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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI735, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI735 2008-05-29 09:21 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0735/01 1500921
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290921Z MAY 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9021
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8313
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9555
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000735 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused May 29 
news coverage on the historic meeting between KMT Chairman Wu 
Poh-hsiung and his Chinese Communist Party (CCP) counterpart Hu 
Jintao in Beijing Wednesday; on new developments in cross-Strait 
relations; and on the fuel price hike in Taiwan, to be followed by 
increases in various commodity prices.  The centrist, KMT-leaning 
"China Times" ran a banner headline on page three that said "Hu 
[Jintao] Pledges: There Should Be Viable Ways for Taiwan to 
Participate in the World Health Organization." 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" criticized the Wu-Hu meeting and 
said President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policies are actually 
pushing the Taiwan people toward ultimate unification with China.  A 
separate "Liberty Times" analysis said Beijing's policies regarding 
direct transportation across the Taiwan Strait and allowing Chinese 
tourists to Taiwan are merely economic bait - its ultimate objective 
is to annex Taiwan.  An op-ed piece in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" criticized President Ma's inaugural 
speech and said it offered little of substance to Taiwan.  An 
editorial in the pro-unification "United Daily News," on the other 
hand, urged Beijing to "face the reality" of the existence of the 
Republic of China while interacting with Taiwan on the basis of the 
"1992 Consensus."  End summary. 
 
A) "Ma Administration's Policies Are Pushing the Taiwan People 
toward the Road of Unification [with China]" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] 
editorialized (5/29): 
 
"... The negotiation platform set up by the KMT and the Chinese 
Communist Party is a welcome sign for the Taiwan people as long as 
it can contribute to alleviating tension across the Taiwan Strait. 
But the contact between the political parties of the two countries 
should remain limited to the level of the private sector and must 
not be defined, as claimed by President Ma, as the second-track [of 
communication] between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, otherwise 
it will go beyond the bounds of the role and competence of a 
political party.  Any formal talks between Taiwan and China must be 
done on a country-to-country basis, with mutual recognition and 
respect.  If not, [we] would rather keep the platform idle than 
allow ourselves to be belittled just for the sake of [resuming] 
talks....Ma's actual practice has been paving the way for [the 
island's] unification [with China] even though he claims that 
unification between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is unlikely 
'within our lifetimes'.   In other words, Ma may not be able to 
witness [Taiwan's] unification [with China] within his lifetime, but 
his policies and practice are actually pushing the Taiwan people 
toward the road of unification. ..." 
 
B) "KMT and CCP Both Hail the Chinese Nation [in an Attempt] to 
Package the One China Principle" 
 
Journalist Su Yong-yao noted in an analysis in the pro-independence 
"Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] (5/29): 
 
"During his current visit to China, Wu Poh-hsiung decried that 'both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the Chinese nation.' 
Similarly, during his meeting with Wu, Hu Jintao mentioned the 
'persistence of safeguarding the fundamental interests of the 
Chinese nation.'  Both the KMT and Chinese Communist Party were 
using the same rhetoric and it appeared that relations between the 
two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been getting closer.  In 
reality, the basis of the Taiwan-centric awareness is being eroded. 
... 
 
"For Taipei, efforts to alleviate cross-Strait tension and to 
facilitate social and economic exchange between the two sides are 
aimed at expanding a foundation favorable for Taiwan's development. 
This is the policy line of the KMT, even though it has yet to become 
the internal consensus in Taiwan.  Beijing is trying to rope in 
Taiwan by inviting high-ranking [Taiwan] party and political 
officials to visit China and even speaking softly to advocates of 
Taiwan independence, but this is only to create a false appearance 
of a peaceful and stable cross-Strait situation.  Beijing's 
short-term objective is to erase its negative image in the 
international community caused by its crackdown on Tibet and the 
Olympic torch relay.  In the long run, Beijing's ultimate goal 
remains to annex Taiwan, using direct transportation across the 
Taiwan Strait and Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan as its economic 
bait. ... 
 
