VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1988/01 1511947
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301947Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3016
INFO RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2/SCJ3/SCJ5//
RUWDQAC/US INTERDICTION COORD WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC//ICE/CNO//
RUMIJTF/DIRJIATF SOUTH KEY WEST FL
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 8815

UNCLAS BOGOTA 001988 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL/LP, WHA/AND, AND WHA/PPC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL MCAP EAID KCRM PTER SENV CO
SUBJECT: AIR MOBILITY KEY TO SUCCESS IN COLOMBIA 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  Colombia has transformed itself into a secure, 
prosperous democracy and an even closer U.S. ally with our help. 
Many factors contributed to this successful transformation, but one 
of the most important was the provision of air mobility to the 
Colombian security forces.  Air mobility allowed Colombia to project 
force and state presence throughout its vast area, providing greater 
security and setting the stage for social, economic, and judicial 
development.  U.S. assistance to Colombia for air mobility is 
declining, and one of the biggest challenges for Colombia will be 
sustaining air mobility in order to maintain and expand the 
government's presence in all its facets.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Colombia Transformed In A Decade, the Numbers Tell It All 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) In 1999, major narcotrafficking groups and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) threatened the sovereignty and 
governability of Colombia.  The USG responded with support via Plan 
Colombia and Colombia responded with its own funding and political 
will.  The transformation of Colombia in the last decade from a 
country that some thought could become a narco-state and others 
thought could become a FARC-controlled state has been impressive. 
By almost any metric available, Colombia has made incredible strides 
in transforming itself from a near-failed state to a democratic and 
more prosperous country.  Between 2000 and 2007, the numbers are 
strikingly positive.  Murders are down by 38%; kidnappings are down 
86%; terrorist attacks are down 96%; attacks against pipelines are 
down 73%; attacks against towns are down 99%; more than 31,000 
members of the leading paramilitary group demobilized and more than 
15,000 narcoterrorists have deserted.  On the "soft side", the 
numbers are also impressive.  The poverty rate has declined by 20%; 
kilometers of paved roads have increased by 431%, primary education 
rate increased 15% and secondary education rate increased 50%; 
families receiving nutritional assistance increased 402%; and the 
economy's growth rate has almost doubled to 7.6%.  There simply are 
no measurable areas in which the country is not better off today 
than it was ten years ago. 
---------------------------------- 
What Made The Turnaround Possible? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) There are many reasons behind the dramatic turnaround. 
These include political will, increased GOC spending, worldwide 
rejection of terrorism post 9/11, professionalization of the 
military, police, and prosecutors; transition to an oral accusatory 
judicial system; demobilization of the AUC; improved intelligence 
capabilities; stopping the increase in coca cultivation; 
extraditions to the U.S.; and U.S. developmental assistance. 
However, the overarching force multiplier behind the scenes that has 
made this dramatic change in Colombia possible is air mobility. 
 
¶4.  (U) In 1998, the Colombian Military Forces and Police had about 
two dozen helicopters to project force and provide assistance in a 
country the size of Texas and California combined.  Colombia's 
current inventory is about 285 helicopters, with about half of these 
purchased with the GOC's own funds.  These helicopters have made the 
critical difference in counterdrug efforts, in providing mobility to 
successful military operations, in the evacuation of wounded 
soldiers and civilians, and in helping establish legitimate state 
presence in rural areas by bringing in and supporting police, 
judicial, and civilian authorities after the military secured the 
areas. 
 
¶5. (U) One of the most important lessons learned from Plan Colombia 
is that socio-economic development is not possible without security. 
 Helicopters and other air assets have helped to deliver the 
security necessary for development and economic activity to succeed. 
 Without security and reasonably safe access by civilian and 
governmental representatives, there can be no sustainable 
alternative development or state presence. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Air Mobility Made the Difference 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Colombia east of the Andes is the size of Texas, but only 
has about 5% of the national population (2.2 million).  Roads are 
scarce and in poor condition.  At the same time, this territory has 
been part of the traditional homeland of the FARC and an area where 
the FARC earns significant income from coca cultivation and 
narcotrafficking in all its facets.  Until the arrival of 
significant air assets, Colombia could not exert state control east 
of the Andes, and the armed forces were a garrison force, with a 
security strategy based on a bunker mentality, reacting to the 
FARC's actions.  There were few proactive offensive operations and 
most of the residents in "Texas" believed that the FARC was the real 
government in that part of Colombia.  The ten-fold increase in the 
number of helicopters allowed the GOC to project force and state 
presence to these far-flung areas and provided security for the full 
gamut of nation building activities.  We might have made progress in 
Colombia without so many new air assets, but it would have been 
slower and many more lives would have been lost. 
 
