VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0762 1082321
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 172313Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 040762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNSC PREL
SUBJECT: INTERVENTION FOR APRIL 17 JOINT AU PSC-UNSC 
MEETING 
 
 
¶1.  This is an action request.  See paragraphs 2. 
 
¶2.  USUN is instructed to deliver the briefing on Sudan as 
requested by the President of the Security Council for the 
April 17 Joint AU PSC - UNSC meeting.  USUN may also draw 
from the talking points in paragraph 3 for the discussion 
phase of the joint meeting.  USUN should join consensus on 
the joint communique in paragraph 4. 
 
Begin briefing on Sudan: 
 
"The Security Council has been deeply engaged in 
addressing all aspects of the crisis of Sudan.  Over the 
past several years, we have adopted numerous resolutions 
and statements on implementation of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan 
(GOS) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM), on the 
situation in Darfur, and on sanctions to limit arms 
transfers and restrict the activities of certain 
individuals involved in violence in Darfur.  On many of 
these issues, the Council has worked in close partnership 
with the African Union.  We welcome the continuing strong 
interest in the AU's Peace and Security Council in working 
together with the United Nations on measures to promote 
peace, stability, security and prosperity for all the 
people of Sudan. 
 
Regrettably, the efforts of the Security Council and our 
partnership with the AU have fallen far short of achieving 
the desired results.  In each area of our engagement, 
there has been a large gap between our aspirations, some 
of which are expressed in legally binding obligations 
created by Security Council resolutions, and flawed 
implementation by the parties to the various conflicts. 
 
With regard to CPA implementation, we can be proud of the 
relatively rapid and complete deployment of the UN Mission 
in Sudan (UNMIS) to assist the parties in maintaining 
security following the landmark agreement ending more than 
21 years of civil war.  Much remains to be done, however, 
in particular with regard to planning for the 2009 
national elections and determination of the North/South 
border, especially in the disputed Abyei region. 
 
Concerning Darfur, I need only point to the recent 
continuing violence as reflected in reports of the 
Secretary-General to highlight that the Government of 
 
SIPDIS 
Sudan and some rebel groups have ignored the repeated 
calls from our two organizations to abide by cease-fire 
agreements and an end to the targeting of civilians and 
humanitarian workers. 
 
The role of the African Union in deploying the AU Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) was an important step in moving toward 
effective international monitoring and support for 
implementation of a peace process in Darfur, followed last 
year by the adoption of resolution 1769 to mandate the 
UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur as the 
first-ever collaborative effort of its kind. 
 
Unfortunately, obstruction by the Government of Sudan, 
shortfalls from troop contributors, and inadequate 
logistical support from the UN has hindered deployment, 
leaving UNAMID today with barely 1,000 more personnel than 
the 8,000 it inherited from AMIS on 1 January 2008.  We 
must all redouble our efforts in the coming weeks and 
months to ensure that the bulk of the authorized force of 
up to 26,000 troops and police is deployed as soon as 
possible. 
 
With regard to sanctions, the Security Council has imposed 
various limitations on arms transfers including bans on 
any transfers to non-government and government parties 
operating in Darfur and has demanded that the GOS cease 
offensive military flights over Darfur.  The 
Secretary-General and the Sanctions Committee Panel of 
 
SIPDIS 
Experts reports document that various parties continue to 
flout the arms embargo measures adopted by the Council. 
The Sudanese Government's recent aerial attacks in West 
Darfur are simply one of the most recent examples of the 
Government of Sudan flouting the arms embargo.  The 
Security Council has also imposed an international travel 
ban and assets freeze on four individuals for violence 
committed in Darfur and for impeding the peace process. 
Not only has implementation of the individual sanctions 
been inadequate - the Government of Sudan has even 
promoted one of the individuals sanctioned by the Security 
Council to a more senior position. 
 
Finally, the Security Council made clear that the Government 
of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur were 
obligated to cooperate in bringing  those guilty of serious 
human rights and humanitarian law violations to justice.  The 
Government of Sudan has failed to carry out its obligations in 
this respect. 
 
The UN and AU have also worked together to further the 
Darfur peace process.  The Secretary General and the AU 
Commission Chair each appointed a Special Envoy to lead 
the peace process, supported by a Joint Mediation Support 
Team comprised of individuals from both organizations.  We 
are highly appreciative of the efforts of these two 
Special Envoys and their staff to advance peace in 
Darfur.  At this crucial juncture in the process, however, 
we support the Envoys in their view that it is time for 
the UN and AU to appoint a single Joint Chief Mediator. 
This is an urgent and important next step in moving the 
Darfur peace process forward, and one which we hope will 
take place very soon. 
 
