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Viewing cable 08MANAGUA417, ELECTION THEFT FOR DUMMIES: CPCS, CSE, FSLN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANAGUA417 2008-04-08 20:26 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXRO6794
OO RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0417/01 0992026
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 082026Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2395
INFO RUEHMU/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J2/J3/J5// IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000417 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR USAID/LAC BONICELLI AND BATLLE 
NSC FOR ALVARADO AND FISK 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN - NYMAN AND GREENE 
DEPT FOR INR/IAA - EMERSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ELECTION THEFT FOR DUMMIES: CPCS, CSE, FSLN 
RIGGING VOTER ROLLS 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 209 
     B. MANAGUA 153 
     C. 2006 MANAGUA 2423 
     D. 2006 MANAGUA 2080 
     E. 2006 MANAGUA 148 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b & d. 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The Citizens' Power Councils (CPCs), the 
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) and FSLN-controlled 
municipalities in several of Nicaragua's Departments appear 
to be engaged in a concerted and coordinated effort to pad 
voter rolls with FSLN-supporting voters for the upcoming 
municipal elections.  According to our contacts, CPC teams 
are canvassing villages block-by-block identifying 
FSLN-leaning voters and pre-clearing them for cedula (ID 
card) registration with the CSE, while skipping over non-FSLN 
households.  In some cases CPCs have been granted the use of 
official municipal assets (camera, vehicles, etc.) to seek 
out and register potential FSLN voters.  The plan is as 
follows:  Upon instruction from CPCs, these would-be new 
voters are "screened" for candidate preference by CSE 
personnel, with FSLN supporters given expedited service. 
Finally, the CSE releases new cedulas to the CPC teams, which 
then deliver cedulas directly to the homes of the 
newly-minted voters.  While we saw elements of widespread CSE 
collusion in voter disenfranchisement during the 2006 
National elections (REFS C & D), there is a disturbing new 
twist involving the CPCs that results in a state-subsidized 
discrimination against non-FSLN voters.  Opposition political 
parties have been able to partially mitigate this 
disadvantage by encouraging their supporters to indicate a 
stated preference for the FSLN candidate when registering for 
cedulas.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CPCs Engaged in Padding Voter Rolls 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) We have heard with increasing frequency from multiple 
independent sources that the FSLN is utilizing the CPCs to 
collude with the CSE in order to pad voter rolls with FSLN 
supporters for the upcoming municipal elections.  Several of 
our contacts both from political parties and from 
pro-democracy NGOs have provided independent confirmation of 
widespread collusion between the CPCs, the CSE and 
FSLN-controlled municipalities to facilitate expedited cedula 
(ID card) registration for FSLN supporters, including some 
"voters" under the legally established voting age of 16 
years.  We have also been told that CSE personnel are 
routinely asking cedula applicants which election candidate 
they prefer.  Those naming the FSLN candidate are offered 
expedited service, while those applicants naming a different 
candidate are given the "raton loco (crazy rat)" treatment, 
i.e. the runaround, and told application documents are 
incomplete or inadequate. 
 
How the Plan Works: Collusion and Corruption 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (C) Based on multiple conversations with opposition party 
and NGO contacts over the last two months, the plan is 
carried out in the following manner.  At the local level CPCs 
have organized voter roll teams comprised of CPC 
rank-and-file, FSLN party rank-and-file, and frequently, 
FSLN-supporting departmental employees of National 
Ministries, e.g. Education, Health, Agriculture, etc.  These 
teams have been given voter registration lists and charged 
with identifying and registering new voters who are likely to 
support FSLN candidates in the upcoming municipal elections. 
In FSLN-controlled municipalities, these CPC voter 
registration teams are also granted access to municipal 
assets, primarily means of transportation, e.g. trucks, 
motorcycles, bicycles, which they use to reach remote, 
outlying areas where potential voters would otherwise find it 
difficult, if not, impossible to undertake the time and 
expense of registering to vote. 
 
 
MANAGUA 00000417  002 OF 003 
 
 
4. (C) Each day these CPC voter registration teams are sent 
out with cameras and materials to identify and register 
potential FSLN-friendly voters.  Teams then determine whether 
a particular household is "FSLN" or not.  Any "non-FSLN" 
household is skipped.  NOTE: In Nueva Segovia, Matagalpa and 
other Departments, we have heard multiple stories of CPC 
teams moving house by house through a neighborhood and 
intentionally skipping households known to be non-FSLN 
friendly.  END NOTE.  For the FSLN-supporting households, 
potential voters are provided their cedula registration 
packet (a photograph and official copies of vital documents 
-- birth certificate, etc.) free of charge by the CPC team 
and instructed to visit the CSE office and identify 
themselves as supporters of FSLN municipal candidates.  We 
have been told that upon doing so, the CSE expedites the 
cedula registration process by accepting the documentation 
packet unchallenged.  Furthermore, the CSE is turning over 
completed cedulas to the CPC teams that deliver the new 
cedulas directly to the voters, saving these individuals the 
time and expense of a return trip to the CSE offices.  On its 
face this process appears to be simply a well-organized voter 
registration effort by the ruling FSLN.  However, its 
practical effect is to discriminate against and 
disenfranchise large numbers of non-FSLN-leaning voters. 
Though we saw this type of systematic disenfranchisement 
during the 2006 National elections (REFS C & D), there are 
three areas of concern that make the involvement of CPCs a 
new and disturbing development. 
 
