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Viewing cable 08USUNNEWYORK343, UNSC REFORM: MOSTLY PROCESS AND LITTLE SUBSTANCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08USUNNEWYORK343 2008-04-11 22:57 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO0503
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #0343/01 1022257
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 112257Z APR 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4108
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8470
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2154
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0946
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1877
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0586
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0670
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 1955
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KUNR UNSC BR IN JA GR
SUBJECT: UNSC REFORM: MOSTLY PROCESS AND LITTLE SUBSTANCE 
IN LATEST OEWG MEETING 
 
REF: A. USUN 310 
     B. STATE 36722 (NOTAL) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary and comment.  President of the General 
Assembly (PGA) Serdjam Kerim convened the Open-Ended Working 
Group (OEWG) on April 10 to discuss the four proposals he 
received as a basis for inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) 
on UNSC reform -- the Cypriot paper, Italian letter, African 
letter, and OIC letter (ref A) -- and try to divine a way 
forward.  Instead of discussing the substance of these 
proposals, member states focused largely on the process by 
which these proposals were developed and repeated their 
positions on UNSC reform.  The G-4 group was split 
internally, with Germany and Brazil expressing support for 
the Cypriot paper and calling for IGN to start immediately, 
Japan doing the same but complaining about parts of the 
paper, and India appearing to reject the Cypriot effort 
completely because it does not adequately reflect the option 
of adding new permanent members to the Council.  Uniting for 
Consensus (UFC) countries, led by Italy and Pakistan, refused 
even to acknowledge the validity of the Cypriot paper, and 
called for the OEWG to first agree on a procedural framework 
to prepare such a paper before it could be properly 
considered.  They repeated their view that intermediate 
expansion of the UNSC -- new longer-duration, non-permanent 
seats -- is the only basis for discussion. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary and comment cont'd.  P-5 states were also 
split along familiar lines, with the UK and France expressing 
support for the G-4 model as well as a willingness to 
consider intermediate expansion, and the U.S., Russia, and 
China taking a cautious approach.  The U.S., Russia, and 
China agreed that the OEWG, which operates on the basis of 
consensus, should be the forum for discussions on UNSC 
reform.  The African Group, the largest bloc of votes not 
allied with either the G-4 or UFC positions, used the OEWG 
meeting to reiterate its unreaslistic insistence on two new 
permanent seats for Africa with veto rights as well as two 
additional non-permanent seats.  This exhange of well-known 
and unchanged positions left many member states to conclude 
that an opportunity to move UNSC reform forward had been 
lost.  At the conclusion of the meeting, a beleagured PGA 
Kerim effectively passed the buck on UNSC reform to his Task 
Force, which now confronts the nearly impossible task of 
reconciling the views expressed during this debate into a 
basis for IGN that can be agreed by all states.  The Task 
Force will start consulting with member states next week and 
hopes to present its report at another meeting of the OEWG in 
mid-May.  End summary and comment. 
 
PGA Passes Buck to Task Force 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (U) PGA Kerim opened the meeting by commending states for 
the four inputs they submitted on UNSC reform and announcing 
that his Task Force -- PermReps from Bangladesh, Portugal, 
Chile, and now Djibouti -- would initiate discussions with 
the membership on how to reach an agreed basis on which to 
begin IGN.  He expressed his intention to convene another 
OEWG meeting soon at which the Task Force could present its 
report.  He hoped that the report would lead to negotiations 
in the UNGA before the end of the 62nd session, but added 
that the OEWG (which operates on the basis of consensus) 
should continue to function until there is an agreed text on 
which to begin negotiations.  Kerim said that during these 
negotiations, member states would have to commit to UNSC 
reform at the highest political levels, compromise to the 
maximum extent possible, and refrain from unilateral steps 
(such as tabling a separate resolution while the negotiations 
are underway).  He also emphasized that reform of the UNSC is 
an integral part of overall UN reform. 
 
P-5 Split Along Familiar Lines 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (U) The P-5 split along familiar lines, with the UK and 
France embracing both the G-4 and intermediate expansion 
models in light of the Brown-Sarkozy communique released 
after the recent UK-France summit, and the U.S., Russia, and 
China underscoring the need for the broadest possible 
agreement on UNSC expansion and reiterating several 
red-lines.  The UK and France both termed the Cyprus paper a 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000343  002 OF 003 
 
 
good starting point for IGN and said they were ready to 
discuss intermediary solutions which could lead to renewable, 
non-permanent seats with the option for conversion to 
permanent status in the future.  They also said any reform 
must ensure the UNSC remains effective.  China and Russia 
declared that the OEWG must remain the channel for UNSC 
reform.  China said any expansion of the Council should 
increase the representation of small and developing 
countries, especially from Africa, but should be acceptable 
to all member states.  China also welcomed the PGA's plans on 
how to proceed.  Russia said it was "open to considering 
intermediate solutions" but emphasized that any reform should 
secure much more than the two-thirds majority required by the 
UN Charter.  Russia also said it favors the "compact nature" 
of the UNSC. 
 
