VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0900/01 1082148
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 172148Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHFSI/DIR FSINFATC
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7250

UNCLAS LA PAZ 000900 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DIR FSINFATC FOR FSI/LMS/CMT 
SECSTATE FOR S/ES-O/CMS AND WHA/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PREL AEMR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISE 
 
REF: FSINFATC 1303 
 
¶1. Summary:  Mission Bolivia held a Crisis Management 
Exercise (CME) via digital video conference with Washington 
on April 7.  Members of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) 
and representatives from DEA Santa Cruz and Cochabamba were 
present.  The scenario outlined a civil disturbance in La Paz 
with scattered violence throughout the country. Embassy La 
Paz had previously conducted a CME in November 2007 that 
included locally engaged staff and took place over two days. 
The April 2008 exercise included only direct-hire Americans 
and took only one day, revisiting and refining the earlier 
exercise with significant changes to the scenario.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. The following comments are keyed to reftel paragraph 2, 
A-H. 
 
¶A.  Digital video conference format was effective.  Three 
hours were sufficient, although some EAC members suggested 
that the 1-hour orientation be shortened to allow more time 
for the exercise and review.  Audio and video quality were 
clear enough to allow for effective interaction.  Because of 
the sensitivity of the microphone at FSI, we recommend that 
the microphone be muted when controller is not speaking, thus 
eliminating stray paper and movement noises. 
 
¶B.  The CME scenario was appropriate and worked well with a 
digital video conference format.  Due to time limitations, 
the scenario had to be cut during the exercise: in the 
future, a shorter scenario might be better. 
 
¶C.  Intervention by the controller was appropriate and 
effective. 
 
¶D.  Post has drawn up an extensive list of lessons-learned 
based on this exercise.  EAC will work with these lessons 
learned to modify reactions in the event of a real crisis. 
 
¶E.  The primary lesson learned, echoing the experience of 
2007, was that action sooner is better than later.  As a 
corollary, thanks to La Paz's unique setting sometimes even 
the earliest action does not allow sufficient time for an 
evacuation.  La Paz is located in a narrow valley, and all 
roads out can be easily blocked by protesting crowds (as has 
occurred in the past.)  Therefore, Embassy La Paz and the 
NAS/USAID building need to be prepared for a "shelter in 
place" situation.  In both crisis scenarios, the EAC 
attempted to call for evacuation at the earliest indication 
of need, and both times significant numbers of employees 
remained in the city when the crisis came to a head and no 
travel was possible. As a result, another lesson learned was 
to attempt to revise our drawdown list, minimizing 
"essential" personnel so that a potential siege at the 
Embassy or NAS/USAID building would have less impact. 
 
Another lesson learned is the difficulty of getting out of 
the country in general.  The primary mode of protest in 
Bolivia is street-blockades, and many of the major interstate 
roads are two lane and blocked with little effort.  In the 
past, many Mission plans for evacuation have been based on 
the expectation that Santa Cruz could act as a temporary 
safe-haven on the way out of the country.  With increasing 
turmoil in Santa Cruz, this assumption may no longer hold. 
Both official and private Americans may need to be ready to 
shelter-in-place and wait out a crisis if internal travel is 
impossible. 
 
Both CMEs emphasized the need for preparation as a 
best-practice for crisis management.  EAC members suggested a 
dry run to test the set up of an alternate command center, 
both to have the experience of the quick conversion and also 
to determine what will be needed in the event an alternate 
command is needed.  The EAC could then meet at alternate 
command centers occasionally, to familiarize themselves with 
these new areas.  In anticipation that shelter-in-place may 
become necessary, EAC members suggested increased 
communication regarding stockpiling, the location of 
safe-houses, and exit strategies. 
 
EAC members also requested more information on the reaction 
time of various fly-away teams, including military support 
teams.  Hands-on practice drills with partner Bolivian groups 
such as the National Police could also be valuable, although 
difficult to arrange due to the current sensitivities of the 
Bolivian government.  The EAP will be updated to include 
recent contact information, a streamlined drawdown list for 
evacuation, and more information on shelter-in-place needs. 
¶F.  The overview training provided a good introduction to the 
various resources available in a crisis, particularly from 
agencies or departments that help State in a crisis.  The 
overview training in DVC format was appropriate.  Currently 
no overview training for LES or non-EAC Americans is 
scheduled, but Post plans to provide some of the information 
in upcoming townhall meetings with the Mission and American 
communities as appropriate. 
 
¶G.  Current schedule of CMEs seems appropriate.  Post will 
continue to supplement this schedule with internal exercises, 
as in November 2007.  Although some level of basic crisis 
training should be maintained for all posts (a plane crash or 
truck bomb can take place anywhere), it seems to make sense 
that posts that are more likely to face a crisis (based on 
current developments or historical trends) should receive 
more preparation and training. 
 
¶H. Mission Bolivia appreciates CME coordinator Douglas 
Kinney's efforts in facilitating our most recent crisis 
management exercise. 
 
GOLDBERG