The challenges that remain for Sudan and the region are 
daunting.  Our organizations and member states must forge 
ahead strongly to continue with the provision of 
humanitarian aid, implement the CPA, fully deploy UNAMID, 
and make progress on the peace process.  Thank you." 
 
End briefing. 
 
¶3.  Begin points for discussion on role of the UN in 
strengthening the AU: 
 
ON THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN MAINTAINING 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 
 
-- The United States agrees with the Secretary General in 
his report of March 24 that there is a lot of ambiguity 
about what role regional organizations should be taking in 
the maintenance in international peace and security. 
However, it should always be remembered that first and 
foremost the role of maintaining international peace and 
security lies with the Security Council.  This certainly 
does not mean that the Security Council needs to be 
involved in the resolution of every conflict.  Regional 
Organizations can and do get involved in conflict 
prevention, resolution, and post-conflict recovery.  Two 
recent examples in an African context are the AU's 
handling of the crisis in Kenya and the Comoros.  In 
Kenya, the AU Panel of Eminent Personalities, led by 
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, did a superb job 
in bringing both sides of the dispute to the table to work 
out a political compromise.  Due to the AU's efforts the 
crisis was resolved before it could escalate into a 
situation requiring the AU Peace and Security Council and 
the UN Security Council intervention.  In the Comoros, 
certain AU member states recently sent military forces to 
the island of Anjuoan to oust rebel leader Mohamed Bacar. 
The successful intervention took place with little 
bloodshed.  It was undertaken at the invitation of the 
government of Comoros and without an AU PSC mandate. 
 
-- Some members have expressed a view that when regional 
or sub-regional organizations deploy a peacekeeping force 
that they are doing so on behalf of the international 
community, particularly the Security Council, and should 
be reimbursed for their efforts by the UN.  The United 
States disagrees with this view.  Even if the Security 
Council approves a mandate for a peacekeeping operation by 
a regional organization, it does not imply in any way that 
the UN has committed or is obligated to pay for such an 
operation be it KFOR in Kosovo, MNF-I in Iraq, or AMISOM 
in Somalia.  Our view is that there are important legal 
and practical considerations that prevent the UN from 
paying for the costs of other organizations conducting 
peacekeeping operations and that we must respect these 
constraints.  Of course, the Security Council has and 
should continue to look for creative ways that the UN can 
help with regional efforts-- such as encouraging donors in 
voluntary funding efforts, and through practical 
assistance the UN secretariat can offer on command and 
control, logistical management and other areas.  On a 
bilateral basis, the U.S. very much appreciates the role 
many regional organizations are playing in deploying 
peacekeeping operations to conflict areas around the 
world.  We generously fund many of them on a voluntary, 
bilateral basis.  These regional and sub-regional 
organizations often deploy peacekeeping missions because 
it is in their own best interest to prevent instability 
from spreading, and we should help and encourage them to 
develop further their capabilities in this regard. 
Instability in one country can easily spread to 
instability in another.  Local regional organizations have 
a vested interest in making sure this does not happen. 
 
ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATION OF A PANEL TO 
CONSIDER FUNDING MECHANISMS TO THE AU 
 
-- The United States realizes that the African Union lacks 
the financial capabilities to carry out extensive 
peacekeeping operations.  It is for this reason that the 
United States has given so much bilaterally to assist AU 
peacekeeping missions, including providing $57 million to 
AMISOM over the last two years and over $450 million to 
AMIS over its lifetime.  We welcome the exploration of 
ways to address the financial challenges faced by regional 
peacekeeping missions.  In this regard, we support the 
establishment of a panel of distinguished persons from the 
African Union, the United Nations, and other relevant 
stakeholders to seek alternative, cost-effective means of 
financial support, such as the establishment of a trust 
fund or enhanced donor coordination. 
 
-- We need to remember that the AU's lack of financial 
capacity is only one of several challenges these AU 
peacekeeping missions face.  The UN and international 
community need to also investigate ways to help the AU 
build up its military planning, logistical, and 
administrative capacities, including the need to establish 
better financial accountability and transparency 
mechanisms for peacekeeping operations. 
 