5. (U) Per ref B, Amb Wolff expressed appreciation for the 
various proposals submitted to the PGA on UNSC expansion, but 
reiterated several well-known U.S. positions.  First, 
expansion of the UNSC must preserve its ability to respond 
quickly and effectively to threats to international peace and 
security, which means only a modest increase in seats is 
possible.  Second, aspiring intermediate or permanent members 
must have demonstrated strong commitments to democracy, human 
rights, and non-proliferation and provide substantial 
peacekeeping or financial contributions to the UN.  Third, 
UNSC reform must be part of a package of comprehensive reform 
of the UN.  Fourth, the OEWG should not focus on working 
methods of the UNSC, as the Charter entrusts each principal 
organ to devise its own working methods.  Fifth, it is vital 
to achieve the broadest possible support for UNSC expansion 
to ensure that no significant portion of the membership is 
alienated by the result.  For this reason, the OEWG should 
remain the forum to carry forward discussions on IGN. 
 
G-4 Air Their Dirty Laundry 
--------------------------- 
 
6. (U) Within the G-4 camp, Germany and Brazil were most 
positive about the Cypriot proposal, while Japan expressed 
reservations about the text and India excoriated it.  Germany 
and Japan, arguing that the "overwhelming majority" of 
countries are ready to begin IGN and that the Cyprus text 
offers a good basis to start, said there is no need for any 
more preparatory work.  Member states should start IGN now, 
without waiting for another report.  Brazil also supported 
the Cyprus text and called for IGN to start.  Although Japan 
supported the Cyprus text as a basis for IGN, it said UNSC 
reform must include additional permanent seats, and 
complained that the Cyprus text does not adequately reflect 
this option.  Indian PermRep Sen, in an especially convoluted 
20 minute speech, insisted that UNSC reform must include 
expansion in the permanent category in order to check the 
unfettered power of the P5.  New intermediate seats would be 
unable to remedy this "historical injustice."  Sen ridiculed 
the OIC for purporting to represent developing countries 
while opposing new permanent seats, which he said is the only 
way to rebalance power in favor of the developing world, and 
he criticized the Cyprus text for failing to appreciate this 
fact. 
 
UFC Talks Only Process 
---------------------- 
 
7. (U) UFC delegations, led by Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, 
Argentina, South Korea, Canada, and Spain, refused to discuss 
the substance of the Cyprus proposal and insisted that it had 
no legitimacy as a basis for IGN.  Recalling the report of 
the facilitators in the 61st UNGA, UFC delegations repeated 
once again that only intermediate expansion, without the 
option of new permanent members, could be a basis for 
negotiations.  But to begin those negotiations, member states 
must first agree on a procedural framework, then agree on a 
text basis for IGN, and only then can they start the actual 
negotiations.  All of these discussions, UFC countries 
argued, must take place in the OEWG -- which operates on the 
basis of consensus.  Pakistan and Italy made the debate 
personal by attacking the German-Cypriot over-arching group 
effort as exclusive and arbitrary in nature.  They termed the 
Cypriot paper "regression" from the results of last year's 
OEWG discussions because it failed to focus solely on the 
intermediate option.  In deference to Africa, Italy argued 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000343  003 OF 003 
 
 
for new permanent seats for regional organizations (such as 
the AU or EU), while Pakistan insisted that the Muslim 
"Ummah" desrves at least one-third of the seats on the UNSC 
because Muslim states comprise 57 of 192 member states of the 
UN. 
 
Africans Close Ranks and Stand Firm 
----------------------------------- 
 
8. (U) The African Group, the largest bloc of votes not 
allied with either the G-4 or UFC positions, used the OEWG 
meeting to reiterate its long-held insistence on two new 
permanent seats for Africa with veto rights as well as two 
additional non-permanent seats (also called the Ezulwini 
Consensus).  Several African states which supported India's 
submission of a unilateral resolution (L69) on UNSC reform 
during last year's OEWG meeting in an effort to jump-start 
negotiations on the issue, such as South Africa, Nigeria, and 
Congo, reverted to the African Group position during this 
meeting.  Several African speakers noted that AU Foreign 
Ministers directed their PermReps to "participate" in IGN on 
UNSC reform, but only on the basis of the Ezulwini Consensus. 
 In defending the Ezulwini Consensus, many African speakers 
railed against the "historical injustice" that deprived 
Africa of permanent seats on the UNSC in 1945, and questioned 
why Africa should allow the same mistake to be repeated now. 
 
Next Step: Good Luck Task Force 
------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) At the close of the meeting, a somewhat beleagured 
Kerim announced that he would ask his Task Force to begin 
consulting member states as early as next week (April 14-18), 
with a view to presenting a report on reconciling the four 
inputs as soon as possible.  Separately, USUN heard from the 
Portugese and Chilean Missions that the Task Force intends to 
meet with UN regional groups first, followed by meetings with 
interested groups such as the P-5, UFC, G-4, AU, etc.  These 
meetings would be intended to present a new text as a basis 
for IGN by mid-May.  The Portugese and Chileans acknowledged 
that their task is an extraordinarily difficult one, as it 
was not clear from the OEWG meeting how the four separate 
inputs could be reconciled, given the wide divergence in 
views expressed.  But they suggested the Task Force would try 
to present a paper nonetheless, and if that paper were 
rejected as a basis for IGN, at least the Task Force would 
have done its job. 
Khalilzad