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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000735 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS OFDP OVIP BL AR CO BR
SUBJECT: NEW PUSH FOR DIALOGUE: SHOW BEFORE THE SHOWDOWN? 
 
REF: LA PAZ 677 
 
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca called 
for renewed examination of third-party facilitated 
negotiations with the opposition March 31, in conjunction 
with an April 1 La Paz visit by OAS envoy Dante Caputo. 
Caputo met with Santa Cruz opposition leaders April 2. 
Choquehuanca said the government is looking into all options 
to "get the opposition to the table," including facilitation 
by OAS, church, or a "friends group" of countries.  Foreign 
Ministry delegations from Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil are 
arriving April 3-4 at government invitation. 
 
¶2. (C) Despite what we've heard from the Vice President, MFA 
Vice Minister Cabinet Director Jorge Caballero told PolOff 
April 1 that there is no role for the United States in any 
friends group.  Caballero said the government would only 
resort to a friends group after May 4, hoping the violence it 
produces can be blamed on the opposition to bolster its 
negotiating posture.  Caballero opined that the government 
would use third-party facilitation of a dialogue as a 
stalling tactic or if it could be reasonably assured of a 
GOB-friendly outcome.  He said the government wants to 
prevent the May 4 referendum from happening, but if it goes 
forward will use its civilian supporters to bloody the event 
to challenge the legitimacy of the results.  End Summary. 
 
Surprise OAS Visit: Caputo to the Rescue? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) An OAS delegation led by Dante Caputo, Deputy 
Secretary for Political Affairs, arrived in La Paz March 31. 
 
SIPDIS 
The delegation met with President Evo Morales, Foreign 
Minister David Choquehuanca, Senate President Oscar Ortiz 
(PODEMOS-Opposition), Chamber of Deputies President Edmundo 
Novillo (MAS-Government), and National Electoral Court 
President Jose Luis Exeni on April 1.  Caputo met April 2 
with Santa Cruz Department Prefect (state governor) Ruben 
Costas, and had separate meetings with leaders of 
neighborhood civic groups, legal expert and autonomy statutes 
drafter Juan Carlos Urenda, and Martha Lazo, the Santa Cruz 
director for the watchdog "fourth power," representing social 
and indigenous groups. 
 
¶4. (C) The visit comes as something of a surprise, as the 
Bolivian government had put the OAS on hold pending the 
outcome of proposed church negotiations.  The government 
appears to have called in Caputo for a last-minute detour as 
he was returning from a medical trip to Argentina.  In any 
event, OAS officials were expecting OAS Secretary General 
Jose Miguel Insulza to be tapped for such a trip. 
 
¶5. (C) Bernhard Griesinger, OAS Representative in Bolivia, 
told PolOff weeks ago that the government reacted defensively 
to the OAS statement following the February 28 encirclement 
of the Bolivian congress by government supporters, keeping 
opposition congressmen from attending critical votes.  He 
said the government was surprised at the level of OAS 
criticism, particularly following a rosy Morales January 25 
reception with Insulza.  Griesinger told DCM on April 2 that 
there was also resistance to OAS involvement by the 
opposition, which was very upset by remarks made by Insulza 
and "spin" by the government according to Griesinger.  The 
OAS representative told DCM that Caputo may return in 12-19 
days to mediate between the government and opposition, if 
conditions warrant. 
 
Evo Invites Superfriends (not U.S.) to La Paz 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca told leading daily 
La Razon March 31 that the government would evaluate the 
option of OAS facilitation "in parallel" with an option to 
have a "group of friends" from various countries facilitate. 
The latest list of such a group based on anonymous sources 
from Brazilian newspaper Folha includes Brazil, Argentina, 
Colombia, and, maybe, Mexico (Note: we have also heard Peru 
and the U.S. as possible members.  End Note.)  Argentine 
Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana and Colombian Vice Foreign 
Minister Camilo Reyes arrive in La Paz today (April 3) to 
meet with government and opposition leaders.  Reyes is 
scheduled to meet with President Morales at 9:30 a.m. 
Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim will arrive April 4. 
Government invitations have not been sent to the U.S. nor 
Mexico, according to anonymous media sources in the Mexican 
Embassy. 
 
Government Talks Up Dialogue, But Not With Opposition 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶7. (U) Foreign Minister Choquehuanca explained that the 
government is looking into various options to facilitate a 
negotiation with the opposition.  "We are not going to 
concentrate only in one option," said Choquehuanca in 
reference to stalled efforts to get the Catholic Church to 
play a facilitation role.  "We want, with the help of these 
organizations, to bring the opposition to negotiation table." 
 The government had still not favored any option nor laid out 
any concrete dialogue agenda.  The only official mention of 
the OAS meetings was state media coverage of the National 
Electoral Court meeting, which laid out the reasons the court 
cannot verify or recognize the May 4 Santa Cruz autonomy 
referendum results and announced an OAS audit of the CNE's 
electoral roles in the coming weeks. 
 
