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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI654, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI654 2008-05-12 09:41 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0015
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0654/01 1330941
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 120941Z MAY 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8902
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8255
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9498
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000654 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage May 10-12 on the continuing investigation into Taiwan's 
Papua New Guinea diplomatic fund scandal; on the sudden death of 
Taiwan's Interior Minister-designate Liao Fung-te; and on the lineup 
of Taiwan's President-elect Ma Ying-jeou's national security team. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" urged Ma to continue arms procurement 
from the United States.  A column in the centrist, KMT-leaning 
"China Times" implied that the United States in fact has a role in 
contributing to the diplomatic competition between Taiwan and China 
in the South Pacific.  An editorial in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taiwan News" asked Ma to think about whether a 
'truce in diplomacy' with China is really pragmatic and urged Ma to 
continue cultivating Taiwan's relations with Pacific island nations. 
 An op-ed in the pro-unification "United Daily News" gave several 
recommendations to Ma's administration to bring about 
all-dimensional economic and trade relations with Taiwan's major 
trading partners.  End Summary. 
 
A) [Taiwan's President-elect] Ma [Ying-jeou] Should Procure Arms 
[from the United States] 
 
The mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] 
editorialized (5/12): 
 
"... The United States wants Ma to make good on his promises after 
May 20 [inauguration day].  The first touchstone is [the sale] of 
F-16 C/Ds [warplanes].  We hope that while Ma improves relations 
with China, Ma will also reinforce the defense buildup and use arms 
procurements to retain the United States.  Reasonable arms 
procurements will not only strengthen Taiwan's defense and make the 
other side [China] not to use force hastily due to miscalculation, 
but also reinforce the defense relationship with the United States 
and deter China's intrusion.  At the same time, [arms procurement] 
is also an extremely important bargaining chip when [Taiwan] 
negotiates with China on highly political issues, such as demanding 
that China withdraw missiles [targeting Taiwan].  In other words, 
arms procurement is not going to sabotage [the intention] to improve 
relations with China, which is a dialectical relationship.  Instead, 
giving up building the military will weaken defense, alienate the 
United States, and allow China to demand everything from Taiwan.  Ma 
should clarify Taiwan's grand strategy and do things that are in 
accordance with the highest-level national interests and security. 
This is also a President's highest obligation, isn't it?" 
 
B) "Not Only Dollar Diplomacy Has to Be Changed" 
 
Jou Yi-cheng, a member of Taiwan's Third Society Party, wrote in the 
column "Idea Base" of the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" 
[circulation: 400,000] (5/12): 
 
"... For Taiwan, island nations in the South Pacific are probably 
targets for establishing diplomatic ties, as they have lower 
populations and [come] with a relative cheap price.  But for the 
United States, a global hegemon in an age of sea power, [the Pacific 
island nations] are the front where two major powers, the United 
States and China, a new sea power transformed from a land power, 
compete intensely. 
 
"After the breakout of [Taiwan's] Papua New Guinea diplomatic fund 
scandal, Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Michael 
Hayden pointed out in a recent speech that China has spent US$370 
million to lure away Pacific islands.  That is right.  China and the 
United States have been competing for natural resources and 
strategic deployment in the South Pacific.  Countries that have 
military forces in the South Pacific, such as the Papua New Guinea, 
Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu, all receive China's military aid. 
Therefore, the competition of dollar diplomacy between Taiwan and 
China in the South Pacific is not only an issue between Taiwan and 
China; instead, it is a triangular relationship among Taiwan, the 
United States, and China. 
 
"The best example is Kiribati, a country much smaller than Papua New 
Guinea.  Starting in 1997, China established a satellite tracking 
station [there].  The satellite tracking station enabled China to 
observe the United States' test of its missile defense system and 
became an arena of the wrestling between China and the United 
States.  In 2003, Kiribati established diplomatic ties with Taiwan 
and severed ties with China.  The satellite tracking station was 
ripped out.  China was forced to find other islands in the South 
Pacific Ocean to establish satellite tracking stations. 
 
"This explains the implication of the competition for diplomatic 
ties in the South Pacific between Taiwan and China.  Taiwan helps 
the United States exclude the interference of Chinese influence in 
specific strategic points in the South Pacific.  It is not a mistake 
that Taiwan supports the United States to have a role in Asia's 
 
security system.  However, [the consideration] whether we should 
devote ourselves unscrupulously and without any reservation in every 
point should be based on Taiwan-centric interests. ..." 
 
C) "[Taiwan's President-elect] Ma [Ying-jeou] Must Keep 'Pacific' 
Policy" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (5/12): 
 
"... Now, Ma apparently plans to place all of his government's bets 
on the improvement of cross-Strait relations to maintain Taiwan's 
international space, but crucial questions, such as whether the PRC 
leaders themselves want a diplomatic cease-fire and what would be 
the cost of such a 'truce,' remain unanswered. 
 
"Domestic media have reported that Ma aims to make his first state 
visits as president to Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central America 
in August with stopovers in New York City or even Washington D.C. 
 
"If so, it will be interesting to see whether Beijing will cease its 
uninterrupted practice of pressuring Washington to deny such 
high-profile transit stops and how Ma reacts to any attempts by the 
PRC to block the trip or even deliver humiliation to the Taiwan 
president en route, as the PRC regularly did to [Taiwan's President] 
Chen [Shui-bian]. 
 
"Improving cross-Strait ties can of course be a possible route to 
persuade Beijing to ease its suppression of Taiwan's international 
space, but we urge the new KMT government not to bet all of our 
diplomatic resources and prospects on such wishful thinking. ..." 
 
D) "All-dimensional Economy and Trade; Framing the Cross-Strait 
Agreement First" 
 
Tsai Horng-ming, the Deputy Secretary-General of Taiwan's Chinese 
National Federation of Industries, opined in the pro-unification 
"United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] (5/12): 
 
"In a speech delivered at the first annual session of 'the Republic 
of China Association of international Relations [on Saturday],' 
[Taiwan's] President-elect Ma Ying-jeou pointed out that he hopes to 
sign free trade agreements or similar arrangements with our major 
trade partners.  Owing to the scope of an 'all-dimensional 
negotiation' that Ma proposed covers Mainland [China], the United 
States, Southeast Asia, Japan, [South] Korea, and India, it shows 
that [Ma's] strategy of foreign economic and trade development hopes 
to establish an 'all-dimensional economic and trade networks' 
instead of leaning towards China in a one-way direction. 
 
"However, it is worthy to discuss how clearly to arrive at enough 
'economic inducements' to [our] economic partners and at the same 
time overcome the obstacle facing the 'Chinese factor' when trying 
to sign free trade agreements with other countries. 
 
"First, with regard to 'the economic inducement', take the free 
trade agreement with the United States for example: Taiwan can 
proactively plan the ultimate goals of the free trade agreement 
between Taiwan and the United States and the market interests [that 
benefit] United States businesses.  [Taiwan's] new government should 
negotiate continuously with the United States the framework of trade 
and investment.  [Taiwan's new government] also [needs to] propose 
mid- to long-term plans for liberalizing trade and investment, and 
make sure that by clearing away the hindrance of [issues such as] 
rice, pharmaceutical, and intellectual property rights, Taiwan can 
demonstrate its resolve to fulfill the 'comprehensive 
liberalization' of trade and investment by showing a timeline and a 
roadmap. ..." 
 
YOUNG