ON THE EFFECTIVE WAYS TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION BETWEEN 
THE AU AND THE UN 
 
-- The United States notes with interest the many 
recommendations made by the Secretary General on effective 
ways to strengthen cooperation between the AU and the UN 
in his March 24 report.  We were very pleased to hear of 
the many programs the UN already has established to 
strengthen cooperation between the UN and regional 
organizations, most of which are being funded within 
existing resources.  Some examples of this cooperation are 
the desk-to-desk exchanges and the holding of various 
training sessions by the UN Department of Political 
Affairs for the secretariat staff of the AU Peace and 
Security Council. 
 
-- The AU has identified its need to increase 
administrative, logistical, and military planning 
capacities as well as improve financial management and 
transparency mechanisms.  In response, the U.S. has 
substantial programs to assist these efforts and has 
provided significant support in the form of logistical 
support and technical expertise to the African Standby 
Force, the AU Commission's emerging Strategic Planning and 
Management Unit, and the AU's Situation Room.  The United 
States continues to provide significant logistical 
capability in support of both UN and AU peacekeeping 
efforts in Africa through the provision of strategic lift 
of TCC units into theater, including Darfur and Somalia. 
We are prepared to work with the AU and other regional 
organizations to further enhance their capacity, and we 
call on other countries to step up their bilateral support 
as well.  In our opinion, the UN and the international 
community should prioritize its efforts to help the AU 
enhance its financial management and establish clear 
standards for financial transparency.  Such improvements 
will raise donor countries' confidence and lead to more 
support for AU missions such as AMISOM. 
 
-- We are pleased that the newly established African Union 
Peacekeeping Support Team, part of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, is focusing its efforts on 
improving mission planning, mission management, logistics 
and resource management for AU peacekeeping operations. 
 
-- On cooperation between the AU and UN on conflict 
prevention and mediation, we are pleased with the efforts 
of DPA's Mediation Support Unit (MSU) to offer support to 
the AU and other regional organizations, including efforts 
to assist the AU in developing an operational plan for the 
Panel of the Wise.  We also note the MSU has held several 
consultations around the world to assist regional 
organizations with their mediation capacity. 
 
ON COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION MECHANISMS BETWEEN THE SC 
AND AU PSC 
 
-- We agree with the SYG's recommendation to extend 
desk-to-desk dialogues on conflict prevention to the 
African Union.  This exchange has worked well with other 
regional organizations such as the UN-EU desk-to-desk 
exchanges. 
 
-- The United States supports the continued implementation 
of the 10-Year Capacity-Building Program for the AU, 
especially in areas of peace and security.  We commend 
DPA, the UN Liaison Office in Addis Ababa and the AU 
Regional Consultative Mechanism for the work they have 
done on the issue thus far. 
 
-- On the issue of formal meetings between the two 
bodies.  The United States agrees that given the number of 
conflicts and the disposition of UN peacekeeping forces, the 
UNSC and the AU 
PSC should continue to meet once a year to review 
conflicts in Africa and UN-AU cooperation, as long as the heavy 
concentration of UN activity in Africa persists,  but meetings 
with other regional partners should happen  on an ad 
hoc basis as circumstances require. 
 
-- The United States supports the SYG recommendation of 
sending a follow-up mission of UN Secretariat Staff to the 
AU to provide further assistance and share experiences in 
institutional memory-building and supporting a training 
program for AU PSC secretariat staff on the challenges of 
implementing sanctions and/or other restrictive measures. 
 
-- We applaud the formation of the UN DPKO - AU Peace 
Support Team and its work in the areas of mission planning 
and management of logistics and resources. 
 
ON PEACEKEEPING IN GENERAL 
 
-- The UN peacekeeping infrastructure is overstretched-- 
in large part as a result of the extensive and 
increasingly complex commitments on the African 
continent.  Sixty-three thousand of the 91,000 UN troops 
currently deployed are serving in Africa and these numbers 
will only increase as deployments in support of the UN/AU 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur come to fruition. A possible UN 
Operation in Somalia could involve the deployment of 
thousands more.  The bottom line is that the supply of 
well-equipped peacekeepers does not meet demand, and we 
must find ways to use existing resources effectively and 
efficiently and build capacity -- particularly regional 
capacity-- to do more. 
 
