VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPG #0226 0991436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081436Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0231
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0767
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 0040
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAMDA/MDA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS PRAGUE 000226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV NATO EZ RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN VIEWS FROM THE CZECH REPUBLIC ON MISSILE 
DEFENSE, KOSOVO, AND US-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
 
REF: PRAGUE 0208 
 
1.(SBU) Summary: On March 27, the Embassy's Political 
Military Officer met with Denis Grischenko, Russian Political 
Counselor, and Yevgenia Litvin, an attache in the Russian 
Embassy's external political unit. Grischenko highlighted the 
Russian Government's desire to work together with the U.S. 
However, he felt the US was wrong to think that the Czech 
Parliament would pass the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement 
(BMDA) and the Supplemental Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA). He said the Czech Government's inability to recognize 
Kosovo showed the fragility of Prime Minister Topolanek's 
government. End Summary. 
 
US-Russia Relations 
 
2.(SBU) Grischenko began the meeting by highlighting how the 
USG and the Russian Government have recently worked together 
in the Czech Republic on non-proliferation (e.g., the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative, the DOE-funded repatriation to 
Russia of fuel from Soviet-era nuclear research facilities.) 
He expressed the hope that the meeting between President Bush 
and President Putin in Sochi would signal a new basis for our 
relations and allow our two Embassies to work again on 
initiatives where our interests coincide. He cited 
Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation as the two most 
likely areas of cooperation to come out of Sochi. 
 
Missile Defense 
 
3.(SBU) The majority of the conversation centered on our 
progress on the BMDA and the SOFA agreements. Grischenko was 
very interested in how quickly we expected the agreements to 
be completed. He doubted the Czechs could finish both 
agreements in the next couple of months. He said he hoped the 
US understood why Russia wanted to monitor the radar 
facility. He emphasized Russia's concerns about possible 
future expansion of the missile defense system beyond the ten 
interceptors we plan to put in Poland. 
 
4.(SBU) In regards to ratification, Grischenko kept 
emphasizing the overwhelming public opposition to the radar. 
He said he believed it would be political suicide for 
politicians to support the radar agreements. Therefore, he 
said he feels confident "telling Moscow" that they should not 
worry too much about the agreements. (Note: The Czech 
Government has stated in the press and privately that Russia 
is actively funding Czech anti-radar groups, utilizing 
commercial contacts to pressure Czech businesses to oppose 
the radar, and possibly bribing members of parliament. End 
Note) 
 
Kosovo 
 
5.(SBU) On Kosovo, Grischenko strongly argued his 
government's belief that Kosovo's independence violates 
international law. He cited a study by the Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs that found 200 similar cases to Kosovo, 
including the Dakota Indian Tribe in the United States. He 
said that the Czech Government's inability to recognize 
Kosovo was the beginning of the end of Topolanek's 
government. In his view, if the Czechs could not even get a 
governmental quorum to recognize Kosovo, they will find it 
impossible tackle pension reform or gain parliamentary 
ratification for the MD agreements. (Comment: As discussed in 
reftel, the Embassy continues to believe that the Topolanek 
government can win approval for the MD agreements, although 
this will be an uphill battle. End Comment.) 
Graber