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UNCLAS ATHENS 000743 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/SE AND S/WE FOR GERDA LANE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SOCI GR
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for Ambassador Tahir-Kheli's visit, June 2-5 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR SPECKHARD TO AMBASSADOR TAHIR-KHELI 
 
¶1. (SBU) Dear Ambassador Tahir-Kheli, we are looking forward to your 
visit.  I wanted to offer you the following background information 
that you may find interesting in preparing for your trip.  I look 
forward to the opportunity to meet and discuss some of these issues 
in more detail when you are here.  The Embassy stands ready to 
assist to make your visit a productive and enjoyable one.  We have 
prepared for you several meetings and roundtables with women 
actively involved in NGOs, women entrepreneurs, and female Members 
of Parliament. 
 
------------ 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Greece's center-right New Democracy government of Prime 
Minister Kostas Karamanlis seeks to maintain good relations with the 
U.S., though the U.S.-Greece partnership is complex and at times 
challenging.  Greek-U.S. military-to-military cooperation is good, 
particularly at the U.S. Navy base at Souda Bay on Crete, and Greece 
is among the largest purchasers of U.S. military equipment. 
Greece's participation in NATO, however, is politically sensitive 
with weak public support for NATO operations.  Some of the Embassy's 
priority goals in Greece include: 
 
-- Promoting stability in the Balkans in light of Kosovo's 
declaration of independence and Greece's veto of Macedonia's bid to 
join NATO until the name issue is resolved; 
 
-- Further cooperation in combating Greek domestic and international 
terrorist threats and in strengthening Greek borders against 
transiting terrorists; 
 
-- Increasing Greek-Turkish cooperation and stability in the Aegean 
and on Cyprus; 
 
-- Encouraging Greece to contribute to European energy security 
through diversification as Greece develops as an energy transit hub; 
and 
 
-- Expanding trade with the U.S. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) You can reinforce our message of support and cooperation 
in furthering women's empowerment, particularly in the Middle East. 
Although the USG faces a difficult political environment following 
the recent events in the Balkans and the NATO Summit, your presence 
highlights Secretary Rice's commitment to creating a forum for 
dialogue to address challenges faced by women throughout the world, 
especially in the Middle East. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) You can help advance our agenda in combating trafficking 
in persons (TIP) by highlighting the issue in your informal 
conversations and in reiterating our desire to work cooperatively to 
make more progress on the issue this coming year. 
 
---------------------------- 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ISSUE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) During your visit, the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 
Report is scheduled to be released publicly by Secretary Rice on 
June 4.  Until then, we cannot confirm Greece's TIP ranking.  Greece 
will be demoted from Tier Two to Ter Two Watch List because of a 
lack of evidene of increasing efforts to combat TIP and lackluster 
implementation of the TIP Action Plan.  Greece has yet to ratify a 
2004 child repatriation agreement negotiated with Albania, shelters 
remain underutilized and convicted traffickers are not serving 
imposed sentences.  We also are concerned with inadequate protection 
of dentified and potential trafficking victims.  You can expect 
that your Greek interlocutors ill raise their disappointment in 
Greece's TI ranking with you.  Many Greeks are likely - bu wrongly 
-- to see the TIP ranking demotion as "payback" for Greece's veto of 
Macedonia's NATO membership.  In your conversations, it would be 
helpful if you emphasized the following: 
 
-- We know that Greece has a strong commitment to addressing women's 
issues. 
 
-- We wish to work in partnership with Greece to combat more 
actively trafficking in persons.  We do not doubt Greece's political 
commitment in this area, but more needs to be done on the ground. 
 
-- We would particularly encourage the Prime Minister's appointment 
of a senior coordinator on TIP issues, who would have the political 
clout and authority to direct the various Greek agencies working on 
TIP issues. 
-- (If asked) Our TIP rankings are based solely on TIP-related 
criteria, and this was not/not a political decision.  Attributing 
Greece's TIP ranking to the Macedonia name issue is not only 
incorrect; it also diverts attention from the real issues that need 
to be addressed. 
 