-- The UN Security Council needs to reassess how we plan 
for and sustain peacekeeping operations.  Our peacekeeping 
operations should be "goal-oriented" in nature, with 
clearly defined missions, timelines and budgets.  In some 
cases, Somalia comes to mind, we should not let the 
perfect be the enemy of the good.  It may be that while we 
cannot do the comprehensive 25,000 mission, we can put 
together a smaller force that can provide reinforcement 
for political consolidation.  In our view, that is exactly 
where we are heading in Somalia.  Peacekeeping operations 
need to be more carefully considered as a means to an end, 
rather than a panacea for responding to conflicts or a 
device to buy time.  While we understand the risk of 
leaving too soon, we should review peacekeeping operations 
regularly to evaluate whether they are fulfilling their 
mandates and meeting clearly defined benchmarks.  We 
should look toward downsizing missions and eventually 
closing them as objectives are successfully achieved or it 
becomes clear that the mission is no longer making a 
meaningful contribution to the maintenance of peace and 
security. This will encourage self-reliance and free up 
forces and funds for where they are needed most -- places 
like Darfur and Somalia, where we should consider creative 
ways to collaborate with the AU. 
 
end points 
 
¶4.  USUN is instructed to join consensus on the draft 
UN-AU Communique listed below: 
 
begin text 
 
DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY 
COUNCIL. 
 
¶1.  Recalling that the Security Council has primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII 
of the Charter of the United Nations on the relationship 
with regional arrangements; 
 
¶2.  Recognizing that an effective relationship between the 
United Nations and the African Union, in particular the 
Security Council and the Peace and Security Council would, 
contribute significantly towards addressing common peace 
and security challenges and facilitate their resolution in 
Africa; 
 
¶3.  Reaffirming the importance of the AU's role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security in 
accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and 
Constitutive Act of the AU, the importance of 
co-ordination between the UN and AU in pursuance of this 
role and of making full use of the UN and AU's 
complementary capacities and experience; 
 
¶4.  In that regard, underlining the importance of the 
operationalization of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture, especially the African Standby Force; 
 
¶5.  Recalling the Presidential Statements and decisions of 
the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council on 
the relationship between the two bodies; 
 
¶6.  Recalling also the joint Communiqu agreed by the UN 
Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council on 
11 June 2007; 
 
¶7.  At our second meeting, both Councils explored ways and 
means of developing a stronger working relationship 
between the two bodies, and following an exchange of views 
expressed satisfaction with the ongoing efforts to 
strengthen their relationship, through: 
 
a) enhancing cooperation in the fields of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution, including in 
respect of issues such as the good offices of the 
Secretary-General, mediation support, effective use of 
 
SIPDIS 
sanctions, early warning and support of the AU Panel of 
the Wise; peacekeeping and peace building; 
 
b) taking steps to identify predictable, sustainable and 
flexible resources for the African Union, in order to 
undertake peacekeeping operations in the context of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; 
 
c) sharing of experiences on working methods between the 
two structures; 
 
d) Encouraging the implementation of the 10-Year Capacity 
Building Programme for the AU, in particular between the 
UN Secretariat and the AU Commission and looking forward 
to the first review by the two organization of the 
Programme; 
 
e) discussing ways that the UNSC and the broader 
international community can cooperate with the AU to 
assist it in further developing its military planning, 
technical, logistical, financial management and 
administrative capacities, so that the AU is able to 
conduct peacekeeping operations in the most effective, 
transparent, and accountable manner; and 
 
f) sharing information on African conflict situations on 
the respective agendas of the two bodies, including but 
not limited to Somalia; Sudan; Chad/CAR; Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ethiopia/Eritrea; DRC and Kenya; 
 
¶8.  We re-affirm our determination to strengthen the AU 
conflict prevention, management and resolution capacities 
and post-conflict stabilization capacities, through: 
 
a) assessing regularly the developments in the region; 
 
b) supporting African regional and sub-regional capacities 
for early warning to enable prompt response to early 
warning indicators; and 
 
c) supporting African Union capacities for mediation; 
 
¶9.  In this regard we welcome initiatives such as the 
African Union Peacekeeping Support Team established by the 
United Nations, the capacity building efforts undertaken 
by the EU in the framework of the Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership, and other actions, including bilateral 
initiatives in support of AU capacity-building that will 
contribute, in a coordinated way to improvements in 
mission planning and mission management; 
 
¶10.  We look forward to further discussions at our next 
meeting in 2009. 
 
New York 
17th April 2008 
RICE