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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000751 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS OFDP OVIP BL AR CO BR
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: PRE-MAY 4 DIALOGUE HOPES ON THE ROPES 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 747 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 735 
 
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Despite much-publicized government urgency to 
head off Santa Cruz Department's (state) May 4 autonomy 
referendum through dialogue with the opposition, Bolivian 
government contacts are privately accepting they cannot head 
off the referendum and are looking at a post-May 4 strategy. 
In the meantime, the government continues its flirtations 
with various potential third-party mediators (OAS, Catholic 
Church, and Brazilian/Argentine/Colombian governments), 
efforts that Morales used April 5 to warn opposition 
departments that the international community has declared 
their autonomy movements "illegal."  Despite his newfound 
vigor for dialogue, Morales also laced his April 5 speech 
with legal threats against autonomy leaders and calls for his 
base to mobilize against the referendum.  Rather than 
actually proposing a concrete role for a "Group of Friends," 
Morales used his meeting with Colombian and Argentine 
delegations April 3 to lambaste Santa Cruz oligarchs, the 
USG, and Ambassador Goldberg, according to the Colombian DCM. 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Although the opposition is politely meeting with 
proposed facilitators, it has been steadfast that it will not 
postpone the May referendum for another open-ended dialogue 
(earlier attempts at compromise in the Constitutional 
Assembly, in Congress, and with prefects ended 
acrimoniously).  Opposition leaders view the government's 
dialogue push as either an empty PR gesture to curry 
international and domestic support and/or as a strategy to 
strip the opposition of what they perceive as a winning hand 
on May 4.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) During an April 4 lunch of mission DCMs, Colombian 
Charge Adriana Patricia Arbelaez provided DCM with a readout 
of the April 3 meetings the Colombian Vice Foreign Minister 
Camilo Reyes and Argentine Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana had 
with government and opposition leaders.  The two were invited 
by the Bolivian government ostensibly to lay the groundwork 
for a "friends group" of Latin American governments to 
facilitate/mediate negotiations between the deadlocked 
government and opposition leadership.  Brazilian Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim was also invited, but was not able to 
arrive in La Paz the evening of April 4.  Argentine DCM Jorge 
Gomez, also present at the lunch, confirmed Arbelaez's 
version of events. 
 
Evo Strong on Blame, Weak on Direction 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Arbelaez said Bolivian President Evo Morales blasted 
the U.S. and opposition "oligarchs" for a straight hour with 
Reyes and Taiana.  Among Morales' "unbelievable" accusations: 
the United States is funneling funds to Santa Cruz 
Department's (state) opposition leadership and Ambassador 
Goldberg is masterminding the autonomy movement behind the 
scenes.  Morales added boilerplate criticisms that opposition 
oligarchs are concerned only with protecting their wealth and 
privileges at the expense of the common people.  Morales 
allegedly challenged the popular support for the May 4 Santa 
Cruz autonomy referendums, asserting that if it wasn't for an 
alliance between Goldberg and a small group of business 
oligarchs, "there would be no referendum."  (Note: Government 
Minister Alfredo Rada April 6 publicly accused the Ambassador 
of trying to "dismember" Bolivia.  Reftel a.  End Note.) 
 
¶5. (C) Arbelaez said Reyes asked Morales, Vice President 
Alvaro Garcia Linera, and Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca 
repeatedly "what do you want us to do?"  Although none of the 
government leaders laid out any options for a charge or 
mandate for the nascent "friends group," Garcia Linera 
allegedly asserted the government would be willing to make 
changes to the draft constitution and redirect petroleum 
revenues to departments if the opposition dropped autonomy 
referendums (which are also scheduled for three other 
departments).  (Comment: This is the same line Garcia Linera 
used during negotiations with the opposition in Congress, 
which ended in blocking the opposition from a Kangaroo 
session to pass legislation making department autonomy 
referendums explicitly illegal.  End Comment.)  Choquehuanca, 
however, indicated he did not share this view and would not 
support any compromise that included changing the draft 
constitution. 
 
