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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA638, CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 8 VISITS BRAZIL, STRENGTHENS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA638 2008-05-12 14:21 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1947
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0638/01 1331421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121421Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1621
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
INFO RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5508
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4088
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7362
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0327
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8024
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6142
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2047
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM AND WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018 
TAGS: PREL MOPS BR
SUBJECT: CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 8 VISITS BRAZIL, STRENGTHENS 
MIL-MIL TIES, IGNORED BY POLITICAL LEADERS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.  Reason 1.5 (D) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Carrier Strike Group Eight (CSG8), 
centered on the USS George Washington, visited Brazilian 
waters April 16-May 2.  While in Brazilian waters to 
participate in the UNITAS 08 exercise, the priority objective 
for the visit was to enhance the strategic partnership 
between the U.S. and Brazil and to lay the groundwork for 
more robust mil-mil engagement between U.S. and Brazilian 
naval forces.  Drawing on themes from both State and DoD 
policy statements, Strike Group Commander Rear Admiral Philip 
Cullom delivered a strong message to Brazilian visitors that 
the U.S. and Brazil share an interest in preserving maritime 
security against an array of non-traditional threats.  The 
visit was well received by members of Brazil's business 
community and by the press but generated little interest 
among Brazilian political leaders. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  Carrier Strike Group Eight, consisting of the USS 
George Washington, USS Farragut, USS Kaufman and USCGC 
Northland, visited Brazil April 16 to May 2 for this year's 
Atlantic phase of the forty-ninth annual UNITAS exercise. 
During the exercise, U.S., Brazilian and Argentine ships 
practiced a range of possible operations, including search 
and rescue, maritime interdications and detection of WMD 
smuggling.  The participants expressed satisfaction with the 
exercises, which U.S. Navy leadership described as "at a 
higher level of complexity than previous UNITAS."  In after 
action reports, participating navies identified communication 
difficulties and not enough overall exercise time as areas 
for improvement. 
 
3.  (C)  Consistent with Mission and USSOUTHCOM goals, CSG8 
made it a priority to use its presence to enhance military to 
military contacts with the Brazilian navy and underline the 
need for bilateral engagement in light of the current 
maritime security environment.  Brazilian liaison officers 
were embarked in Norfolk to prepare for the CSG's stay in 
Brazilian waters, and more than fifty Brazilian personnel 
were stationed on U.S. ships during the exercise.  Each of 
the Brazilians was assigned to a U.S. counterpart to allow 
for sharing of best practices as the Brazilians observed how 
the U.S. Navy worked.  The inclusiveness shown to the 
Brazilians drew hugely positive reviews and was reagarded as 
important at a time when Brazil is struggling to return its 
own aircraft carrier to active service. 
 
4.  (C)  With input from Embassy Brasilia and Consulates 
Recife, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, the CSG Strategic 
Communication team drew up an extensive distinguished 
visitors program that would highlight U.S.-Brazil partnership 
and our common interests in preserving maritime security. 
Visitors got to spend a day on the carrier, witness flight 
operations and see how Brazilian personnel were integrated 
with the U.S. crew.  Strike Group Commander Rear Admiral 
Philip Cullom began each visit with a presentation 
highlighting the importance of sea transport to global 
prosperity and maritime forces' role in preserving this.  He 
also noted the importance of cooperative approaches between 
nations with common interests in ensuring maritime security. 
Visitors were drawn primarily from the Brazilian military and 
business communities and drew a strongly positive response. 
Unfortunately, none of Brazil's political leaders who were 
invited attended. 
 
5.  (C)  The April 28 visit by members of the Brazilian press 
resulted in generally positive coverage.  Leading Brazilian 
commentator William Waack filed two reports for O Globo on 
the visit that reflected the importance the U.S. places on 
partnership with Brazil.  Press coverage also focused on the 
expense of the carrier and its operations, an important point 
as Brazil seeks to modernize its own defense.  The real scoop 
for several reporters was the presences of 
Brazilian-Americans in the crew in positions of 
responsibility.  This contrasts with the popular image of 
Brazilian emmigrants getting only low-skill, low paying jobs. 
 Quoting several crew members saying that they felt at home 
in both countries probably did more to advance the idea of 
partnership than the demonstrations of air power. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00000638  002 OF 002 
 
 
6.  (C)  COMMENT.  The Navy's effort to coordinate with the 
Embassy and engage in public outreach added value to the 
annual exercises.  In comments to Embassy personnel, 
Brazilian visitors consistently mentioned that the Navy's 
emphasis on humanitarian assistance, drug interdiction and 
cooperation with friendly states gave a more positive 
impression than the usual Brazilian images of the U.S. 
military bombing Middle Eastern states.  Admiral Cullom's 
comment to a group of Brazilian business leaders that while 
an aircraft carrier is expensive, it is a cost that the USG 
believes is worthwhile in terms of its value to safeguarding 
global prosperity received nods and at least one offhand 
comment that the Brazilian government could learn from this. 
While the lack of Brazilian government attendance was 
disappointing, we should still look for opportunities to make 
the point that the U.S. and Brazil are natural security 
partners.  Defense Minister Jobim missed the carrier visit 
because he was out of the country.  As a next step, we should 
try to arrange a visit for him to a U.S. carrier when he 
visits SOUTHCOM this summer. 
SOBEL