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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI725, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, U.S.-RUSSIA-CHINA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI725 2008-05-27 10:22 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0010
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0725/01 1481022
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271022Z MAY 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9001
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8300
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9542
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000725 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, U.S.-RUSSIA-CHINA 
RELATIONS 
 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused May 
24-27 news coverage on KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's visit to China 
Monday and the new developments in cross-Strait relations, on the 
controversy over whether a KMT legislator still retains U.S. 
citizenship, on the soaring commodity prices in Taiwan, and on the 
Basic Competency Test for Taiwan junior high school students. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" criticized the Ma Ying-jeou 
administration and the KMT for anxiously pushing for cross-Strait 
talks. The article said the Ma administration is walking voluntarily 
into China's trap and is therefore putting Taiwan's sovereignty in 
danger.  An op-ed in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei 
Times," written by Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum 
affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
urged Beijing to make some significant gestures in response to 
President Ma's call for "reconciliation and truce" between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait.  An editorial in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taiwan News," however, said Ma's peace offer will 
lock Taiwan into an "iron cage," which will gradually take the power 
out of the Taiwan people's hands to determine their own future.  An 
editorial in the pro-unification "United Daily News" discussed the 
historical significance of KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung's upcoming 
meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao and described it as the 
best "historical opportunity" for both sides to create a win-win 
situation.  In terms of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's recent 
visit to Beijing, an editorial in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" predicted that a new Cold War could 
soon begin unless the United States, Russia and China sit down and 
talk.  End summary. 
 
3. Cross-Strait Relations 
 
A) "The New Administration Voluntarily Walks into China's Trap; 
Taiwan's Sovereignty Meets with Disaster" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] 
editorialized (5/27): 
 
"... Evidently, the 'new era' advocated by President Ma did not 
refer to consolidating Taiwan's democracy and sovereignty, and 
instead, it denoted the beginning of Taiwan being ultimately unified 
by China.  Ever since Ma was elected, Beijing has been insisting on 
using the '1992 Consensus,' which offers no room for 'respective 
interpretation,' as the basis for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to 
resume dialogue.  Still, the new [Ma] administration and the KMT are 
keen on walking to the negotiation table daringly, a move which is 
akin to abandoning [Taiwan's] own position and yielding to the 
conditions set by China.  The so-called 'putting aside 
controversies' has turned out to be putting aside Taiwan's 
sovereignty.  Such a political direction runs entirely counter to 
Ma's campaign statement, in which he said he was running for the 
presidency of a sovereign nation. ... 
 
"There are two reasons why the new [Ma] administration and the KMT 
have been behaving so anxiously [in pushing for cross-Strait talks]: 
 First, their ideology.  They do not recognize the sovereign nation 
constituted by the 23 million people [of Taiwan].  They only 
recognize one China and that Taiwan is part of China.  Second, the 
check Ma and the KMT wrote regarding starting direct charter flights 
across the Taiwan Strait and allowing Chinese tourists to Taiwan 
beginning in July was akin to tying a rope around Taiwan's neck and 
handing the other end over to China; talking about the 1992 
Consensus only without mentioning one China with respective 
interpretations will thoroughly obliterate the essence of 
sovereignty for Taiwan or the Republic of China. ... 
 
"More serious is that the second-track [dialogue] established by the 
KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will allow China to employ 
a double-dealing strategy, taking advantage of the KMT-CCP platform 
to place pressure on the new [Ma] administration.  That is, from 
Lien Chan to Wu Poh-hsiung, [all KMT officials] will become the 
targets whom China wants to win over.  It is imaginable that the 
political consensuses reached by the Lien-Hu meeting and Wu-Hu 
meeting will form a kind of pressure such that political parties 
will dictate the policies, a way that will force the new [Ma] 
administration to make more substantive concessions to China and for 
Taiwan to give up more of its leverage.  It can be said that this is 
a trap set up by China to 'hurry the horses into the stable.'  In 
this vein, there will be an irreversible trend of Taiwan being 
tilted toward China for the next four years..." 
 
B) "Beijing Must Offer an Olive Branch" 
 
Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, and senior editor of 
Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal, opined in 
the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
RELATIONS 
 
30,000] (5/25): 
 
"... It should be relatively easy for Beijing to respond positively 
to Ma's calls for direct weekend charter flights and visits to 
Taiwan by Chinese tourists and other economic and cultural 
exchanges. Some security gesture, such as a visible drawback of 
missiles opposite Taiwan, is also doable without dramatically 
changing the security calculus. But, is Beijing prepared to make 
significant gestures aimed at truly improving Taiwan's sense of 
security and easing its international isolation? 
A failure by Beijing to respond positively to Ma's olive branches 
will seriously undercut the new Taiwanese leader as he tries to 
build consensus at home in support of his forward-looking 
cross-Strait policies. His address is already being labeled by the 
opposition as 'nave' and 'wishful thinking.' Will Beijing prove 
this to be the case? ... 
 
