VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #0792/01 0951224
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041224Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6176
INFO RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0927
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR PM/DTCC (BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR, STITZIEL) 
STATE FOR NEA/IPA (PECCIA) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC IS
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN FOLLOW UP ON RDT EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS 
 
REF: A) TEL AVIV 481 B) STITZIEL-KEAYS 3/6/08 E-MAIL 
     C) STATE 7531 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) On April 3, emboffs met with RDT Equipment and 
Systems (RDT) executives to follow up on questions regarding 
the company's possession and transfer of a USML-controlled 
FLIR camera.  Operations Manager Noam Sarfati acknowledged 
that the FLIR camera in RDT's possession was left with 
Fibrotex "for a few days" so that the company could perform 
extended tests on the materials it is producing.  Sarfati was 
able to produce an in-house document referring to a temporary 
export license issued by the State Department authorizing 
RDT's possession of the FLIR camera, but could not show any 
subsequent license authorization or conditions for possession 
and use of the camera.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Emboffs' April 3 visit to RDT was prompted by 
questions raised during a February 20 pre-license check of an 
Israeli company -- Fibrotex Technologies -- which was 
proposing to import a FLIR camera (ref A).  At that time, 
emboffs discovered that Fibrotex had already obtained a FLIR 
camera on loan and without a license from the State 
Department.  Subsequent research by the State Department's 
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls raised further concerns 
that RDT itself may have acquired the FLIR camera without a 
license (ref B). 
 
-------------------------- 
DETAILS ON THE FLIR CAMERA 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) On April 3, emboffs met with RDT Operations Manager 
Noam Sarfati and Sarit Cohen to follow up on questions 
regarding the company's possession and transfer of the 
USML-controlled FLIR camera to Fibrotex. At emboff's 
questioning, Sarfati acknowledged that RDT salesman Oz Koren 
had visited Fibrotex to demonstrate the FLIR camera and 
"might have left it for a short time." (NOTE: Emboffs noted 
that this was at odds with Fibrotex engineer Vladimir 
Kotler's statement on February 20, that Fibrotex had been 
authorized by RDT to keep the camera on loan until their own 
camera could be delivered (ref A).  END NOTE.) Sarfati said 
that RDT frequently does allow companies to keep licensed 
technologies on loan for several days so they can conduct 
"extended checks" of the technology before deciding to buy 
it.  He quickly added, however, that as soon as Fibrotex's 
license application for the FLIR camera was denied, RDT had 
their lawyer send a letter to Fibrotex requesting the 
camera's return.  Sarfati showed emboffs the camera he 
claimed that Fibrotex was using -- an SC4000 ThermaCAM.  The 
serial number (S/N) on the camera was 1011.  The part number 
(P/N) was 420-0044-04-00P.  The camera also bore the 
following markings:  Rev. 130.  320x256 InSB.  The camera was 
contained in a large, plastic case protected by foam padding, 
stored alongside cables and other components. 
 
----------------------------- 
DETAILS ON THE EXPORT LICENSE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) When asked under what authority RDT received and 
operated the FLIR camera, Cohen produced a document on RDT 
systems letterhead that stated that the FLIR camera system 
was being consigned to RDT under "an approved temporary 
export license as issued by the U.S. Department of State, 
license no. 730001118, a copy of which has been provided to 
us."  The document further stated that the ThermaCAM SC4000 
system is to be used for demonstration purposes, and that 
RDT's "possession and temporary use of the....equipment is 
anticipated to be between the following dates: 
(07-11-21-07-12-15)."  Neither Cohen nor Sarfati could 
produce a copy of the State Department-approved export 
license.  When emboffs pointed out that the document was 
printed on RDT letterhead, Sarfati explained that it had been 
e-mailed from the FLIR manufacturer with instructions to 
print it on company stationery.  When emboffs noted that the 
temporary license document specified anticipated dates of use 
from November 21, 2007 through December 15, 2007, Sarfati 
seemed confused and insisted that there must have been a 
mistake.  He suggested that there may have been a more recent 
license issued, but said he never received a copy of it.  He 
explained that RDT does not receive licenses directly from 
the USG for any of the controlled items in RDT's possession, 
but rather relies on the manufacturers to obtain the 
necessary authorizations.  When asked, Sarfati was able to 
produce copies of Department of Commerce-issued licenses and 
terms of use for five other cameras purchased by RDT. 
Sarfati identified the following person as RDT's main point 
of contact at FLIR Systems in the U.S.: 
 
Melissa Wilkinson 
Trade Compliance Officer 
FLIR Systems, Indigo Operations 
70 Castilian Drive 
Goleta, CA  93117 
Phone:  (805) 690-7176 
FAX:  (805) 685-2711 
 
Sarfati said that Wilkinson may have sent the text of the RDT 
document.  Sarfati said that there is another person in 
Sweden who works for FLIR and who is responsible for Israel. 
Without providing his name, Sarfati indicated that it is 
possible that either this man or Ms. Wilkinson may possess a 
copy of the original export license for the FLIR camera, 
issued by the State Department. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DISCUSSION ON MAINTAINING CONTROL OF THE CAMERA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Emboffs noted that the document specified that RDT 
agrees "...to maintain control of the equipment at all times 
and not to additionally consign the equipment to any third 
party not specifically named on the license," and "...to be 
responsible for taking all necessary steps to ensure the 
security of the equipment on the license from loss, theft, or 
unauthorized access."  When asked if he believed this would 
allow RDT to leave the FLIR camera with Fibrotex 
unsupervised, Sarfati said that his company "has to be 
lenient on that because nobody will purchase anything if they 
cannot test it."  He added that while he was not aware of any 
specific directives regarding restrictions on the use of the 
FLIR camera, he uses his "common sense," to ensure that the 
technology is protected.  The document -- signed by Avi Tiv, 
General Manager for RDT Equipment and Systems -- further 
states that RDT agrees to maintain security measures for the 
equipment, but lacks a description of the security measures 
to be maintained.  (NOTE:  A copy of the document has been 
sent by FAX to PM/DDTC at FAX number 202-261-8198). 
 
¶6. (SBU) Sarfati acknowledged that his company is regularly 
audited by the Israeli Ministry of Defense's Directorate for 
Security (Malmab/DSDE), and volunteered that all RDT 
employees go through background checks and receive Israeli 
military security clearances.  He claimed not to be familiar 
with new GOI export control laws, however, and suggested that 
his security office might be familiar with them. 
 
¶7. (SBU) At the beginning of the meeting, Sarfati said that 
salesman Oz Koren, who has worked at RDT for two years, had 
allowed Fibrotex to borrow the camera for "a few days."  At 
another moment, he said RDT may have left the camera with 
Fibrotex for "a short amount of time."  At the end of the 
meeting, Sarfati backpedaled from his original statement and 
suggested instead that the unit was in fact not left 
unsupervised overnight.  He said he would have to ask the 
salesman to find out more about the dates that Fibrotex used 
the camera, and indicated that he would be able to supply a 
listing of the dates when Fibrotex used the camera, if such a 
listing is requested. 
 
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