¶7.  (U) Throughout the first half of the current decade, significant 
social and developmental projects were not possible in many 
Colombian departments, such as Putumayo, Vichada, Meta, and 
Guaviare.  The security brought about by the Colombian security 
forces using air mobility has made these areas more secure, allowing 
other elements of the government to operate.  Currently, there is a 
multiagency bilateral program in the area around the Macarena Park 
in Meta.  This is the center of the FARC's traditional base and 
never before has the GOC or USG attempted significant developmental 
and judicial projects in this area.  Because of improved and 
increased security, this program is moving forward, utilizing both 
military and civilian resources to guarantee consolidation and 
sustainability. 
 
¶8.  (U) The Colombian military and police, with USG assistance, have 
made great strides and are now one of the most professional and best 
trained and equipped militaries and police in the hemisphere.  This 
was not always the case.  At the end of the 1990's, Colombia's army 
was mainly one of conscripts and it was on the ropes.  Some said 
that the FARC was as well-trained and equipped as the Colombian 
army, if not better.  Although the FARC recently has suffered 
tremendous losses from the Colombian security forces, it still 
receives substantial revenue from illicit drug crops, which sustains 
the armed insurgency.  However, the FARC has not been able to 
challenge Colombia's air mobility.  The single biggest difference in 
the battlefield balance of power between the Colombian security 
forces and the FARC and other armed groups is that of air mobility. 
It is the force multiplier that allows the GOC to put their 
professional, well-trained and equipped troops where they need them, 
when they need them with protection from above.  In addition, other 
aviation assets allow the GOC to provide the logistical support to 
keep the troops in place for as long as necessary.  In 2002, 
Colombia did not have a government presence in 158 of the then 1,098 
municipalities and counties in Colombia.  Today, the GOC has a 
presence in all 1,102 municipalities, which could not have happened 
without aviation assets that allowed the GOC to remove the enemy and 
then provide support for the sustainment of government presence. 
 
¶9.  (U) In addition to helicopters, Colombia has benefitted from 
fixed-wing air assets carrying sensors that provide intelligence 
information that allow commanders to plan their actions and direct 
the movement of the helicopters carrying the troops.  There has also 
been an increase in logistical aircraft that maintains soldiers and 
police in the field longer and keeps readiness and morale up by 
providing a constant stream of food, ammunition, and medicines.  An 
army marches on its stomach, and the Colombian Army would not march 
for long without support from aviation assets. 
 
---------------------------------- 
The Future of Aviation in Colombia 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) U.S. assistance has helped the GOC train hundreds of pilots 
and mechanics to fly and fix the almost 500 helicopters and fixed 
wing aircraft.  Less than half of these were purchased by the USG. 
We are just now beginning to see the results of this Herculean 
effort.  This has not been easy or fast, because training a 
pilot-in-command or a master mechanic for a helicopter often takes 
more than four years.  In addition, the overall fleet is much larger 
than anyone could have predicted at the beginning of Plan Colombia. 
Over the next year Colombia will receive 15 UH-60 Black Hawk 
helicopters, and up to 15 additional helicopters of other models -- 
all purchased with GOC funding.  These aircraft will require pilots 
and mechanics at a time when USG support for "hard side" aviation 
training and support activities is decreasing.  Colombia's challenge 
will be to keep the operational readiness rate for existing and new 
aircraft at a level high enough, so that they can continue to make 
progress against the FARC and other narcoterrorists.  Our 
nationalization plans are trying to take this into account, but 
planning is difficult for the controlled and moderate glide path 
needed to guarantee success and sustainability in an environment of 
budget cuts of almost 30% to aviation programs in fiscal year 2008. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Air Mobility Will Be Needed, Even In Post Conflict 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) As the Colombian military and police forces continue to 
make advances against the FARC, the smaller insurgent Army of 
National Liberation (ELN), and other narcoterrorists, the need for 
air mobility and logistical support is even greater.  Even in an 
eventual post-conflict Colombia, roads will not be built overnight, 
and commercial air service will not immediately extend to remote 
areas.  Colombia will need a robust aviation fleet to satisfy the 
needs of all sectors of the government.  Already, the growing 
emphasis on manual coca eradication has led to a greater need for 
air support for this difficult and dangerous endeavor.  There are 
not enough prosecutors and judges to totally cover Colombia, so 
Colombia will either need to take the judges and prosecutors to the 
public or bring the public to them.  In either case, air assets will 
be needed.  Colombia is subject to earthquakes, mudslides, tsunamis, 
major forest fires, and a plethora of other natural calamities. 
Facing these problems and providing humanitarian support and 
security requires aviation assets. 
 
¶12.  (U) Even as large illegal armed groups and transnational drug 
cartels are broken up, there will still be localized criminal groups 
that have the ability to cause serious disruptions to the lives of 
Colombians in remote areas.  The GOC must be able to respond to such 
incidents swiftly if they are going to make the tremendous progress 
to date irreversible.  Air mobility has been vital in accomplishing 
both USG and GOC goals over the last ten years.  With or without USG 
support, Colombia will need to ensure a robust and efficient fleet 
of aircraft into the foreseeable future in order to continue to 
project, promote, and protect state presence. 
 
BROWNFIELD