VZCZCXRO1746
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1077/01 1091200
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181200Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7658
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 5234
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0165
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0814
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4373
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 1539
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0441
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0293
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RHEFAFM/DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK MD//MA-1//
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//CT//
RHEFSNG/HMSNG WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 001077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USDA FAS FOR OSTA/MACKE, WRIGHT, ROSENBLUM; 
-  OCRA/FLEMINGS; OA/PATRICK CLERKIN 
HHS FOR COURY, STEIGER 
FAS PASS FSIS AND APHIS 
SECDEF FOR OSD 
STATE FOR G/AIAG, EB/TPP/ATP, EB/TPP/BTA, OES/STC 
VIENNA PASS APHIS/TANAKA, BRUSSELS PASS 
- APHIS/FERNANDEZ 
USDOC 3150/DAVID FULTON/MOLLY COSTA/ITA/CS/OIO/EUR 
GENEVA PASS HEALTH ATTACHE 
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR GH/RCS/EE/ROSENBERG 
CDC ATLANTA PASS SEPRL FOR DAVID SUAREZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFLU EAGR TBIO PGOV RS
SUBJECT: CLOSELY WATCHED BIRDS: RUSSIA'S RESPONSE TO AVIAN AND 
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
 
REFS:  A. Moscow 1000 
   ¶B. Vladivostok 39 
   ¶C. 07 Moscow 5929 
   ¶D. 07 Moscow 1677 
   ¶E. 06 Moscow 10955 
   ¶F. 07 Moscow 1318 
   ¶G. 07 Moscow 3379 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Russia has been effective in stamping out nearly 
150 outbreaks of the H5N1 strain of avian influenza (AI) among 
poultry over the last three years through a combination of strict 
quarantines and mass cullings in outbreak areas, and large-scale 
vaccinations of commercial and backyard bird flocks throughout the 
country.  Russia has an effective animal and human disease 
surveillance network and the laboratory capacity to quickly identify 
highly pathogenic flu strains following suspected AI outbreaks.  At 
the same time, Russia has not yet completed a national pandemic 
preparedness plan and has struggled to provide the public with 
consistent information during outbreaks.  A lack of coordination and 
rivalries among the country's leading animal and human disease 
institutes and laboratories could hinder the response to a pandemic, 
and Russia has been reluctant to share AI virus samples with 
international health institutes. END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Russia's Scorched Earth Policy Contains Outbreaks 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Despite lying along several avian migratory flyways through 
Eastern Europe and Asia, Russia has effectively stamped out nearly 
150 outbreaks of avian influenza (AI) among domestic poultry over 
the last three years.  (Sitreps on these outbreaks are posted on the 
embassy's classified website:  www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/moscow/) 
Russia has adopted a "scorched earth" policy of mass culling in 
outbreak areas.  In some cases, entire bird populations on farms 
have been destroyed, rather than individual populations in single 
chicken houses, in order to contain infections and punish commercial 
farmers who, in the authorities' view, failed to meet minimum 
biosafety standards (Ref C). 
 
¶3. (U) Russia has vaccinated commercial and backyard flocks against 
AI, inoculating millions of birds in both 2006 and 2007.  During the 
recent outbreak in the Russian Far East (Refs A, B), local law 
enforcement officials quickly established a quarantine around the 
affected village while the government veterinary service destroyed 
dozens of birds and vaccinated thousands of domestic poultry in the 
area.  As an additional precaution, the farmer, whose chickens were 
originally infected, was placed in a local hospital for several days 
of observation, where he has received antiviral medicine, although 
he so far has no flu symptoms (Ref B). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Over the last three years, the federal government has paid 
for vaccine production to support mass bird inoculation campaigns at 
commercial farms, but it is less clear who will pay for the 
continuing expenses of large-scale vaccinations.  While the federal 
government is willing to continue paying for vaccine production, 
there is no federal budget to pay for the continuing costs of mass 
inoculations, leaving regional or local governments to bear those 
 
MOSCOW 00001077  002 OF 004 
 
 
costs in the future.  Agricultural contacts report that some poultry 
farms are vaccinating their commercial flocks with expired vaccines 
produced last year, which raises obvious questions about how 
effective these vaccination campaigns will be in protecting 
commercial flocks from future infections. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Russia has a strong veterinary surveillance system for 
highly pathogenic AI (HPAI), but unlike the United States, there is 
no surveillance of low pathogenic AI (LPAI) strains.  This systemic 
flaw leaves Russia unable to identify reservoirs of LPAI among birds 
that could potentially mutate into HPAI. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite the success at stamping out avian outbreaks, the 
government's public statements have sometimes been uncoordinated. 
Local, regional and federal officials, as well as leading human 
health and veterinary officials, have sometimes provided conflicting 
or irresponsible statements to the press.  In some cases, federal 
health officials have announced an AI outbreak before lab results 
confirmed the presence of AI.  Regional officials and certain 
elected federal officials have periodically made irresponsible 
statements on the origin of outbreaks and sought to attribute them 
to trade-related sabotage by foreign governments (Ref D). 
 