¶8. (C) Choquehuanca stressed that he was in a hurry to get a 
dialogue started before Santa Cruz's May 4 autonomy 
referendum because the alternative is an obligation to 
"respect the law" (Comment: we take this rather cryptic 
comment as a veiled threat of a crackdown on opposition 
referendum organizers or an admission that the 
government/police will not step to quell violence associated 
with the "illegal" referendum.  End Comment.)  A spokesman 
for the Archbishop of Santa Cruz said the church has not 
received any indication from either side that they want to 
negotiate. 
 
Both Sides Waiting for the Phone to Ring 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Presidential Minister Juan Ramon Quintana and other 
government officials are busy characterizing opposition 
leaders in Santa Cruz as unreasonable radicals intent on 
tearing Bolivia apart.  "The government has not proposed any 
conditions (for dialogue).  I hope the opposition recovers 
its moderation, its calm, and says yes to dialogue for the 
peace of the country," said Quintana.  Opposition Senator 
Roberto Yanez shifted the onus for dialogue on the 
government, saying its the government's responsibility to 
initiate a negotiation process.  Three former Bolivian 
Presidents (Carlos Mesa, Jaime Paz Zamora, Guido Vildoso) and 
one former Vice President (Victor Hugo Cardenas) jointly 
asked President Morales to "take a step back," revoke the 
draft constitution, and return hydrocarbon funds to the 
prefects (states).  Paz Zamora and Cardenas said it was 
incumbent on the government to initiate a negotiated solution 
with the opposition. 
 
Santa Cruz/Opposition Reaction 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) Despite the government's new public push for 
negotiation, Santa Cruz leaders say the government has not 
talked to them about a new dialogue.  Santa Cruz's Director 
of Autonomy Carlos Dabdoub publicly discounted the motives of 
the government's latest dialogue overtures: "If the purposes 
of dialogue is to postpone May 4, this will not happen." 
 
¶11. (C) Santa Cruz Director for International Relations Karen 
Balcazar told PolOff that the best prefect leaders are hoping 
for is that Caputo presents a balanced report to the OAS. 
She said prefectural officials laid out in detail to Caputo 
the history and reasoning of the autonomy movement in Santa 
Cruz, after which Caputo stayed true to his characterization 
of his "listening tour" and had no substantive comments.  He 
explained to opposition leaders that the OAS could only take 
on a observer role for the May 4 referendum at the request of 
the Bolivian Foreign Ministry. 
 
MFA insider: No U.S. Role in Negotiations 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) MFA Vice Minister Cabinet Director Jorge Caballero 
(protect) bluntly said there is no role for the United States 
in any "friends group," directly contradicting what Vice 
President Alvaro Garcia Linera told us last week (reftel). 
Caballero said a U.S. role would be unacceptable to the 
government, just as a Venezuelan role would be unacceptable 
to the opposition.  He asserted MAS hard-liners would color 
our intentions as "intervention" and we could ultimately 
endanger the prospects of a negotiated settlement. 
Caballero's advice is we stay out of any direct, public 
mediation role and instead work behind the scenes with 
international partners; i.e. push them to play a role. 
 
¶13. (C) Caballero said he had never heard the U.S. was being 
considered in a friends group.  He suspected all the 
different friends group compositions are being floated 
because there is no agreement on who should be in such a 
group and when asked about it, officials are just throwing 
some reasonable names out off the top their heads.  To the 
best of Caballero's knowledge the government has not 
seriously considered who would be in such a group, consistent 
with their low prioritization of this option (see below). 
 
Trying to Decipher the GOB Plan 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Although Caballero concedes there is much internal 
MFA confusion regarding the government's plan, he said the 
follow rank list of options was his best effort at 
deciphering the administrations strategy.  He emphasized, 
however, that incompetence and misunderstandings reign 
supreme in the Morales interagency process and added that 
"having a plan is one thing, but executing it is another 
thing." 
 
--Option 1: OAS.  This is the only real option both sides 
"could accept" to come to a negotiated solution, in 
Caballero's opinion, but Caputo is an unknown quantity 
to the GOB.  Government leaders will feel out Caputo April 1 
and push for an OAS facilitation/mediation role if they 
determine he is inclined to favor the government position. 
They may also accept an OAS role if they feel it will buy 
them time, as they feel like the opposition has captured the 
momentum and will support any veneer of 
facilitation/mediation if it postpones autonomy.  If the 
Morales Administration gets the feeling he is inclined to 
favor the opposition, they will move to option 2.  This 
option also fails if the opposition opposes it for perceived 
government leanings, which is likely, considering their 
inherent distrust of the OAS and preference for church 
mediation. 
 