"In this vein, when Hu said he 'will discuss the issue of Taiwan's 
participation in international activities,' it seemed evident that 
the issue will be dealt with under the one China principle, wrapped 
up with the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.  If the KMT 
rejects such an offer, it will be akin to running counter to [Wu's 
statement that] 'both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the 
 
Chinese nation]; but should it accept the offer, Taiwan will no 
longer enjoy its status as an independent sovereign nation. ..." 
 
 
C) "Ma's Speech Offered Little of Substance to Taiwan" 
 
Ruan Ming, a consultant at the Taiwan Research Institute, opined in 
the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (5/29): 
 
"President Ma Ying-jeou's inaugural speech can be summed up in two 
short phrases: Compromise outweighs conviction; emotion overrides 
reason.  Ma made satisfying China a priority in his speech, quoting 
Chinese President Hu Jintao's three talks on cross-strait relations 
on March 26, April 12 and April 29, then concluding that 'His views 
are very much in line with our own.'  And it came as no surprise 
that the speech was quickly approved by China's Taiwan Affairs 
Office, despite it lacking the conviction that the president of a 
young democracy should deliver.  Is Ma not aware that the terms 
'controversies' and 'differences' in Hu's proposal to 'shelve 
controversies' and 'find commonalities despite differences' also 
imply that China is refusing to recognize Taiwan as an independent, 
sovereign state? 
 
"This is a Chinese trick to annex Taiwan through its United Front 
scheme -- or maybe even military force. As a popularly elected 
president, Ma should insist that Taiwan's independence and 
sovereignty brook no violation, disavowal or delay. ...  Ma's speech 
raised a question mark. With compromise outweighing conviction and 
emotion overriding reason, his proposal is, at best, a short-term 
fix.  After compromising with China and speaking emotionally to 
Taiwanese, then what? Where is he leading Taiwan?" 
 
D) "Wu-Hu Meeting: Enlightenment of Sun Yat-sen and Interpretation 
of the 1992 Consensus" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (5/29): 
 
"... In addition to the 'new developments' and 'new opportunities' 
across the Taiwan Strait, as emphasized by both Wu Poh-hsiung and Hu 
Jintao, we hope to see cross-Strait relations in the wake of the 
Wu-Hu meeting advance in terms of 'macroscopic vision' and 'a basis 
in reality.'  In terms of macroscopic vision, it means that both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait should develop and pursue a common 
political philosophy, namely, the 'Sun Yat-sen structure.'  The 
basis in reality here refers to the idea that both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait should have an interactive structure that can better 
reflect the reality, namely, the '1992 Consensus.' ... 
 
"... The '1992 Consensus' has become more and more stable as a 
policy banner since the meeting between Lian Chan and Hu in 2005 and 
the recent Wu-Hu meeting.  But the essence of the '1992 Consensus' - 
'one China with respective interpretations' - remains to be 
embodied.  Following the twists and turns over the past two decades, 
the Beijing authorities must be aware that to stabilize cross-Strait 
relations, they must first stabilize the 'Republic of China,' and 
that without a stable 'Republic of China,' there will be no stable 
cross-Strait relations.  In this respect, Taipei emphasizes 'facing 
up to the reality,' namely, facing up to the 'fact' that both sides 
are ruled separately,' while Beijing stresses 'shelving 
controversies' -- the 'controversies' remain, except that they are 
put aside temporarily.  Hu took the initiative in inviting Wu to 
visit China, a move naturally indicating that he has acknowledged 
Wu's status as the 'chairman of the ruling party of the Republic of 
China (ROC),' but it is not equal to 'facing the reality' of the 
[existence of] the ROC . ...  [We] sincerely hope the authorities on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait will not just 'put aside 
controversies' but will also 'face the reality squarely' on the 
basis of the '1992 Consensus.'  The two sides can in fact adopt 
models similar to those between the previous West and East Germany 
and South and North Korea to establish an interactive structure, and 
they will surely achieve greater results than those between East and 
West Germany and South and North Korea. ..." 
 
WANG