--------------------- 
Pandemic Preparedness 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In 2007, the GOR prepared and submitted to the WHO a draft 
pandemic preparedness plan, but the document still needs substantial 
reworking.  Several regions affected by AI have drafted pandemic 
preparedness plans and submitted them to the federal government for 
review, but the GOR has not yet approved these plans or attempted to 
coordinate and make them consistent with the draft federal 
preparedness plan.  Russia has worked steadily to strengthen AI 
surveillance and testing capacity.  In 2006, Russia approved an 
action plan to spend nearly $49 million combating the further spread 
of AI, with the Ministries of Agriculture and of Health and Social 
Development receiving the lion's share of the funds to produce and 
purchase vaccines and to improve laboratory capacity (Ref F). 
 
¶8. (SBU) The GOR has applied to establish the "Vector" State 
Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology in Novosibirsk Oblast 
as a World Health Organization (WHO) reference laboratory and 
collaborating center for AI.  (Russia already has WHO collaborating 
centers for all types of human influenza virus in St. Petersburg and 
Moscow, and the Federal Center for Animal Health in Vladimir is the 
national reference laboratory for animal diseases, but Vector would 
serve as a special WHO collaborating center for AI.)  A WHO 
assessment team visited Vector in April 2007 and concluded that the 
laboratory could eventually become a WHO collaborating center for AI 
research, but that this process could take as long as two years (Ref 
G). 
 
¶9. (SBU) Over the last two years, Russia has established itself as 
the leader within the CIS on AI and pandemic preparedness, executing 
bilateral influenza collaboration agreements with many of the other 
CIS countries, hosting numerous regional influenza conferences, and 
sponsoring training sessions for CIS flu and laboratory experts 
(Refs F, G). 
 
 
MOSCOW 00001077  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) AI sample sharing remains a thorny issue for Russia.  The 
country has accepted AI samples from both Western Europe and the 
CIS, but has not shared any AI samples collected in Russia beyond 
its borders.  For routine human influenza cases, Russia has 
historically exchanged information and provided virus samples to the 
CDC and other WHO Collaborating Centers.  We are also not aware of 
any sharing of AI samples beyond Russia's borders through the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE).  For AI samples, in 2007, 
Vector provided the CDC with DNA material and sera from humans who 
had contact with sick birds during the 2005 AI outbreak in the 
Novosibirsk region.  Officials at Vector would like to share virus 
isolates with both CDC and with the St. Jude Children's Research 
Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee.  However, Vector's supervisory 
agency, the Federal Surveillance Service for Consumer Rights 
Protection and Human Well-Being, has not yet granted the lab 
permission to share samples abroad, though the lab is expecting it 
will receive permission.  In 2006, Russia dropped its legal 
objections to sharing AI samples, but we are not aware of any cases 
in which AI samples have actually been shared outside of Russia 
since then.  Health officials maintained from 2004-2006 that Russian 
law prohibited the sharing of AI samples, because they are included 
in a list of dangerous pathogens that cannot be exported.  The 
reluctance to share samples with the outside world is probably a 
legacy of the closed and secretive culture at both human and animal 
research institutes, many of which worked on biological weapons 
programs during the Soviet Union and remain closed facilities even 
today. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In September 2006, the St. Petersburg Institute of 
Influenza announced that a human vaccine developed from the AI 
strain that circulated in Vietnam from 2004-2005 had successfully 
completed the first phase of trials (Ref E).  At the Sixth 
International Bird Flu Summit in Bali on March 27, 2008, Russia's 
leading state-owned vaccine manufacturer, Microgen, said it had 
developed two additional human AI vaccines and was prepared to 
establish vaccine production in Southeast Asia, if necessary. 
 
¶12. (SBU) A lack of coordination and rivalries among Russia's 
leading veterinary and human influenza labs could hinder Russia's 
response to AI and pandemic flu.  Senior management at the Research 
Institute of Influenza in St. Petersburg, Russia's leading human 
influenza lab, has been irritated by the spending of lavish sums to 
develop Vector's AI capacity.  Vector also has not cooperated with 
the Federal Center for Animal Health in Vladimir, Russia's premier 
veterinary diagnostic and testing lab.  Although the Vladimir center 
is supposed to take the lead role in AI outbreaks among birds, 
Vector has in some cases conducted preliminary testing of specimens 
from birds and then not shared those samples with the Vladimir lab 
(Ref G).  There is no standing committee of agriculture and health 
officials and specialists that could help facilitate coordination 
among Russia's leading agriculture and health institutes. 
 
¶13. (SBU) COMMENT: Given the budgetary grumbling over the expenses 
of continued mass bird vaccinations and the lack of any evident 
political will to focus on reworking Russia's draft pandemic 
preparedness plan, we believe a certain amount of "bird flu fatigue" 
has infected Russia's leading animal and human health officials and 
policy makers.  Nonetheless, we believe Russia will continue to 
react quickly to AI outbreaks, given the track record of effective 
responses over the last three years, and the country's evident 
 
MOSCOW 00001077  004 OF 004 
 
 
strengths in surveillance, testing, and vaccine production. 
 
BURNS