Evo Not so "Friendly" with Colombia 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) According to Arbelaez, Morales did not shake hands 
with Reyes and ignored him throughout the meeting.  Arbelaez 
explained that Reyes defended the United States' intentions, 
although she did not go into specifics. 
 
Mexico Standing in for "Unacceptable" Peru 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) The Mexican DCM added that Mexico is being considered 
for a friends group to appease the opposition, and only 
because the opposition's first choice, Peru, was unacceptable 
to the Bolivian government.  She explained the Mexican 
Foreign Minister is waiting for a readout on the 
Argentine/Colombian meetings before committing to an official 
visit to La Paz.  According to press accounts over the 
weekend a Mexican delegation is forthcoming, though no dates 
were provided. 
 
Brazilian FM Notes Will/Lack of Will on Dialogue 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Among others, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso 
Amorim met with President Morales, Public Ombudsman Waldo 
Albarracin, and opposition leaders Samuel Doria Medina 
(National Unity), Jorge Quiroga (PODEMOS), Oscar Ortiz 
(PODEMOS Senate President), and Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben 
Costas April 5 and 6.  Following his meeting with Morales, 
Amorim said he was "concerned with the disposition of both 
sides to open a dialogue."  Perhaps recognizing how 
pessimistic the comment appeared in the press, Amorim seemed 
to reverse course the next day, saying "despite the 
difficulties " there is a desire on both sides for dialogue." 
 In a public roundtable sponsored by the Brazilian Embassy 
later in the day, Amorim compared Morales favorably with 
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Da Silva, who also was not 
initially liked by "the establishment."  Quiroga said he told 
Amorim that any international efforts to mediate the conflict 
should be subordinated and coordinated with existing 
mediation efforts of the Catholic Church in Santa Cruz. 
 
Church Tries to Revive Moribund Facilitation Role 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9. (U) Meanwhile the Catholic Church plans to meet with 
opposition prefects (governors) April 7 to explore mediation 
options.  The Church has blamed the lackluster progress of 
its efforts to move a dialogue forward, underway since March 
14, on the lack of will from both sides to negotiate. 
Bolivian Cardinal Julio Terrazas said on April 3 that he 
believes it is now "impossible" to facilitate dialogue 
between the government and the opposition due to an 
environment of mutual suspicion, pressure and violence. 
Terrazas lamented that the two sides seem to appreciate force 
and pressure over rational arguments.  These comments came 
only one day after Bolivian President Evo Morales appealed 
for mediation by the Catholic Church in the conflict. 
President Morales has also appealed for mediation assistance 
from the OAS (reftel b). 
 
Evo's Schizophrenic Dialogue/Confrontation Message 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶10. (U) Despite talking dialogue with FM Amorim in the 
morning, Morales talked later April 5 about mobilizing his 
base against the referendum (although he did not specify 
advocate violence).  Morales also threatened legal 
prosecution against opposition autonomy leaders.  "If these 
prefect officials are investigated, I am certain they will be 
thrown in jail," said Morales, specially citing prefect 
misuse of government funds.  Vice President Alvaro Garcia 
Linera followed Morales' statement with a call for government 
supporters to mobilize against the referendums.  "If they 
(opposition) want to try something, it will be illegitimate, 
unconstitutional, and will provide the basis to take them to 
court for their misdeeds." 
 
Evo: Internationals Love Me, Love Prefects Not 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶11. (U) Morales attacked the legality of "seditious" Santa 
Cruz autonomy statutes, specifically its supposed creep into 
federal prerogatives.  Morales warned prefects not to 
"deceive themselves" concerning the legality of autonomy 
referenda and assured the prefects they would not be able to 
count on the support of the international community. 
 
