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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0349/01 1121611
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211611Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1370
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SECOND REVIEW 
CONFERENCE A MODEST SUCCESS 
 
REF: A. STATE 34977 (REVCON GUIDANCE) 
     ¶B. STATE 17328 (REVCON OBJECTIVES AND REDLINES) 
 
This is CWC-16-08. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Second Special Conference to 
Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (RevCon), after difficult and protracted 
negotiations, adopted a 152-paragraph substantive 
report reviewing all aspects of the Convention and 
setting the course for the future.  The key U.S. 
objectives were minimally met, and none of our 
redlines were crossed.  There was far less pressure 
with respect to U.S. chemical weapons (CW) 
destruction than expected; the final text merely 
expresses concern and calls upon all CW possessor 
States Parties (SPs) to destroy their stockpiles 
within their extended deadlines.  Success needs to be 
measured in what is not/not in the report; much 
effort was expended by western delegations in keeping 
new initiatives on victims of CW, international 
cooperation, and corresponding budget increases out 
of the document.  The U.S. delegation kept language 
on incapacitants out of the report, and only allowed 
the Convention language on Riot Control Agents 
(RCAs). The process was complicated by extremely 
inept chairmanship in the Committee of the Whole, as 
well as the obdurate positions and brinksmanlike 
negotiating tactics of a few delegations, most 
notably Iran and, to a lesser extent, India. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:  Of the CWC's 183 States 
Parties, 114 participated in the Review Conference, 
signaling the strong support for the Convention that 
has grown progressively in its eleven-year life. 
During the Review Conference's opening days, 45 
states spoke during the General Debate, in addition 
to collective statements on behalf of the European 
Union (EU) and associated states, the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and China, the African Group, and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and a 
separate statement from the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China. 
 
¶3. (U) THE FINAL DOCUMENT PROCESS:  The Final Report 
includes 152 substantive paragraphs, addressing the 
overall Operation of the Convention and setting out 
objectives for the coming years.  It was based on a 
draft document developed over the course of a year in 
an Open-Ended Working Group, chaired by Ambassador 
Lyn Parker (UK), in which Western delegations 
participated more actively and substantively than did 
NAM delegations.  While this should have facilitated 
a smooth and quick process for resolving issues 
within the two week span of the Review Conference, 
the arrival of fully formulated NAM positions just 
before the RevCon (and, indeed, the very existence of 
a NAM coordinated proposal), supplemented by the more 
radical national positions of Iran and a handful of 
others, significantly raised the number of unresolved 
issues and the general polarization of the 
Conference.  This, coupled with a Committee of the 
Whole Chairman (Amb. Benchaa Dani, Algeria) who was 
neither familiar with the draft document nor capable 
of inducing diverse views into a compromise product, 
made for a slow negotiating process that did not 
yield compromise text. 
 
¶4. (U) After two readings in the Committee of the 
Whole, with an unwieldy document containing numerous 
counter- proposals and bracketed text, Amb. Dani 
turned, too late in the process, to five facilitators 
for help.  Although the products of facilitation were 
useful, it was too little, too late.  The 
facilitation groups lasted only half a day (the 
afternoon of April 16) before a rescue operation was 
 
set up consisting of 18 delegations invited by the 
Conference Chairman (Amb. Waleed El Khereiji, Saudi 
Arabia), initially without the knowledge of other 
delegations, to begin the tedious process of turning 
the heavily-bracketed text into a consensus document. 
That small friends of the chair group met 
continuously for 48 hours with one short nap break, 
while the Committee of the Whole continued its work 
on the introductory part of the report.  El Khereiji 
took charge of the drafting group and pulled the text 
out of the ashes toward a final product. 
 
¶5. (U) However, the lack of transparency (other 
delegations were not informed of the membership of 
the friends of the chair group, were unclear about 
the schedule, and worried -- correctly -- that they 
would be forced to accept a document without 
discussion) led to growing resentment among other 
delegations and sharp formal statements about the 
process in the final plenary meeting.  Southeast 
Asian states were particularly unhappy, as they were 
not represented in the gang of 18. 
 
¶4. (SBU) U.S. OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS:  U.S. Del, led 
by Ambassador Javits and ISN/CB Director Mikulak, was 
successful in protecting U.S. redlines and achieving 
overall U.S. objectives, including:  reinforcing 
commitment to the Convention's objectives; broadening 
understanding of the comprehensive nature of the 
Convention (the General Purpose Criterion); 
reinforcing the importance of compliance with Treaty 
commitments, and of the CWC's compliance mechanisms, 
including challenge inspection; reinforcing the call 
to meet national implementation (Article VII) 
obligations; laying the groundwork in a number of 
areas for evolution of the OPCW to more capably 
address its mounting nonproliferation objectives. The 
overall document held to our bottom line that the 
second RevCon not walk back from the 2003 report. 
Del was successful in tempering language calling for 
destruction by possessor states within deadlines, 
deflecting language on incapacitating agents, and in 
preventing NAM efforts to establish action plans on 
assistance and protection (Article X) and 
international cooperation (Article XI).  The document 
instead contains extensive, redundant (but not 
particularly problematic) hortatory passages on these 
two NAM hobby horses. 
 
¶5. (SBU) CONFERENCE DYNAMICS:  Most, if not all, 
delegations approached the Review Conference with a 
seriousness of purpose and a clear desire for a 
success, evidenced in a willingness to work the text, 
and seek compromise, consensus outcomes. 
Unsurprisingly, Iran was particularly difficult, even 
duplicitous, in its negotiating tactics.  However, 
Iran did not push some of its more troublesome 
agendas (assistance to CW victims; efforts to 
undermine the legitimacy of export controls) as 
aggressively as expected, and seemed motivated mainly 
by knee-jerk opposition to Western (especially U.S.) 
proposals and a desire to be seen as a key player in 
the negotiations, on par with the U.S., China, and 
other powers.  The Iranians clearly demonstrated, 
particularly to their fellow NAM delegations, in both 
the small drafting group and the Committee of the 
Whole that they were the single biggest barrier to a 
constructive outcome.  The Cuban Ambassador, who 
chairs the NAM, was far more constructive than Iran 
in final negotiations.  (Del comment: Iran may find 
it more difficult in future to hijack the NAM for its 
own agenda.  This would be a positive outcome for 
future negotiations.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) India, Pakistan, and South Africa were also 
troublesome throughout.  India, in particular, took 
inflexible, dogmatic stances that appear to be 
 
motivated by a desire to freeze the CWC verification 
regime in its current form to protect Indian 
industry, only yielding in the last hours.  Del 
worked well and cooperatively with the EU, other 
Western Allies, and moderate NAM delegations.  China 
played a quiet and relatively constructive role. 
Russia was supportive on national implementation but 
appeared to have no particular agenda other than 
avoiding criticism of their CW destruction efforts. 
 
¶7. (SBU) WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?  The Review 
Conference launched no new initiatives and stayed the 
current successful course of the OPCW.  There are 
affirmations and statements in the final report that 
could be used to advance U.S. objectives in the OPCW. 
The report could just as easily gather dust, however. 
What matters now is a diligent, ongoing effort to use 
these key references as leverage to advance our 
goals. 
 
¶8. (U) Javits sends. 
Gallagher