-------------------- 
MACEDONIA NAME ISSUE 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Greeks consider the unmodified use of "Macedonia" an 
infringement on their heritage and warn that it could encourage 
irredentism towards Greece's northern province of the same name.  We 
have repeatedly urged both sides to engage in negotiations led by 
Matthew Nimetz under the auspices of the United Nations and have 
stated that the U.S. would accept whatever solution Athens and 
Skopje agreed upon through the negotiations.  In the aftermath of 
Greece's vetoing the NATO invitation at the April 2008 NATO Summit 
in Bucharest, we continue to urge both countries to work for a 
mutually agreeable solution through the UN/Nimetz process. There has 
been little progress in this area, pending the completion of 
Macedonia's June national elections. The Administration is hopeful 
that an agreement could be reached by July 9th, when Croatia and 
Albania will sign the NATO Accession Protocol to officially launch 
accession talks. Greek counterparts, however, are skeptical this 
target can be met, given the time it will take to organize and 
empower a new government in Skopje.  The government of Greece, 
however, is signaling its desire and intent to move swiftly in 
finding a solution after the elections. 
 
------------- 
ENERGY ISSUES 
------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Greece has a new role as an energy pipeline corridor to 
Western Europe and can contribute positively to European energy 
security through rapid completion of the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Interconnecter (TGI), which is the first pipeline to carry Caspian 
gas to Europe without going through Russia or through 
Russian-controlled pipelines.  It is therefore an important step in 
realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of increasing European 
energy diversity and security.  TGI will also help Greece: whereas 
currently 80 percent of Greece's natural gas supplies come from 
Gazprom, once TGI becomes fully operational by 2012, this dependence 
could be reduced to under 50 percent. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Greek cooperation on energy with Russia has increased 
significantly over the past two years.  On April 29, PM Karamanlis 
and outgoing Russian President Putin signed an agreement on 
cooperation on the South Stream gas pipeline. While some view this 
pipeline as a competitor to TGI, TGI is far more advanced in design 
and development and likely will not be impacted. Meanwhile, Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Russia have agreed to support the 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bosporus Oil Bypass Pipeline (BAP) and share 
ownership, which we support insofar as it is commercially feasible. 
 
 
------------------- 
VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Greece is the only one of the original fifteen EU 
member-states that do not participate in the U.S. Visa Waiver 
Program (VWP).  Secretary Rice sent a letter to DHS Secretary 
Chertoff in August 2007 to officially nominate Greece for the 
program, after Greece introduced a new biometric passport that meets 
all ICAO standards.  A DHS-led team of technical experts visited 
Greece in November and positively assessed its eligibility.  Another 
team from the interagency Terrorist Screening Center just completed 
a successive negotiation with the Greeks on a terrorist database 
agreement, which is required for Greece's entry into the VWP.  Other 
VWP negotiations remain ongoing (Greece asked for a short pause in 
February to consult within the EU but has since provided us with a 
counter-proposal for an MOU.)  Greece's inclusion in the VWP would 
boost the U.S. image, and we are working hard to make this happen 
this year. 
 
-------------------- 
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Against the sway of public opinion, Greece remains 
supportive of Turkey's EU accession hopes and understands that a 
Turkey in the EU is in Greece's long-term strategic interest. 
Greece and Turkey still differ on issues such as Aegean 
air-/sea-space demarcation.  The recent cancellation of a 
Greek-initiated Aegean exercise, when NATO declined its support, 
aggravated relations, yet rapprochement remains the overall 
leitmotif of their bilateral relations.  On Cyprus, the February 
2008 election of Cyprus President Demetris Christofias is widely 
seen as a new opportunity for progress.  His presidency has 
witnessed the opening of the historic Ledra Street crossing between 
the two sides and a renewed energy to implement the UN-brokered July 
8th 2006 agreement designed to reach a mutually acceptable solution 
to the Cyprus problem, although many of the tough political issues 
remain to be addressed. 
 
------ 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, 
shortly after Serbia's January 2008 elections.  Kosovo has been 
formally recognized by more than 40 United Nations Member States, 
including 19 individual EU member-states, though a number, including 
Greece, have not.   Despite this, Greece maintains substantial 
military forces in NATO's Kosovo force and is providing personnel 
and support to the EU's "Rule of Law Mission" in Kosovo.  The 
Administration has encouraged Greece to recognize Kosovo in the 
interest of supporting stability.  We welcome Greece's ongoing 
efforts to urge Serbia to take a forward-looking approach to its 
future in the European and Euro Atlantic community. 
 
SPECKHARD