VZCZCXYZ0023
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSF #0229/01 1061425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH(CCY ADDED ADDEES AD0080B934/MSI6780 510)
P 151425Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4930
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNFB/DIR FBI WASHDC
RUEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  COPY (ADDEES ADDED ONLY) 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM KCOR BU
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER RESIGNS UNDER MOUNTING PRESSURE 
 
REF: SOFIA 0192 
 
Classified By: ambassador Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY: PM Stanishev forced Interior Minister 
Petkov,s hand into a resignation after two weeks of a 
deepening scandal that had trashed Bulgaria,s international 
image and fed domestic cynicism over government collusion 
with criminals.  Intense international pressure made the 
difference in Stanishev,s calculations, but the Bulgarian 
media also showed some welcome teeth in taking on a 
dangerously powerful figure.  The Prime Minister emerges as a 
net winner, patiently outlasting hardline Socialist party 
stalwarts protecting Petkov.  He has promised a thorough 
shakeup of the cabinet, and overhaul of a clearly 
dysfunctional ministry.  The intelligence service (DANS) that 
the PM fought to establish as independent of MOI saw its 
first "internal" action, and was generally praised. 
President Parvanov comes out looking weak, in first 
supporting and ultimately abandoning a longtime confidante 
and protege.  The Socialists, coalition partner NMSS 
exploited the scandal to force action against its own cabinet 
ministers who have run afoul of ex-PM King Simeon.  The Prime 
Minister now has a brief window to try to rebuild some public 
confidence in government integrity, and to lead real reform 
of the deeply corrupt Interior Ministry.  To that end, the 
PM,s National Security advisor has requested consultation 
and advice from U.S. experts.  We should move fast to say 
yes. END SUMMARY 
 
EXTERNAL REALITY-CHECK 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Interior Minister Petkov battled for two weeks 
against an ever more damaging scandal regarding his 
leadership.  He sought out the U.S., UK and Dutch ambassadors 
in an effort to defend himself, but our blunt, private answer 
(ref A) was that he had to go for the good of the country. 
The EU steadily reinforced that message with harsh public 
warnings and private pressure.  A PM adviser told us 
Stanishev received at least two phone calls from Brussels 
threatening to invoke the safeguard clause against Bulgaria 
if Petkov were not removed.  According to another insider, 
such a harsh sanction -- enough to topple the government -- 
gave Stanishev the necessary leverage within his Bulgarian 
Socialist Party to remove Petkov.  The end, in the end, came 
more quickly than even the PM,s closest advisors predicted. 
 
 
GROWING DOMESTIC PRESSURE 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  With at least two investigations opened by 
prosecutors against Petkov, and his other MOI allies arrested 
or close to it, the embattled Interior Minister found himself 
under unceasing domestic assault.  While key BSP figures and 
even President Parvanov initially rallied to his defense, 
they backed away as more revelations came to light.  Pressure 
mounted when Petkov's own 50-page report, which the BSP hoped 
would defuse the crisis, depicted a corrupt and paralyzed law 
enforcement system.  Parliament's Domestic Security Committee 
issued a brutal report April 10, criticizing the MOI's 
failure to investigate crimes due to the leak of information 
to suspects and lack of cooperation with other law 
enforcement agencies.  Based on data from the newly 
established State Agency for National Security (DANS) and 
hearings of ex-MOI officials, the report concluded that drug 
seizures had fallen after Interior Ministry officials passed 
classified information to crime groups trading in synthetic 
drugs, profits from which were partly used to fund terrorist 
organizations. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Most damaging of all was the weekly journal 
Kapital's April 11 publication of a leaked confidential 
transcript of the Domestic Security Committee's hearing.  The 
transcript exposed a ministry in chaos and helpless in 
dealing with organized crime groups supported from high 
government levels.  The most shocking revelation was the 
admission of Gen. Vanyu Tanov, the former chief of the MOI 
organized crime unit GDBOP, that every single GDBOP operation 
over the past two years had been compromised due to leaked 
information.  Tanov told the Committee that every operation 
against the gray economy revealed the involvement of 
politicians, MPs, government officials, employees of the 
customs office or tax authorities.  As if to underscore the 
extent of the ministry's incompetence, last week four more 
prominent execution-style killings took place in Bulgaria, 
further raising public tension.  A poll released just before 
Petkov,s resignation indicated that 59 percent of Bulgarians 
wanted Petkov to resign, with 44 percent believing he was 
 
personally involved in criminal activities. 
 
PRESSURE FROM PARTNERS - MORE CABINET CHANGES? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Early in the scandal junior coalition partner NMSS 
called publicly on Petkov to step down, the most vocal public 
disagreement between the NMSS and BSP since the coalition was 
formed.  Though the government predictably won a 
no-confidence vote on April 11, NMSS parliamentarians 
abstained rather than vote to support their own coalition. 
Deputy PM Vulchev from NMSS told the Ambassador the 
abstention was aimed at signaling unhappiness with Petkov, 
but that was not the whole story: ex-king and NMSS leader 
Simeon used the tactic to press the PM to make a wider 
government reshuffle that would also replace NMSS ministers 
who had dissented against him, including Deputy Prime 
Minister Vulchev, Defense Minister Bliznakov, and State 
Administration Minister Vassilev.  The PM announced he would 
begin discussions on cabinet changes with the coalition 
partners this week. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Bulgarians reacted with relief to Petkov's removal. 
While clear U.S. messages and a sharp EU threat were likely 
decisive, the government also faced domestic and media 
pressure to clean house.  Still, Petkov's resilience, even 
likely survival as an MP and BSP administrator, shows the 
depth and breadth of corruption within the government and 
BSP. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Stanishev is a clear winner, though he would have 
looked even stronger had he acted earlier.  He had long 
wanted to reduce Petkov's influence, much of which was based 
on his MOI position and access to "kompromat."  Stanishev's 
creation of DANS was clearly aimed at weakening Petkov by 
stripping him of a key investigatory tool.  President 
Parvanov, Stanishev's rival for party influence, has suffered 
embarrassment for his early and strong public support for his 
ally Petkov. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The coming months will test Stanishev's ability to 
remake the BSP and the coalition.  Choosing a technocrat to 
succeed Petkov would indicate Stanishev's strength and 
resolve and would be a hopeful sign for real reform.  A 
replacement chosen from the BSP old guard would indicate that 
the party accepted Petkov's removal only as a face-saving 
gesture and the MOI will return to business as usual.  As for 
the NMSS, Stanishev will likely strike a bargain over the 
cabinet positions.  Bulgaria has a weak bench as it is, and 
with barely 14 months until the next general election, the PM 
will need to drive any reform vigorously.  Stanishev-Parvanov 
tensions can only grow sharper, and will bear watching for 
the future of the BSP as the PM looks to his political future 
and the President to his legacy. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Even as Stanishev looks to revamp the cabinet, he 
must also overhaul the MOI to restore public trust, rebuild 
law enforcement capacity and shore up morale.  It,s a 
massive job.  New legislation was already planned to account 
for different responsibilities and authorities since DANS was 
created.  A key Stanishev advisor has reached out to us 
seeking input from U.S. experts as the PM tries to build a 
new structure for the Interior Ministry that is effective, 
modern, and above suspicion.  We should seize this offer, 
which represents a strong signal from the Prime Minister of 
his commitment to an even closer U.S.-Bulgarian relationship. 
 We doubt he,s made the same request to the Russians.   END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
Beyrle