Why This Process is Problematic: State-Funded Discrimination 
and Disenfranchisement 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (C) State-Funded Disenfranchisement. These CPC teams are 
been granted access to municipal-owned assets; placing all 
other party and NGO voter registration efforts at a financial 
disadvantage.  By allowing CPC teams the use of official 
vehicles, the FSLN-controlled municipalities are, in effect, 
using state funds to subsidize the cost of FSLN voter 
registration efforts.  The use of state-funded resources to 
register voters is a benefit is not equally available to 
other opposition parties and NGOs seeking to implement voter 
registration programs and, with local fuel prices currently 
above USD 4.30 per gallon for gasoline and for widely-used 
diesel, is a substantial financial advantage particularly 
given that there is no evidence that municipalities are being 
reimbursed for fuel costs by the CPCs. 
 
6. (C) A second aspect of this state-funded 
disenfranchisement is that of the CPCs providing the cedula 
registration packets without cost to applicants.  Normally, 
Nicaraguans incur substantial costs when registering for a 
cedula.  These costs include a photo of the proper size and 
type, official copies of vital documents, including birth 
certificate, etc.  Applications must also be done in person 
at a CSE office, which incurs travel and lodging costs as CSE 
offices are neither widely-dispersed throughout the country 
nor continually manned throughout the year.  The CPC teams 
have been provided with cameras and use of FSLN-controlled 
municipal assets to provide paper documentation.  Again this 
amounts to a state subsidy for FSLN voters that is not 
available to non-FSLN voters. 
 
7. (C) Discrimination Based on Party Affiliation.  The second 
aspect of this process is its discrimination against non-FSLN 
voters and the apparent collusion between CPC voter 
registration teams and CSE staff.  CPC-referred applicants 
are provided an expedited registration process, including 
having their application packet accepted by the CSE without 
challenge.  Furthermore, newly-printed cedula documents are 
given back to CPC teams that deliver the cedula directly to 
the applicant.  We have been told by multiple contacts from 
political parties and pro-democracy NGOs that upon appearing 
at the CSE office, applicants are routinely asked which 
candidate they favor.  If the answer is not the FSLN 
candidate, applicants have their application packet 
challenged.  The CSE staff routinely finds some problem or 
 
MANAGUA 00000417  003 OF 003 
 
 
deficiency with the packet, e.g. the packet is incomplete, a 
photo is the wrong type, a copy of a vital document is 
inadequate or unacceptable, at which point the applicant is 
directed to remediate the deficiency.  This normally requires 
a new photo or a return visit to the applicant's local 
registry office for a new "proper" copy of a vital document, 
and then a return trip back to the CSE office, with all the 
associated additional costs.  This runaround normally 
lengthens the registration process by day or weeks and 
occasionally by months, if the applicant is from a 
particularly remote area.  Furthermore, even if an applicant 
can successfully submit his or her packet, they are required 
to return to the CSE office in person to collect the cedula. 
However, we have been told repeatedly that local CSE offices 
are frequently unable to locate the finished cedulas of 
non-FSLN voters, often for months at a time.  The end result 
is large numbers of non-FSLN potential voters that are unable 
to register or vote due to lack of a cedula. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
8.  (C) With increasing frequency, we have heard detailed 
descriptions from several different locales of this apparent 
collusion between the CSE, CPCs, and the FSLN.  The apparent 
corruption and ineptitude of the CSE is not new to us (REFS C 
& D) -- being an all-too-common story in advance of the 2006 
presidential elections.  However the disturbing new elements 
here are the direct involvement of the CPCs in registering 
FSLN voters and the use of state-controlled funds to 
facilitate this process as well as the apparent level of 
coordination between the CPCs, FSLN-controlled 
municipalities, and the CSE to actively discriminate against 
and disenfranchise non-FSLN voters.  We also note that the 
ability of the CSE to engage in systematic disenfranchisement 
of this scale has been greatly increased, given that earlier 
this year, senior CSE leadership purged nearly all non-FSLN 
aligned staff (REF B). 
TRIVELLI