VZCZCXRO8046
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHYD #0368/01 1061543
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151543Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8807
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE 0136
RUEHFSI/DIR FSINFATC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 YAOUNDE 000368 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/C, M, S/ES-O/CMS, FLO, AND DS/IP/AF 
NFATC FOR FSI/LMS/CMT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AEMR AF AFIN AMGT ASEC CA CASC CM CMGT KFLO
SUBJECT: YAOUNDE AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE LESSONS LEARNED: IT 
CAN HAPPEN TO YOU 
 
REF: STATE 031997 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: During the last week of February 2008, 
Cameroon's renowned stability and tranquility of Cameroon 
were shattered by a spasm of rioting and violence that led 
Embassy Yaounde to request the authorized departure of 
eligible family members.  Mission Cameroon's lessons learned 
from this crisis include the importance of clear 
communication, institutionalized emergency preparation that 
involves host country authorities, staying ahead of the 
curve, and making the most of local employee expertise.  End 
Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Trite but True - Communication Counts 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) By far, the greatest challenge and frustration for the 
Mission related to communication issues, particularly those 
within the Embassy.  Disparate mission elements, including 
our branch office located in Douala which was the epicenter 
of violence, were hearing constant rumors and a handful of 
accurate reports which were often compared during our 
frequent EAC meetings, where key facts and trends were 
distilled.  We found this system worked effectively for 
decision-making at high levels, created an effective liaison 
between agencies represented at post, and provided the key 
information for warden messages, but it did not disseminate 
and control information internally as well as possible. An 
issue that came up early in the crisis was rumor control, 
which we successfully addressed by designating a single 
"rumint" point of contact to collect and compare information 
being received.  Another challenge post encountered was 
ambiguity about the information gathering and disseminating 
role of some sections.  The EAC meetings were usually 
attended by "core" Mission members.  As the crisis grew in 
magnitude and the implications of EAC decisions grew 
commensurately, Post ensured a broader participation in EAC 
meetings, which improved communication and coordination 
within the Mission. 
 
¶3. (U) Post established a Consular Control Center early in 
the crisis, which helped centralize and control information - 
but was probably not used to full potential.  As a 
medium-sized Embassy, staff often called one another or the 
duty officer rather than the control room to seek or share 
information.  We recommend that colleagues facing even a 
small scale crisis establish and use a control room to 
institutionalize communication patterns within post and 
between post and the Department.  A robust control room is a 
critical resource to manage information and can provide good 
practice for the staff that actually create and man the post, 
forcing them to check emergency supply closets, follow 
procedures, consult crisis reference materials, and manage 
real calls from real people.  Control room staff would also 
be responsible for maintaining a log, and for doing sitreps, 
relieving the EAC of those tasks which became cumbersome, in 
part because our first reports combined analysis with 
reporting on decisions made at EAC meetings. In our case, by 
the time the utility of a control room separate from Consular 
became obvious, the crisis was already subsiding. 
 
¶4. (U) Another lesson learned was our experience that many 
people hold unrealistic expectations about what can and 
should be done in an emergency.  It was important to 
communicate to both Mission employees and private Americans 
about what assistance they can expect, and under what 
conditions such assistance would be granted.  For example, 
American citizens are often surprised to learn that 
evacuation is not a free service, and Embassy families often 
have questions about when it is appropriate to consolidate in 
the main Embassy compound rather than in residences. 
 
¶5. (U) Although Post was fortunate that the regular and cell 
phone networks never went down, our communications themselves 
functioned well, and good backup systems were in place with 
radios and satellite phones.  The Peace Corps had good 
success in sharing information with volunteers via SMS, a 
system that post is working to extend to cover both Mission 
employees and private Americans registered with the Consular 
Section. 
 
------------------------ 
Practice = Preparedness 
------------------------ 
 
 
YAOUNDE 00000368  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6. (U) In responding to the crisis, post drew heavily on 
recent exercises and experiences (assisting in the evacuation 
of Embassy N'Djamena) as well as on our Emergency Action 
Plan, and found the resources and training that the 
Department has made in emergency preparedness to be valuable 
and effective.  Nonetheless, there were a number of areas for 
improvement that ranged from a need for additional 
communications gear to the need to update certain contact 
lists to the limitations of our host-country interlocutors. 
While our post will address these specifically, the moral of 
our story is that real emergencies happen when you don't 
expect them and don't always leave time to make preparations. 
 Also, many shortcomings became apparent only when attempting 
to actually gain remote access using a FOB, or when we 
learned that off-duty DOD personnel were not required to file 
a country clearance request, or when it became evident that 
planned consolidation points for Peace Corps volunteers were 
more dangerous than their regular sites.  In short, while 
tabletop exercises are useful in refining plans, drills that 
require staff to actually execute the plan are necessary to 
identify hidden difficulties and avoid unnecessary delays 
during a real crisis. 
 
