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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/C/P, CA/VO/L/C, WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC 
DEPT ALSO FOR INR/B AND INR/IAA - EMERSON 
SOUTHCOM FOR FPA AND J9 
NSC FOR ALVARADO AND FISK 
BOGOTA FOR POL, NAS AND RLA - FGROENE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018 
TAGS: CVIS PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM EFIN NU
SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA 
INELIGIBILITY FINDING--JOSE MANUEL MARTINEZ SEVILLA 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 130 
     ¶B. 07 MANAGUA 2562 
     ¶C. 07 MANAGUA 2001 
     ¶D. 06 MANAGUA 36 
     ¶E. 05 MANAGUA 2774 
     ¶F. 05 MANAGUA 2740 
     ¶G. 05 MANAGUA 2662 
     ¶H. 05 MANAGUA 2625 
     ¶I. 05 MANAGUA 2597 
     ¶J. 05 MANAGUA 2443 
     ¶K. 05 MANAGUA 223 
     ¶L. 05 MANAGUA 1760 
     ¶M. 04 STATE 45499 
     ¶N. 04 MANAGUA 1349 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b & d. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST:  Embassy is seeking a 
security advisory opinion under section 212 (f) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, proclamation 7750, 
suspending the entry into the United States and revoking the 
visa presently held by Jose Manuel Martinez Sevilla, born in 
Nicaragua on 19 November 1941.  Martinez is currently the 
chief justice of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court (CSJ). 
National Assembly deputies loyal to FSLN leader Daniel Ortega 
and corrupt ex-President Arnoldo Aleman facilitated 
Martinez's election to a five-year term on the Supreme Court 
in 2003 as part of the "pact" between the two party bosses 
intended to undermine the Nicaraguan Constitution and ensure 
that all power in Nicaragua remains in their hands.  Martinez 
has been a close associate of Arnoldo Aleman for decades and 
was elected the Supreme Court because of his loyalty to the 
ex-president.  In 2005, as part of the Aleman-Ortega pact, 
which stipulates that the presidency of the CSJ rotate 
between PLC and FSLN magistrates on a yearly basis, Martinez 
became the court's chief justice.  Even though his year 
expired in early 2006, he remains chief justice because of 
disputes between Aleman and Ortega on who should succeed him. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Both as a CSJ magistrate since 2003 and as chief 
justice since 2005, Martinez has used his CSJ posts to serve 
as Aleman's proxy on the court and to enrich himself and the 
PLC by participating in the entrenched system of judicial 
corruption established by the Sandinistas (FSLN).  Since his 
appointment to the CSJ, Martinez has loyally executed 
Aleman's orders on all important cases that have come before 
him, including siding with Ortega and Aleman on every single 
decision in the long-running political and institutional 
battle between the two party bosses and the previous Bolanos 
Administration.  More recently between 2005 and 2006, 
Martinez was one of the two key CSJ actors in a complicated 
scam in which Martinez took bribes and manipulated the court 
system at multiple levels in an attempt to free a pair of 
Colombian drug traffickers, one of whom has a previous 
conviction for narcotics trafficking, and make illicit funds 
seized from them "disappear."  These efforts led to the loss 
of the seized funds, freed one of the two Colombian 
traffickers, and led to a very light two-year sentence for 
the other one. 
 
¶3.  (C) Although the previous Attorney General's office 
(Procuraduria) called for a full investigation of this case 
involving the liberation of drug traffickers and their money 
and for an investigation of the part Martinez played in the 
plot, no substantive investigation has ever taken place. 
This is due to the fact that Martinez enjoys legal immunity 
from prosecution, as well as the protection of Arnoldo 
Aleman, corrupt National Prosecutor Julio Centeno Gomez, and 
of the PLC caucus in the National Assembly, which have 
blocked all efforts to launch an investigation of the CSJ 
 
magistrate.  The ongoing political and financial corruption 
of which Martinez is an integral part has caused enormous 
damage to U.S. national interests including the stability of 
democratic institutions in Nicaragua, U.S. foreign assistance 
and development goals, as well as the activities of U.S. 
businesses here. 
 