"It appears that Beijing is still struggling to figure out how to 
deal with a potentially friendly government in Taipei after years of 
branding every positive gesture by the Chen administration a mere 
'splittist trick.' ...  It is important for Beijing not to wait too 
long before making some significant gestures. For starters, it can 
observe Ma's call for a 'truce' in the international arena. ... 
Ma took a big political risk in reaching out to Beijing. Beijing 
needs to respond. Washington also needs to respond to Ma's gestures, 
while strongly encouraging Beijing to make significant positive 
gestures." 
 
C)  "Ma's 'Peace' Offers Iron Cage" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (5/27): 
 
"... Ma's slogans of 'one China, separate verbal expressions' and 
'no unification, no independence and no force' and his unilateral 
acceptance of the 'ethno-nationalist' proposition that the Taiwan 
people 'belong to the Chinese nation' reflect a fundamental shift in 
Taiwan's political paradigm. ... 
Ultimately, Ma's attempt to realize 'peace through integration' 
threatens to lock Taiwan into an "iron cage" that will gradually 
take the power to determine our right to determine the shape of our 
way of life and its core values out of our hands.  Whether this grim 
prospect is inevitable will depend on no one else but us and our 
resolve to defending the right of Taiwan people to act as 'masters 
of our own home.'" 
 
D) "The Historical Significance of the First Meeting between Leaders 
of the Ruling Parties of Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (5/26): 
 
"KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung set out for his visit to China today and 
will meet with General Secretary of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) Central Committee Hu Jintao the day after tomorrow.  This is 
the first meeting between leaders of the ruling parties of both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, which is of great significance. ...  Wu 
is the Chairman of the KMT, the ruling party of the Republic of 
China.  This is a political reality from which Hu did not shrink 
when he personally invited Wu to visit China.  However, since Hu has 
accepted [the reality that] Wu is 'the KMT Chairman,' it certainly 
and definitely implies that [Hu] at the same time acquiesces to the 
fact that the Republic of China is ruled by the KMT.  After all, if 
there is no Republic of China, how can Wu possibly be the chairman 
of the ROC's ruling party? ... 
 
"Therefore, we hope that the 'Wu-Hu meeting' between leaders of the 
ruling parties of both sides of the Strait share the common goal of 
walking jointly on the road of democracy and bringing happiness to 
their peoples.  We also hope they will encourage each other and wish 
one another well.  [Both sides of the Taiwan Strait] should lower 
the level of 'power struggle' as much as they can, and create, to 
the greatest extent possible, an atmosphere of 'healthy competition' 
and 'cooperation' ..." 
 
4. U.S.-China-Russia Relations 
 
"Beijing's New (Old) Best Friend" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (5/27): 
 
"... Similar fears appear to be animating two countries today: China 
and Russia. No historical friends (despite a fleetingly shared 
ideology) and long haunted by border disputes, Moscow and Beijing 
are being pushed into the same corner by policies of the US and its 
regional allies. Whether their reading of Washington's true 
intentions is accurate or not remains to be seen, but one thing is 
RELATIONS 
 
sure - the two are weary and they are acting on it, epitomized in no 
uncertain terms by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to 
Beijing over the weekend. ...  While it will be years, if not 
decades, before an effective US defense system can be deployed, 
China and Russia have already begun to adjust their policies and 
respective militaries to counter what they perceive as an attempt by 
the US to buttress its hegemonic power and thus allow it to dictate 
its policies in a part of the world that, in their eyes, is more 
theirs than Washington's. 
 
"Rather than sit down with its counterparts in Beijing and Moscow 
and find common ground on missile defense, Washington has acted in a 
manner that has alienated its counterparts and managed to make two 
unlikely allies shed their differences and join forces to 
counterbalance the US. Furthermore, the failure to engage in 
dialogue and the apprehensions that this gives rise to also 
threatens to compel Beijing and Moscow to expand their newfound 
friendship to include other countries - Iran comes to mind - that, 
for one reason or another, are inimical to the US and the alliances 
it leads.  There are, at present, no signs that dialogue between the 
two blocs will improve anytime soon. Secrecy, as the Cold War made 
crystal clear, begets secrecy. Beijing's lack of transparency on 
military matters - which has earned it no small amount of criticism 
by Washington - has contributed to the very mistrust in Japan, 
Taiwan and the US, among others, that makes the deployment of a 
missile defense shield desirable. But this plan also gives rise to a 
vicious circle in Russia and China, where the unclear intentions of 
the US have prompted them to bolster their defenses in a bid to 
countervail what they perceive as a threat to their sovereignties. 
 
Unless the principal parties sit down and talk soon, a new Cold War 
could soon begin in the east, with implications for all, not least 
Taiwan." 
 
WANG