MFA Director Advises Deemphasizing May 4 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) MFA Director of Bilateral Affairs Jean Paul Guevara 
told Poloffs April 4 that both sides needed to 
"de-dramaticize" the May 4 referendum so that "it doesn't 
become an artificial impediment to dialogue."  Guevara said 
it had been a strategic mistake of the GOB to initially give 
so much importance to the May 4 vote, and the GOB was now 
looking beyond May 4 ) "not everything has to be worked out 
before then."  Guevara said dialogue was unlikely before May 
4, but that both parties should renew efforts post May 4, 
which is why the government is engaging the OAS, Catholic 
Church, and the international community.  Guevara said the 
Bolivian government would still consider a U.S. mediation 
role "as we discussed with (Assistant Secretary) Tom 
Shannon," but that for the moment no such role was "under 
discussion." 
 
¶13. (C) Ultimately, Guevara conceded the referendum would 
pass, though not in the landslide estimated by the 
opposition.  He argued, however, that it would not matter 
whether they win by "70, 80, or even 90 percent" because "it 
will still be illegal."  He said the government would ignore 
any vote not recognized by the National Electoral Court or 
international observers.  "Not even the police will 
participate other than to carry out their normal functions." 
Guevara also pointed out that although the government did not 
desire or plan a police/military "state of siege" in Santa 
Cruz May 4, it had every legal right to do so.  Guevara said 
the government would not be instigating its supporters to 
violence May 4 and that if the opposition did the same "there 
will be no violence." 
 
¶14. (U) Separately, the press reported over the weekend that 
a letter sent by FM Choquehuanca to Bolivia's foreign 
missions ordered Ambassadors to campaign publicly against the 
autonomic referendums. 
 
MAS Deputies "Not Worried" 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Ruling MAS party deputies Tony Condori and Ramiro 
Venegas told PolOff April 4 there would be no large-scale 
violence May 4.  They believe the autonomy referendum will be 
not be conclusive enough to put it beyond dispute and 
"hopefully" would become just another bargaining chip in 
government/opposition negotiations.  They foresaw a post-May 
4 grand compromise that would meld opposition autonomy and 
budget concerns into the draft-constitution. 
 
¶16. (C) Condori postulated the government could actually beat 
the opposition at their own referendum, as pollsters and 
politicians routinely underestimate the 
government-sympathetic rural vote, "as they did in 2005." 
(Note: A March 16 Equipos Mori poll estimated a nearly 80 
percent vote in favor of autonomy in Santa Cruz.  End Note.) 
Condori estimated a 70 percent support for the referendum in 
urban communities, with at least 70 percent opposed in rural 
areas.  With about a million voters each, the urban/rural 
split makes the outcome "too close to call."  Anything less 
than a landslide would be considered a defeat, according to 
the MAS deputies. 
 
¶17. (C) Although they discounted the probability the 
government would encourage supporters to confront the 
referendum process violently, they conceded it remained an 
option both for May 4 and beyond.  They added that skirmishes 
with opposition supporters were inevitable May 4, but would 
generally be confined to posturing and "people yelling at 
each other."  Condori contended, "Bolivians are not violent 
people, we always work something out before it comes to 
that."  Condori said citizens from his city of El Alto would 
mobilize if they could be convinced Santa Cruz was blocking 
the government's agenda or threatening recent Aymara 
immigrants, but that such a mobilization would "not be 
automatic," as Altenos were more inclined to support a 
peaceful dialogue than fight.  He added that "no one is 
talking about it" and that "there is no need" to use the 
military or outside government supporters, since there are 
already enough government supporters in Santa Cruz. 
Separately, MAS Lower House leader Cesar Navarro said 
publicly April 4 that "the only way to prevent the referendum 
is to intervene military and we will not do that in any way." 
 