¶4.  (C) Martinez remains a chief proxy for Arnoldo Aleman and 
his cronies, and one of Aleman's primary means both to secure 
illegal financing for the PLC and to undermine Nicaragua's 
Constitution and efforts of democratic forces to improve 
governance.  He continues to damage all of these national 
interests, and to sustain the Aleman- Ortega stranglehold on 
the judiciary and the country as a whole.  Moreover, 
Martinez's specific involvement in the Colombian case has 
played out publicly making obvious the fact that justice can 
be bought and sold in Nicaragua, and that those involved are 
untouchable so long as they enjoy political protection. 
Unfortunately, numerous judges at all levels are emulating 
Martinez's example, severely undermining the entire system of 
justice and impeding U.S. and Nicaraguan efforts to 
successfully prosecute international drug, arms and human 
trafficking.  For all of these reasons, post recommends that 
the Department make a 212(f) finding against Jose Manuel 
Martinez Sevilla.  The following provides information 
requested in reftel M, paragraph 16.  END SUMMARY AND ACTION 
REQUEST. 
 
MARTINEZ AND THE PLC TAKE PART IN THE FSLN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL 
CORRUPTION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - 
 
¶5.  (U) As the Department's recent annual Human Rights 
Reports on Nicaragua have noted, almost all judges appointed 
to the country's Supreme Court owe their loyalty to either 
Aleman or Ortega, and their decisions on all sensitive cases 
are blatantly partisan and political.  Each time openings are 
available on the Court, Aleman and Ortega negotiate package 
deals whereby they divide the judicial appointments evenly, 
always ignoring experienced and politically neutral 
candidates.  Manuel Martinez was appointed to the CSJ in 2003 
as part of such an Aleman-Ortega deal.  Subsequently, he has 
performed a role for Aleman similar to that played by his 
FSLN counterpart, magistrate Rafael Solis, for Daniel Ortega 
Just as Solis does for Ortega, so Martinez votes as Aleman's 
proxy on politically sensitive issues.  NOTE: The Department 
revoked Solis's visa under INA 212(f) in 2004 (reftel N). END 
NOTE.  Martinez also uses his office to sow corruption 
throughout the judiciary via appointments of lower court 
judges and, in return for "fixing" judicial decisions, 
accepts bribes for his personal benefit and to fill 
Aleman-controlled party coffers. 
 
IMPUNITY R' US: MARTINEZ LIBERATES TRAFFICKERS AND LAUNDERS 
THEIR DRUG MONEY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) In August and September 2005, Manuel Martinez 
participated in a complicated scheme (first reported in 
reftel G and described in greater detail in reftel D) to free 
two convicted Colombian drug traffickers and make their 
laundered money "disappear" in return for bribes for himself 
and other magistrates involved, as well as for the PLC and 
the FSLN.  According to confidential embassy sources involved 
in the plot from beginning to end, the entire scheme was 
orchestrated by Lenin Cerna, the former director of state 
security during the 1980s Sandinista regime and current 
General Secretary of the FSLN.  Cerna remains a shadowy 
figure in Nicaragua, involved in all manner of illicit FSLN 
activities.  According to credible sources, Cerna 
 
orchestrated the plan to free the Colombians and their money 
in return for large payoffs to the FSLN, the PLC and the 
individual judges and lawyers involved in the scheme. 
Cerna's plan was implemented with the personal approval of 
FSLN leader Daniel Ortega, who reportedly negotiated 
agreements with international drug traffickers whereby 
traffickers would be allowed to operate unimpeded on the 
country's Atlantic coast if Ortega were elected president in 
¶2006.  Although the FSLN dominates the Nicaraguan judiciary 
and is the key player in such organized judicial corruption 
schemes, Aleman and his loyalists in the PLC, including 
Martinez, also actively participate in the corruption, taking 
their cut of the proceeds. 
 
