all indigenous land is 
the property of the Federal Union.  When asked about the land 
titles that the rice farmers demonstrate, Meira asserted that 
these land documents were obtained illegally and mean 
nothing, saying that all of the farmers in the area are 
invaders of indigenous land. 
 
Much Ado about Six Rice Farms 
----------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The future of several thousand hectares of rice 
plantations is in question, but the reality is that only six 
"landowners" are affected.  Landowners exert strong influence 
on Brazilian decision-makers, including members of congress, 
and often affect GOB policy.  In this case, however, it seems 
that the Lula administration is behind the indigenous. 
President Lula has stated publicly that he will work to 
overturn the Supreme Court's injunction to keep Federal 
Police from forcibly removing the rice farmers, and his 
commitment seems to have the support of his cabinet, most 
notably the Human Rights Minister, the Justice Minister, and 
the Environmental Minister.  Although GOB efforts to protect 
Brazil's "limited" rice supply have complicated the effort to 
remove the rice farmers, it seems unlikely that these illegal 
Roraima rice growers could contribute much to overall 
production levels given their isolation from reliable 
logistics points that would allow them to sell their product 
economically. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶8. (C) Both Heleno and Meira are sincere in their concerns 
about the final disposition of the Raposa Serra do Sol 
territory.  Meira believes that demarcation is important to 
protect the indigenous communities living in the territory 
and although mandated by Brazil's 1988 constitution, final 
demarcation has been repeatedly delayed and obstructed by 
powerful political and commercial interests.  Heleno is also 
sincere in his security concerns.  However, it is difficult 
to see his concerns as legitimately aimed at the indigenous 
or GOB indigenous policy, in light of the minimal military 
presence currently serving in the Amazon -- approximately 
24,000 troops cover an area the size of half the United 
States (including Alaska).  However, Heleno is correct that 
simply leaving indigenous in a vast open territory without 
proper access to government infrastructure to meet basic 
needs as Brazilian citizens is also not appropriate.  Living 
conditions for many of Brazil's indigenous are dire, and the 
GOB needs to go beyond providing land and find ways both to 
provide for the basic needs of its indigenous citizens and to 
protect their important cultural heritage.  Resolving the 
Raposa Serra do Sol dispute in favor of Brazil's indigenous 
would set a precedent and send a strong message to the 
powerful wealthy who manipulate the demarcation process for 
their own ends.  But even if the land is finally demarcated, 
the government would be mistaken to think that it has 
fulfilled its responsibility to the indigenous on the Raposa 
Serra do Sol Reserve. 
CHICOLA