¶7. (U) While Post has a strong set of contacts among the 
police and military authorities, we found that these entities 
were disorganized and/or ill-prepared to either receive or 
act upon requests to assist private Americans or other 
expatriates.  As a result, escort assistance was provided in 
a very ad hoc manner, making the already difficult task of 
coordinating the movement of expatriates significantly more 
challenging.  Consequently, post is joining with other 
missions to approach the host government requesting that it 
establish a central point of contact empowered to coordinate 
assistance to expatriates.  Post has also been prompted by 
the emergency to re-evaluate possible evacuation routes, and 
to consider whether private security firms have a useful role 
to play in assisting expatriates. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Take Care of the Troops and They Will Take Care of You 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶8. (U) First among the things that we believe went well 
during the crisis was our successful effort to reassure and 
engage our local staff in responding to the emergency.  Many 
staff made the risky decision to defy the transportation 
strike and transport colleagues to work, or to walk many 
miles on foot.  The Ambassador herself, in a Town Hall 
meeting early in the crisis, assured our local employees that 
their safety, and that of their families, was our first 
concern.  This was immensely important to them.  Likewise, 
the Herculean efforts made by the Budget and Finance Section 
to ensure that our LES staff was paid in a timely manner made 
a huge impression upon them.  These efforts were rewarded by 
extra effort on the part of our staff, who were invaluable 
eyes and ears, and who were instrumental in our efforts to 
locate and assist private Americans throughout Cameroon. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Hope for the Best but Plan for the Worst 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Among the more valuable aspects of EAC meetings were 
our discussions of worst-case scenarios.  Together with a 
review of our tripwires, this dialog kept the Mission 
thinking and planning ahead of a quickly evolving crisis, and 
set agreed benchmarks to avoid the "frog in the frying pan" 
mindset.  This allowed us to be proactive without being 
alarmist.  Most notably, it gave time for a sober review of 
the serious decision to move to authorized departure, a step 
that was taken partially to stay ahead of a potential 
deterioration in security and avoid an unmanageable rush of 
departures at a point when departing would be more difficult 
and/or expensive. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Know Your Wardens and Manage Your Data 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The Consular Section had some specific lessons 
already shared with the CA bureau and the Crisis Management 
Support staff, and would urge all colleagues to make time to 
invest in maintaining a strong warden system that backs up 
the internet-based registration system (IBRS).  In addition 
to assisting in efforts to locate and assist Americans, 
wardens are invaluable partners in getting security 
 
YAOUNDE 00000368  003 OF 003 
 
 
information as they often have broad networks that extend 
throughout the country and include Cameroonians as well as 
expatriates.  An issue with broader implications for post 
management was our discovery that the quantum leaps that have 
been made in the ability of the consular section to track 
private Americans using the consular taskforce software (CTF) 
come at the price of additional staffing demands, 
particularly prior to the establishment of a Washington 
taskforce to assist.  Effectively collecting and managing the 
huge amounts of data involved is a significant 
responsibility, and we strongly recommend that posts 
designate an officer exclusively to this task as early as 
possible. 
 
----------- 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
¶11. (U) Overall, Post felt well trained and equipped to 
respond to this emergency, and appreciated the excellent 
support provided by our colleagues in Washington.  The 
incident was a reminder that appearances can be deceiving, 
and that in Cameroon, as in many countries in the region, a 
deep reservoir of discontent fed by political 
disenfranchisement, unemployment and high commodity prices 
lies just under the placid surface.  Accordingly, all the 
investments that post has made in developing contingency 
plans, testing communications gear, and engaging with host 
country counterparts have paid handsome dividends.  Post will 
strive to further improve our readiness to respond to a still 
unsettled situation, and we encourage our colleagues to find 
ways to build emergency preparations into your routines, and 
to engage host country counterparts in frank and specific 
discussions about your own worst-case scenarios. 
NELSON