¶7.  (C) This case began with the April 2004 arrest of 
Colombian citizens Jorge Eliecer Gonzales Hernandez (AKA Luis 
Angel Gonzalez Largo) and Leyla Bucardo Chavez in a Managua 
hotel with close to USD 800,000 cash in their possession. 
Since Nicaragua lacks a law governing the maintenance of 
seized assets, the seized money was deposited in a bank 
account belonging to the CSJ and directly controlled by 
Martinez and Solis.  Hernandez and Bucardo were subsequently 
convicted of money laundering and other charges and sentenced 
to ten years imprisonment.  There is no doubt that CSJ PLC 
magistrate Manuel Martinez and CSJ FSLN magistrate Roger 
Camilo Arguello (whose 212(f) case will be forthcoming), 
worked at the behest of Arnoldo Aleman, Bayardo Arce and 
Lenin Cerna, to personally orchestrate a scheme to erase the 
Colombians' convictions and liberate them and their illicit 
funds in return for bribes for themselves, the PLC, and the 
FSLN. 
 
¶8.  (C) This plot to free the Colombians and steal their 
money began in August 2005, when defense lawyers presented a 
spurious allegation that the trial was illegal because it had 
taken place in a jurisdiction different from the one in which 
the Colombians had been arrested.  The appeal made the false 
claim that the duo had actually been arrested in the town of 
San Marcos, not Managua.  This false allegation was supported 
by additional fabricated testimony from a police officer who 
had never testified and had no involvement in the case. 
Despite the fact that this technicality had never been raised 
during the original trial, it served as the legal pretext for 
the scheme that followed.  Once the defense lawyers lodged 
their appeal, FSLN magistrate Roger Camilo Arguello began to 
manipulate the judicial system to ensure that the appeal was 
approved.  First, Arguello used his position on the Supreme 
Court's constitutional chamber to appoint substitute Judge 
Julio Morales Aragon to rule on the spurious claim.  Once 
Morales took up the appeal and "investigated" the case, he 
approved the appeal in record time (one day), overturned the 
convictions of Hernandez and Bucardo, and ordered that they 
and their money be released immediately.  However, word of 
the developing scheme leaked to the media, and, before 
Hernandez or the money could be released, FSLN appeals court 
judge Enrique Chavarria overturned Morales' ruling, 
apparently to quiet the media outcry over what was happening. 
 Subsequently CSJ Chief Justice Manuel Martinez publicly 
promised a full investigation.  However, no such 
investigation took place, and Martinez and Arguello continued 
to proceed quietly with their efforts to free the Colombians, 
including a meeting to discuss how laundered drug money would 
be divided among the CSJ magistrates. 
 
¶9.  (C) With their first scheme to free the Colombians and 
their money having failed, Martinez and Arguello switched 
tactics.  The Colombian's defense team appealed to the CSJ to 
have Chavarria's ruling overturned.  Arguello drafted a 
sentence that would overturn Chavarria's decision and free 
the Colombians and their money.  To obtain the signatures of 
the other constitutional chamber judges, Arguello and 
 
Martinez allegedly misled them as to the purpose of the draft 
sentence, while Arguello forged the signatures of others.  At 
the same time as he was securing the CSJ verdict in favor of 
the Colombians, Arguello also engineered the extension of 
Judge Morales' temporary mandate as presiding judge over the 
case. 
 
¶10.  (C) Once Martinez and Arguello had the requisite 
signatures (both the authentic ones and the allegedly forged 
ones) on the ruling overturning the conviction of the two 
Colombians and releasing them and their money, Arguello took 
the document, which had not been properly authenticated 
according to established CSJ procedures, and made a 
photocopy, which he gave to one of the lawyers for the 
Colombians.  The next day, the lawyers delivered the 
photocopy to Judge Morales, who immediately ordered the 
release of the Colombians and their money.  Bucardo was 
released, but Hernandez remained incarcerated on other 
charges.  At the same time, in his capacity as CSJ chief 
justice, Manuel Martinez signed a check from the CSJ account 
he controlled in the amount of USD 609,000, made out to the 
Colombians' lawyers, and ordered that the money be released 
from the CSJ account in the Nicaraguan Treasury.  In August 
2007, Supreme Court Vice President Rafael Solis confirmed to 
the Embassy that he and Martinez were the only two officials 
with access to this CSJ account. 
 