 
MAS Moving Red Lines Post-May 4 
------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) Venegas opined that if Santa Cruz does pull off a 
clear victory "it will be the end to dialogue" and maybe the 
beginning of a government crackdown.  Condori echoed 
sentiments from Director Guevara that he was not worried 
about May 4, but rather actions Santa Cruz might take 
afterwards to exercise authorities reserved for the national 
government, such as setting up its own police force, 
negotiating with foreign governments, or disputing federal 
land distributions.  "If they start acting like a country, 
the government will have no choice," asserted Condori.  "No 
national government on earth would put up with the Santa Cruz 
statutes." 
Opposition: May 4 or Bust 
------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) However genuine (or not) the government's dialogue 
overtures are, it does not appear that the opposition is 
inclined to participate in a dialogue prior to May 4, at 
least one without conditions.  Bolivian Senate President 
Oscar Ortiz told the Argentine/Colombian "friends" delegation 
that nothing would stop the May 4 Santa Cruz autonomy 
referendum from going forward.  According to Arbelaez, Ortiz 
explained the opposition has been burned too many times in 
negotiations with the government to sacrifice the one card 
they have left: departmental autonomy referendums (Note: 
Since November, negotiations in the Constitutional Assembly, 
Congress, and between Morales and the departments all ended 
acrimoniously for the opposition, with the government forces 
moving forward with their agenda under legally dubious and 
exclusionary processes.  End Note.)  Ortiz indicated the 
opposition would be willing to negotiate, but only after the 
May 4 referendum, when it would be a position of greater 
strength.  Arbelaez and Gomez agreed the opposition gave a 
more cogent and relevant presentation than the government. 
 
¶20. (C) Santa Cruz Department Prefect (state governor) Ruben 
Costas made similar points in his meeting with Reyes/Taiana, 
according to prefect sources, but dramatically added that the 
timeline for the May 4 referendum was out of his control.  "I 
can't stop the May 4 referendum; the people would tear me 
apart."  Following his April 6 meeting with Amorim, Costas 
stressed hopes for a peaceful, democratic May 4: "We are not 
in agreement with violence. 
 
¶21. (U) After his meeting with FM Amorim, Quiroga 
unequivocally placed the burden of creating conditions for 
dialogue with the government, for example by annulling acts 
arrived at undemocratically, such as the draft constitution 
and laws passed during a government blockade of opposition 
congressmen.  The same day, Santa Cruz autonomy authority 
Carlos Dabdoub assured there was no "legal capacity or 
dialogue that could stop the course of this (autonomy 
referendum) process 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶22. (C) The group of friends make-up for now has 
pro-government leaning Argentina and Brazil balanced with 
Colombia and Mexico, at the opposition's request.  But this 
may only be much ado about dialogue, as neither side appears 
serious about negotiating before May 4.  The government 
appears to realize it cannot forcibly stop a May 4 referendum 
from occurring and is working a post-May 4 strategy.  Part of 
that strategy in the near term appears to be 
"de-dramaticizing" May 4, as the MFA's Guevara put it, 
emphasizing the government's legal arguments, and projecting 
a facade of reasonability, to include insinuating support 
from the international community. 
 
¶23. (C) Morales' tone shifted from benevolence to 
confrontation April 5, as it often does when addressing his 
coca-growing radical base in the Chapare.  His statements 
implying the international community backs him against the 
Media Luna's autonomy referenda are a misrepresentation of 
international statements and postures to date and reveal the 
true intentions of inviting foreign ministry delegations from 
Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia to La Paz, ostensibly here to 
explore mediation options.  They were instead paraded out as 
a supposed sign of international sympathy for the Morales 
administration.  Instead of providing guidance on how the 
delegations might utilize their good offices to initiate a 
dialogue, the government lectured these diplomats and used 
them as public props.  Although the government has 
misrepresented international concern about the political 
situation in Bolivia for Morales administration support in 
the past, this is the most flagrant example.  What remains to 
be seen is if these countries will attempt to clarify their 
positions publicly or go willingly along with the role Evo 
has cast them in.  End Comment. 
GOLDBERG