VZCZCXRO3940
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #1993/01 1122207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 212200Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1431
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1004

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 041993 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO PREL PGOV UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR 22 APRIL 2008 UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
CONSULTATIONS ON UNAMID 
 
¶1.  PURPOSE:  This is an action request.  The Department asks 
that USUN draw upon the following points for the United 
Nations Security Council briefing and consultations on the 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur on 22 
April 2008. 
 
--We welcome Secretary-General Ban's April 14 report.  Rapid 
and effective deployment of UNAMID is a fundamental element 
of the international community's strategy for peace in 
Darfur, and we share the Secretary-General's extreme 
disappointment with the lack of progress on all fronts.  With 
that in mind, I would like to make four main points: 
 
---------------------- 
¶1.  SECURITY SITUATION 
---------------------- 
 
-- We continue to be gravely concerned by the security 
situation, which was extremely volatile during the reporting 
period from January to March.  During this time we saw 
reprisal attacks by the government of Sudan in response to 
rebel activity in Western Sudan that included indiscriminate 
bombing of villages and use of the janjaweed as proxy 
fighters.  Cross-border activity between Sudan and Chad only 
added to the violence and insecurity that has had tragic 
repercussions for the civilian population.  Clearly, this 
well-known cycle of violence and the lawlessness that it 
engenders must stop.  The GOS must fulfill its commitments to 
disarm the janjaweed and provide professional police that can 
offer some baseline security.  Sudan and Chad must cease all 
unauthorized cross-border activity.  More security is 
critical to reducing the frequent incidence of sexual and 
gender-based violence against internally displaced persons 
and the disruptive rebel violence.  This banditry has 
severely hampered humanitarian aid delivery, forcing the 
World Food Program to cut food rations in half next month. 
 
-- We welcome the significant increase in UNAMID's patrols 
throughout Darfur and appreciate the expanded 
confidence-building patrols by both the military and police. 
Such a presence in the internally displaced persons (IDP) 
camps is critical to achieving the core of UNAMID's mandate: 
protection of civilians.  We appreciate the UNAMID Police 
Commissioner's emphasis on 24/7 patrols in IDP camps.  UNAMID 
should do even more to demonstrate its robust commitment to 
protect civilians in Darfur and to challenge any party, 
rebel, Government, or Arab militia that obstructs that 
objective.  And given the rapes and other crimes against 
women and children that have occurred, we particularly 
welcome UNAMID programs and participation in efforts to 
address these issues. 
 
--An immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties 
remains the highest priority.  Sudan must fulfill its 
commitments and disarm the janjaweed.  Also among the highest 
priorities, all parties must also comply with the 28 March 
2007 humanitarian communiqu,. In addition, we emphasize we 
are closely watching the situation between northern and 
southern Sudan, as a reversion to conflict would gravely harm 
prospects for progress in Darfur and risk catastrophic 
consequences for the rest of Sudan.  We are particularly 
concerned by violence in the oil-rich Abyei area, where 
several hundred people have died in recent clashes.  The GOS 
must not fuel the violence by arming the Misseriya.  All 
parties must abide by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
including the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission. 
 
--------------------- 
¶2.  UNAMID DEPLOYMENT 
--------------------- 
 
--We are deeply and increasingly disappointed by the slow 
deployment of UNAMID.  Our Special Envoy Richard Williamson 
continues to work with the Friends of UNAMID to engage 
proactively with every major part of the process required for 
UNAMID deployment, including the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and troop-contributing countries. We 
strongly urge all Security Council members to support the 
goal of an additional 3,600 troops for UNAMID by June and 
two-thirds of the full force by the end of the year. 
 
-We continue to seek missing assets that UNAMID desperately 
needs:  helicopters, transport units, multi-role logistics 
unit, multi-role engineering unit, and aerial reconnaissance 
aircraft.  We urge member states to help fill these gaps. 
 
 
STATE 00041993  002 OF 002 
 
 
--The GOS must fully cooperate and end its obstructions to 
UNAMID's deployment.  This means ending its on-going use of 
violence in Darfur, accepting the UN-AU list of TCCs, 
allowing night flights without time limits, providing access 
to land and water for UNAMID camps, and granting timely visas 
and customs clearances.  The GOS must ensure that attacks 
such as the 7 January 2008 unprovoked attack on a UNAMID 
convoy never happen again. 
 
--------------------- 
¶3.  POLITICAL PROCESS 
--------------------- 
 
-Although the primary obstacle to peace in Darfur is the will 
of the parties, the United Nations and member states must do 
more to push for rapid deployment of UNAMID, which would 
improve security on the ground and create a better space 
within which the United Nations-African Union-led political 
process can advance.  Slow movement by the UN and some of its 
TCCs must be replaced by a sense of urgency, and real action 
that will lead to long promised deployments.  The UN has 
ample funds to more robustly prepare for, and support, its 
TCCs deployment and it should use every authority at its 
disposal to meet these goals. 
 
--To advance this process for Darfur, we urge the immediate 
appointment of a Joint UN-AU Chief Mediator to be based in 
Sudan to lead the political process on a full-time basis. 
 
--We welcome the 13 March 2008 Dakar Accord and urge the GOS 
and the government of Chad (GOC) to respect it.  The GOS's 
attempt in February to overthrow the Chadian government by 
supporting Chadian rebels was utterly unacceptable as is 
Chadian support for Sudanese rebels.  Both the GOS and GOC 
must end support of rebel attacks across their border.  The 
GOS and GOC must instead protect civilians and cooperate with 
deployment of peacekeeping operations to provide robust 
protection. 
 
--------------------- 
¶4. Sanctions 
--------------------- 
 
- We urge all member states to support and implement fully 
the existing UN arms embargo for Darfur and sanctions imposed 
against designated Sudanese individuals.  Further UN measures 
must remain on the table to make facts on the ground match 
our rhetoric. 
RICE