¶11.  (C) Henry Areas, the then-Treasury Director, was 
reluctant to release the funds, so Arguello and Martinez 
intervened again, ordering Areas to facilitate the release of 
the check to the Colombians' lawyers as quickly as possible. 
Areas complied, and the lawyers, using power-of-attorney 
documents, received the treasury check on September 26 and, 
based on instructions from Martinez, converted the funds to 
six separate cashiers' checks at a commercial bank that were 
redeemed the next day.  At the bidding of Arguello and 
Martinez, Judge Morales personally went to the bank with the 
defense lawyers.  Bank security cameras filmed Morales in the 
company of the lawyers when they took possession of the 
money.  A confidential Embassy source subsequently reported 
(reftel D) that once the money was withdrawn from the bank, a 
large portion (USD 306,000) of it went to the FSLN via 
then-National Assembly deputy Bayardo Arce, while smaller 
amounts went to the various judges involved in the scheme, 
including CSJ magistrates Martinez, Arguello, Yadira Centeno, 
Rafael Solis, and Edgard Navas Navas.  The source stated that 
Martinez and Centeno received the largest amounts of money 
given to individual magistrates (USD 100,000 each). 
 
¶12.  (C) Accounts of this case leaked to the media, including 
the central roles of Martinez and Arguello in liberating 
Bucardo and the disappearance of the money.  To quiet the 
ensuing public and media uproar, Arguello left Nicaragua for 
nearly a month, while Martinez again promised a "full 
investigation" of the case.  This investigation targeted 
several low-level judges and lawyers involved in the scheme, 
but eschewed any examination of the roles played by Martinez 
and Arguello.  On December 13, 2005, Martinez announced a 
variety of administrative sanctions for several of the lesser 
actors involved in the disappearance of the money, but took 
no action against the two key actors in the entire affair: 
himself and his fellow CSJ magistrate Arguello. 
 
¶13.  (C) In October 2005, the Office of the Attorney General 
(Procuraduria) charged Martinez and Arguello with 
embezzlement of government funds and judicial corruption; 
however, the two enjoyed immunity from prosecution that could 
only be lifted by the National Assembly, which was controlled 
by PLC and FSLN deputies loyal to the Aleman-Ortega pact. 
National Prosecutor Julio Centeno also leapt to Martinez's 
defense, declaring that his office (the Fiscalia), not the 
 
Procuraduria, held primary jurisdiction over any criminal 
investigation.  The subsequent investigation by the Fiscalia, 
widely viewed as bogus, again focused on the "small fish" 
protecting Martinez and Arguello.  In February 2006, the 
Fiscalia "archived" its investigation, declaring it had found 
no grounds to charge anyone in the liberation of drug 
trafficker Bucardo and in the "disappearance" of the USD 
609,000 of drug money.  Thus by virtue of protection under 
the Aleman -Ortega pact, both Martinez and Arguello have 
continued their CSJ "duties" unimpeded.  Martinez has since 
publicly gloated about the immunity (and impunity) he enjoys, 
declaring to the media on November 22, 2005 that, "There is 
no procedure by which we (the magistrates of the CSJ) can be 
judged.  People can say whatever they want, but no one can 
judge us.  Not even the National Assembly has the power to 
judge us." 
 
OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE: MARTINEZ'S ROLE AS ARNOLDO ALEMAN'S 
PROXY ON THE SUPREME COURT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- 
 
¶14.  (C) Martinez and his fellow PLC magistrates on the CSJ 
helped former president and convicted felon, Arnoldo Aleman, 
escape justice, obstructing efforts by the Government of 
Panama to investigate Aleman's money laundering activities in 
that country and violating Nicaraguan law and international 
treaty obligations in the process.  In January 2005, the 
office of the Panamanian Anti-Corruption Prosecutor announced 
that its intention to press charges against Aleman and other 
conspirators for money laundering in that country. 
Panamanian law requires that suspects be formally notified at 
each stage of such cases, so Panamanian authorities asked 
Nicaragua's then-Attorney General, Alberto Novoa, to serve 
papers notifying Aleman and the others of a preliminary 
hearing against them. 
 
¶15.  (C) Immediately, the then-National Prosecutor (Fiscal 
General) Julio Centeno Gomez alleged that Novoa's actions 
were illegal and insisted that only the Fiscalia had the 
legal capacity to deliver such documents, despite both the 
existence of a Central American mutual assistance treaty 
specifically granting this authority to the Procuraduria, and 
the fact that the Procuraduria had already performed executed 
some 40 other similar cases without a word of protest from 
Centeno Gomez, a close friend of Aleman's whose visa was 
revoked under 212f in 2005 (reftel L).  When the Novoa and 
the Procuraduria appealed to the courts, Martinez and his 
fellow CSJ magistrates sided with the Prosecutor Centeno.  As 
the Panamanian investigation proceeded, Martinez and Centeno 
continued to use their positions to obstruct efforts by 
Panamanian authorities to carry out their legal notification 
obligations and derail Panamanian prosecution of Aleman. 
 
¶16.  (C) Also beginning in 2005, Manuel Martinez and all but 
one of the other CSJ magistrates abandoned any pretense of 
judicial independence and took blatantly partisan positions 
on every legal issue that surfaced in the institutional 
conflict between the Bolanos administration and its FSLN and 
PLC opponents in the National Assembly.  (Reftel J)  Between 
2005 and 2006, with Martinez at the helm, the CSJ ruled month 
after month in favor of the Aleman-Ortega pact-controlled 
National Assembly in dozens of constitutional disputes that 
arose out of Assembly "reforms" intended to strip powers (and 
even Bolanos himself) from the presidency and transfer them 
to itself.  The Bolanos government regarded these "reforms" 
as unconstitutional and refused to recognize them -- a 
position bolstered by a ruling from the Central American 
Court of Justice that declared the changes unconstitutional 
and a violation of the separation of powers mandated by 
Nicaragua's Constitution.  At one point, the government 
 
instructed the police to carry out orders that contravened 
the desires of the National Assembly.  In retaliation, 
Martinez and other CSJ magistrates called for the creation of 
a body of "judicial police" that would bypass the executive, 
and report directly to the Court.  Then, after international 
pressure forced Aleman and Ortega into a political 
"cease-fire" with Bolanos, Martinez led the CSJ in reversing 
itself and suspended further legal actions against Bolanos. 
 
IMPUNITY CONTINUES:  MARTINEZ IS INCORRIGEABLE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶17.  (C) Martinez and his fellow magistrates continue to 
subvert Nicaragua's Constitution and its rule of law by using 
the CSJ, and the courts more generally, as an instrument to 
pressure and threaten opponents of the Aleman-Ortega pact. 
In August 2007 Martinez and the CSJ refused to hear the case 
of Alejandro Bolanos-Davis, a National Assembly member from 
the Conservative Party, who had been stripped of his Assembly 
seat on the basis of U.S.-Nicaraguan citizenship, but really 
for attacking Lenin Cerna, the FSLN and judicial corruption 
(reftel C).  Martinez's refusal to hear a case referred to 
the CSJ by the National Assembly itself was surprising given 
his eagerness, only a year earlier, to hear and rule in favor 
of nearly every case he received from the Assembly.  This 
pattern of subversion and corruption has continued.  In 
December 2007 and January 2008 Martinez facilitated two CSJ 
decisions that emasculated the efforts of opposition National 
Assembly members to require (now) President Ortega to comply 
with Nicaraguan law as he sought to formally incorporate his 
Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) into the Executive Branch. 
(Refs B and A) 
 
SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶18.  (C) CSJ Chief Justice Manuel Martinez has used his 
judicial position to serve the political interests of Arnoldo 
Aleman and his allies to undermine the Nicaragua's 
constitutional order and governance; he has helped to free 
drug traffickers, and has taken bribes and used his office to 
protect convicted felon Aleman and other corrupt officials. 
All these corrupt acts have had serious adverse effects on 
those U.S. interests specified in the Presidential 
Proclamation as well as U.S. foreign policy priorities 
highlighted in the Embassy's Mission Program Plan (MPP).  The 
Embassy has encouraged Nicaragua to prosecute officials for 
corruption and has provided substantial financial and 
technical support in corruption cases.  The Embassy has also 
provided a numerous resources and training to the Nicaraguan 
police and military to increase their capabilities to 
intercept and arrest international drug traffickers.  This 
training and support has been increasingly successful, with 
Nicaraguan law enforcement capturing increasing numbers of 
drug shipments, drug traffickers, and laundered drug money 
each year. 
 
¶19.  (C) The Department's 2006 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR) highlighted judicial 
corruption as one of the single greatest factors undermining 
anti-drug trafficking efforts in the country.  Unfortunately, 
the corruption of Manuel Martinez, other Supreme Court 
magistrates, and of lower court judges under his sway, has 
not only enabled many of the drug traffickers to go free, but 
also to recover the drug money and other drug properties 
seized by police, undermining the hard work of the police, 
military and the USG in seeking to prosecute traffickers and 
carry out the rule of law.  Although Manuel Martinez is just 
one part of the CSJ's corruption problem, his corrupt 
actions, and his total impunity, both of which he has thrown 
in the face of the public, have reinforced widespread popular 
 
 
attitudes that justice can be bought and sold in Nicaragua. 
As the CSJ's chief justice, Martinez is the most public face 
of judicial corruption in Nicaragua.  Lower court judges are 
increasingly emulating Martinez and his CSJ counterparts and 
freeing drug traffickers and their money in return for bribes 
 
¶20.  (C) Stability of Democratic Institutions:  The Embassy's 
top priority is strengthening and consolidating democracy 
through the development of transparent, accountable and 
professional governmental institutions, including the 
judiciary.  Our MPP states that "... abuse of power, 
corruption and politicization of many state institutions, 
especially the judiciary, have impeded the consolidation of 
democracy and economic growth."  Martinez sits at the apex of 
this criminal justice system and his corrosive corrupting 
influence has undermined democracy creating serious political 
instability.  Martinez's participation in unrelenting 
"pact"-driven attacks against the Constitution and 
Nicaragua's democratic institutions have helped to put 
supporters of democracy perpetually on the defensive.  His 
stalwart defense of convicted felon Aleman has obstructed 
both Nicaraguan and Panamanian efforts to prosecute the 
ex-president to the full extent of his crimes. 
 
¶21.  (C) Martinez's corruption, which amounts in itself to 
money laundering, and his trafficking of influence have been 
particularly devastating to the credibility of Nicaragua's 
institutions, as overwhelming evidence of his corrupt acts 
has been front page news for months at a time -- without 
Martinez having suffered any legal consequence whatsoever. 
His case has demonstrated to the entire country that corrupt 
officials can commit any act, and be caught at it, without 
suffering any legal consequences as long as they enjoy the 
support of Ortega or Aleman.  The result is total impunity 
for corrupt individuals and bolsters the widespread attitude 
that even a democratically-elected government is incapable of 
providing for the public good.  The resulting cynicism has 
undermined confidence in democracy, government institutions 
and the administration of justice. 
 
