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OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0990/01 1011244
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O 101244Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3354
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2760
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0132
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2216
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 1183
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 8784
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 7213
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 9590
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0882
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 7806
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3289
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9307
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000990 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PARM JA NATO
SUBJECT: EMBASSY AND USFJ DISCUSS OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF 
BANNING CLUSTER MUNITIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affairs, a.i. W. Michael Meserve.  Reasons 1.4 
 (B) (D) 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY: Japan remains committed to addressing 
cluster munitions (CM) within the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) but may be forced to sign an 
agreement restricting CM under the Oslo Process, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
officials told Embassy Tokyo and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) 
representatives during an April 4 meeting.   Embassy and USFJ 
participants explained that if Japan agrees to restrict CM, 
it would limit the United States ability to defend Japan. 
Specifically, CM limitations would prevent dual use of USFJ, 
Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and civilian facilities, 
limit military options for dealing with contingencies, and 
require both the United States and Japan to use more 
resources to get the same operational results.  The MOFA and 
MOD participants said the information would be useful in 
explaining to members of Japan's Diet the importance of 
cluster munitions.  End Summary. 
 
Japan's Position Unchanged: Handle CM in CCW, But... 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (S) Japan remains committed to creating a legally binding 
agreement on cluster munitions (CM) within the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), preferably via a new 
Protocol, but may be forced to sign a more restrictive Oslo 
Process agreement, MOFA Conventional Arms Division Director 
Ryuichi Hirano and MOD Japan-U.S. Cooperation Division 
Director Kiyoshi Serizawa told Embassy Tokyo and U.S. Forces 
Japan (USFJ) representatives on April 4.  While domestic 
pressure means Japan cannot ignore the Oslo Process, Japan is 
keeping in close contact with ""Like-Minded"" countries, such 
as the United Kingdom, France and Australia, to positively 
affect the outcome.  Hirano noted that Japan had ""subscribed"" 
but not agreed to the Wellington Declaration and that the May 
2008 Dublin Conference would address Japan's concerns over 
definitions, implementation time period, and 
interoperability. 
 
USFJ: CM Are Different from Anti-Personnel Mines 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3.  (S) The MOD and MOFA representatives asked how 
restricting or banning CM would affect the ability of U.S. 
forces to defend Japan and operate with the JSDF.  The USFJ 
representative said applying the present work-around for 
anti-personnel landmines (APL) covered by the Ottawa APL 
Treaty Process would be inappropriate because CM have much 
broader applications in a greater variety of operations.  If 
Japan signs on to an agreement limiting or banning CM with 
the same language as the APL Treaty, USFJ will only be able 
to store CM at a limited number of USFJ bases.  In addition, 
JSDF personnel or civilians would not be able to transport CM 
between or store CM at JSDF or civilian facilities. 
 
Banning CM Means Limiting Ability to Defend Japan 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4.  (S) USFJ reviewed the training and operations 
difficulties both sides might face if CM were to be banned or 
restricted.  The inability of USFJ to conduct training along 
side the JSDF using CM, as currently happens under the 
existing restrictions on training with APL, means the 
capabilities of JSDF and United States forces are reduced, as 
opposed to being improved.  In a contingency, United States 
warplane squadrons would not be able to relocate to JSDF or 
civilian airports (for instance to make room for increased 
military transport planes) because the CM would not be able 
to be stored, guarded and loaded by JSDF and/or Japanese 
civilians.  Japan would be unable to participate, either 
directly or by providing support such as in-air refueling, in 
operations in the region involving the employment of CM. 
 
¶5.  (S) Limiting CM storage to particular locations would 
provide the enemy with specific targets to attack.  Enemies 
could be emboldened to launch attacks on Japan,s outer 
islands if they know that CM could not be used to attack 
amphibious landing craft and ground troops on beaches. 
Without CM, Japan and the United States will have to dedicate 
more budgetary, human and material resources to accomplish 
the same results.   Restricting or banning CM limits United 
States options and increases operational risk for both sides. 
 
Rapid Results Needed in CCW 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Hirano said the Government of Japan understands the 
importance of CM in defending Japan and wants to sign a 
loose, though binding, protocol under the CCW and not the 
Oslo Process.  Japan also appreciates the affect that the 
current language contained in the Dublin text would have on 
interoperability.  Ministry officials are explaining the 
importance of CM to Diet members, and will incorporate the 
examples provided by USFJ, Hirano noted.  However, if the CCW 
does not provide a quick and satisfactory conclusion, 
domestic pressure to take action may force Japan to sign a 
treaty proposed under the Oslo Process.  Therefore, Japan is 
working to change language in the Dublin draft text so that 
the affect of a limited ban on JSDF and USFJ operations would 
be minimized.  By way of example, Tokyo officials noted that 
prohibiting States Parties from ""owning or possessing"" CM, 
instead of preventing signatories from ""retaining"" CM, would 
allow Japanese civilians or SDF personnel to transport CM. 
MESERVE