VZCZCXRO1977
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0134/01 0940925
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 030925Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6134
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0462

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU CD SU
SUBJECT: JEM DEVELOPS FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR TALKS AS UN/AU 
MEDIATION "PARALYZED" 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 00469 
NDJAMENA 117 
NDJAMENA 122 
NDJAMENA 123 
NDJAMENA 127 
 
NDJAMENA 00000134  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) Viewing the UN/AU mediation for Darfur as "paralyzed," JEM 
is crafting a "framework agreement" that outlines its conditions for 
adherence to a cessation of hostilities and participation in 
negotiations with the Sudanese Government.  If Sudan then rejects 
negotiations, JEM will return to a "holistic solution" that expands 
the war outside Darfur.  JEM's recent demand for single chief 
mediator and the exclusion of other rebel movements from the peace 
process is rooted in its frustration with the fragmentation of the 
SLA; the absence of clear channels of communication with the UN/AU; 
and the lack of a single, effective UN/AU mediator.  Though 
affirming the importance of the census and elections for the 
"political transformation" of Sudan, JEM maintains that neither are 
possible before a political settlement and is proposing a conference 
of opposition political parties to unlock the stalemate in Darfur. 
End summary. 
 
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JEM DRAFTING FRAMEWORK FOR TALKS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Characterizing the UN/AU mediation on Darfur as 
"paralyzed," the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is crafting a 
"framework agreement" to serve as the basis for re-energizing 
negotiations with Sudan, JEM representatives told Poloff on March 28 
and 30.  Gibriel Fediel, the movement's chief economic advisor and 
an influential political figure, and Abdelaziz Osher, the chief 
political advisor, explained that JEM's recent call for direct 
negotiations with Khartoum--excluding the participation of the other 
movements--resulted from a frustration with the fragmentation of the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA); the absence of clear channels of 
communication with the UN/AU; and the lack of a single, effective 
UN/AU mediator.  If Khartoum continues to reject negotiations, the 
JEM representatives said they would consider a "holistic solution" 
by expanding the conflict outside Darfur to include Kordofan and 
Eastern Sudan. 
 
¶3. (SBU) "The SLM have become warlords scattered throughout Darfur," 
said Fedeil, "and a mediation with two heads (i.e. UN Envoy Jan 
Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim) will never lead to anything 
of value.  If we don't enter into negotiations with the Government, 
we're neglecting our people."  Clarifying previous comments made by 
JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim, Fedeil and Osher explained that while 
JEM viewed Kofi Annan as an ideal chief mediator, they are open to 
other candidates as long as the mediator represents both the UN and 
AU. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The "framework agreement" being drafted is in effect a 
declaration of principles that JEM will require the Government to 
accept before negotiations can begin--and before JEM will commit to 
a cessation of hostilities.  The framework will demand that Darfur's 
three states be consolidated into a single region, that one fifth of 
the positions in the national government be reserved for Darfurians, 
and that a "proper" mechanism for monitoring a ceasefire be 
established, in addition to conditions on wealth-sharing. 
 
¶5. (SBU) If Sudan accepts these requirements, the negotiations can 
then focus on the specifics in these areas, such as the governing 
structure of the single Darfur state and which positions in the 
national government will be reserved for Darfurians.  Fedeil 
promised to provide Poloff with a copy of the framework after it is 
finalized (around early May) but will only give a copy to the UN/AU 
when the "right mediation" is in place.  JEM envisions an effective 
mediator "shuttlin" between the movement and the Government to 
buid agreement on the framework and then convening neotiations. 
 
---------------------------------- 
o Disarmament During "Transition" 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The JEM representaives asserted that the movement will 
need to maitain its forces during--and after--negotiations.  Having 
learned from the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), they claimed that the 
rebel movements will not disarm during a "transitional period" and 
will need to maintain a force presence in Khartoum in order to 
ensure that Sudan adheres to its commitments.  They questioned the 
impact of international leverage on Sudan, calling the National 
Congress Party (NCP) "immune" to foreign pressure. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000134  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
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Forging "United Vision" Among Opposition 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) JEM is also considering convening a conference of the 
"political opposition" to develop a "united vision" for unlocking 
the political stalemate in Darfur.  The movement would invite all 
the major political parties in Sudan, including the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Popular Congress Party (PCP), the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the Umma Party.  Fedeil 
admitted that the conference would aim to prevent the NCP from 
absorbing the Umma Party and the PCP, noting that coalition 
discussions between the three parties are ongoing.  While the JEM 
representatives saw some value in reconciliation among these 
parties, they said that the "dissolution" of Umma and the PCP into 
the NCP will be disastrous for Darfurian political aspirations. 
(Note: JEM is often viewed as an extension of Hassan Al Turabi's 
PCP.  If the PCP discussions with the NCP are in fact occurring, 
JEM's decision to distance itself from this rapprochement is an 
interesting development.  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Census, Elections Impossible in Current Climate 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Echoing the sentiments of many Darfurians and the majority 
of the rebel movements, JEM stated that neither elections nor the 
census can occur in Darfur until a political settlement is reached 
with the Government.  "We are absolutely opposed to the census at 
this time," said Osher.  While JEM recognizes that a census is 
important for the "political transformation" of Sudan, the lack of 
sound preparation and the probability of NCP manipulation will make 
the upcoming census a "fake."  Fedeil said that if the international 
community wanted to avoid census-related violence, it should ask the 
Government to postpone the census.  He also recommended that 
international representatives not associate themselves with the 
census, particularly in the IDP camps, given the likelihood of a 
popular backlash. 
 
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U.S. Misunderstands JEM 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Fediel and Osher bemoaned U.S. "misperceptions" of JEM and 
criticized the USG for its "unbalanced punishment" of the movement. 
Both SLA leader Abdulwahid al Nur and Ibrahim refused the DPA, but 
the U.S. only sanctioned Ibrahim.  JEM felt that U.S. policy 
reflected "Islamaphobia" and that JEM in fact shared U.S. goals for 
stability and democracy in Sudan.  JEM's efforts to stimulate 
negotiations through development of the framework agreement are 
indicative of its good intentions, said Fedeil, as is its 
cooperation with UNAMID.  "We are happy to see UNAMID protecting our 
people because JEM cannot protect each and every corner of Darfur," 
said Fedeil.  "We just need a clear way to communicate with UNAMID 
in order to prevent friction.  Now there is no consistent contact." 
 
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Comment 
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¶10. (SBU) Numerous independent accounts indicate that JEM is losing 
ground militarily and politically as a result of the Sudanese 
offensive in West Darfur, defections from within the movement, and a 
possible shift in Chadian backing (reftels).  This weakness may 
explain JEM's renewed (if possibly rhetorical) interest in 
negotiations.  Its attempt to exclude other movements from such 
negotiations reflects its rivalry with the United Revolutionary 
Front (URF) led by former JEM Secretary General Bahar Idriss Abu 
Gharda, which is making progress in closing ranks with another 
powerful faction, SLA/Unity.  Though the stipulations in the 
framework agreement are maximalist positions unacceptable to 
Khartoum, a sophisticatedmediation could nonetheless capitalize on 
JEM's eadiness for dialogue while simultaneously opening 
discussions with the SLA factions--with the goal f bringing the two 
tracks together down the road  End comment. 
 
¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize consideed. 
 
Tamlyn