¶22.  (C) Foreign Assistance Goals:  One of the top three USG 
foreign assistance goals in Nicaragua is strengthening 
democracy.  The chief goals of USAID assistance in this area 
are battling corruption and effecting judicial reform. 
Aleman and Martinez's actions have directly damaged progress 
in both of these areas.  In December 2003, post froze our 
judicial assistance program in response to endemic judicial 
corruption, highlighted by what appeared to be an imminent 
fraudulent "not guilty" verdict for Arnoldo Aleman, due to 
backroom dealing between Ortega and the corrupt ex-president. 
 Thanks to corrupt officials such as Martinez, Aleman 
possesses the means to protect allies from the consequences 
of their corrupt acts and the power to sanction and silence 
opponents.  This power has enabled him to retain total 
control of the PLC caucus in the National Assembly, and he 
uses this power to negotiate the very future of the country 
with Ortega. 
 
¶23.  (C) Due to their control of Nicaragua's entire court 
system from CSJ magistrates like Martinez on down, Aleman and 
Ortega have the ability to use nominally legal means to 
harass, intimidate and arrest opponents.  In a vicious circle 
that guarantees their political power, Ortega and Aleman use 
co-dependent cronies such as Martinez on the Supreme Court 
and other state institutions to ensure their control of the 
National Assembly, which, in turn, ensures their control of 
all the other institutions of the state that are under the 
Assembly's supervision, including the judiciary, the 
Comptroller General's Office (Contraloria), and the Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE), among others.  For as long as 
Martinez and people like him remain on the Supreme Court, it 
 
will be an integral part of Nicaragua's corruption problem, 
rather than what it should be, a key institution aiding the 
government in its anti-corruption fight. 
 
¶24.  (C) International Activity of U.S. Businesses:  Corrupt 
Nicaraguan institutions hamper U.S. investment in Nicaragua 
and discourage U.S. exporters from establishing 
agent/distributor relationships.  U.S. investors and 
business-people are reluctant to risk their resources in 
Nicaragua, knowing they could easily be subjected to the 
vagaries of a corrupt judiciary or the whims of politicians 
should they become involved in any commercial dispute, real 
or trumped up.  By shamelessly serving only the interests of 
Arnoldo Aleman and the PLC, sowing corruption throughout the 
judiciary, by taking bribes to enable drug traffickers to 
escape with their proceeds, Martinez has undermined 
Nicaragua's constitution, facilitated perpetual political 
instability and ensured that U.S. and international 
businesses continue to regard Nicaragua as a risky investment 
prospect. 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR FINDING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶25.  (C) On February 13, Martinez met with the CG to discuss 
his immigration status.  He said he requested the meeting 
because, in 2005, he had experienced problems at U.S. ports 
of entry on various occasions.  During his last transit 
through the U.S. on November 5, 2005, the DHS officer asked 
Martinez to waive his diplomatic immunities before allowing 
him to clear immigration.  While DHS officers did not explain 
why he was consistently sent into secondary, he concluded 
that he had been included on the list of "desvisados" (those 
whose visas had been revoked by the Embassy).  Martinez said 
he had seen his name on this list, as well as all the other 
members of the Supreme Court, at one point in the local 
newspapers.  He noted that other magistrates of the Supreme 
Court had experienced similar problems at ports of entry and 
that they had come to the Embassy to clarify their 
immigration status.  He was aware of which magistrates had 
subsequently had their visas restored and which had their 
revocations confirmed. 
 
¶26.  (C) CG inquired about Martinez's residency status.  He 
stated that he had lived in the U.S. from 1979 until 1994 and 
was grateful for the political asylum that he had been 
granted.  He said that his sister, his seven children, eight 
grandchildren and ex-wife were all American citizens, but 
that he had not pursued U.S. citizenship because he did not 
want to jeopardize his political fortunes in Nicaragua. 
Nonetheless, he professed great admiration for the U.S. and 
said that he wished to continue visiting his Amcit relatives 
there. 
 
¶27.  (C) CG explained U.S. immigration law and noted that 
when Martinez returned permanently to