--Option 2: Church.  Caballero said the government turned to 
the church first more as a stalling tactic than a good-faith 
effort to negotiate a long-term solution.  In fact, the 
government would prefer the OAS because it sees the OAS as 
more favorably inclined to it than the church.  That said, 
the best government outcome would be for the church to ask 
Santa Cruz to postpone the autonomy vote for the sake of 
dialogue.  In this scenario, the government wins if Santa 
Cruz accepts postponement (unlikely) and wins if Santa Cruz 
rejects it, as government will claim the moral high ground 
and that even the church is on its side against cruzeno 
radicals. 
 
--Option 3: Violence.  There is no feeling of urgency to the 
government negotiating strategy because they view May 4 
violence as an acceptable outcome and negotiation by other 
means, especially if they can distance themselves from the 
blame. 
 
--Option 4: Friends Group.  The government would resort to 
this only after May 4, as it determines it will have more 
leverage with foreign governments after people die or get 
hurt in the "opposition's referendum."  The government thinks 
it could use foreign governments or international 
institutions to force the Media Luna to heel, something it 
"realizes it cannot do" by force.  In any event, the Morales 
Administration will have nothing to loose.  A Friends Group 
mandate could be revoked at anytime by the government and 
results wouldn't be enforceable; neighbors will ultimately 
avoid confrontation with the Bolivian government. 
 
GOB Red Lines 
------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Caballero said the government will not compromise on 
granting autonomy originating from the Department or on 
moving forward on a new constitution, although they are open 
to changes to the constitution.  The ruling MAS party is 
having some second thoughts about parts of its draft 
constitution (overlapping autonomies, communitarian justice), 
which they could change and then paint as benevolent 
compromises to the sake of national compromise.  Caballero 
said the government has always been open to changing the 
draft constitution and is now ready to compromise on 
distribution of funds for the prefects (states), "but now it 
is too late.  Santa Cruz wants a lot more." 
 
Making May 4 Illegitimate, Not Just Illegal 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Ultimately, Caballero said the government understands 
it cannot win with a heavy hand in Santa Cruz and can't win 
by allowing a peaceful, successful referendum to occur. 
"That would be the end for them.  They need to show the 
outcome is in dispute."  They will use violence to discredit 
the referendum, casting it as illegitimate, not just illegal. 
 In the same way that the draft constitution will forever be 
associated with violence in Sucre, the government hopes to 
undermine Santa Cruz's referendum with violence and chaos. 
Because the government "understands they cannot rely on the 
security forces" (Note: Minister of Defense Walker San Miguel 
discarded any use of the military to impose a "state of 
siege" April 2.  End Note.), they will instead step back and 
allow supporters in MAS strongholds around Santa Cruz to 
attack polling stations, referendum officials, and anyone who 
tries to participate.  Caballero said this is partially a 
deliberate strategy and partially out of the government's 
 
hands, as they can't control their radicals any better than 
the opposition can, allowing the government to plead 
deniability for blame in the outcome.  "You should not allow 
them to deny their responsibility."  Caballero was concerned 
that ideological extremists from neighboring countries might 
play a role and push more reasonable Bolivians to violence. 
 
Chapare Indigenous Leaders: "Evo Does Not Negotiate" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶17. (C) Indigenous rural leaders from the Evo bastion of 
Chapare, a region infamous for coca production encompassing 
most of Cochabamba department, told PolOffs today that they 
have known Morales since the 1980s during his rise as leader 
of the coca unions and "he has never compromised."  They 
lamented Evo worked his way up in both the coca union and 
politics by projecting an inclusive image publicly, but 
busting heads behind the scenes.  When his tenure ended as 
president of the coca unions, he simply changed the rules to 
allow multiple terms (Morales maintains the union presidency 
today).  They ominously warned that May 4 in Santa Cruz would 
be a repeat of Evo's 2001 takeover of the Assembly of 
Sovereign People (their organization): when Evo couldn't talk 
his way to a MAS takeover, he ordered his supporters to "kick 
out" his detractors, resulting in a death, three serious 
injuries, and division of the permanent organization. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶18. (C) The Morales Administration is interested in the 
public relations value of cultivating a image of a government 
that values dialogue, but short on concrete proposals.  That 
said, the opposition in Santa Cruz is not inclined to 
negotiate either; they are just more honest about it.  We are 
inclined to accept Caballero's pessimistic analysis: the 
government is ultimately more interested in using 
negotiations as a tool to scuttle the May 4 referendum than 
as a means to establish a comprehensive peace with the 
opposition.  Without pressure from the international 
community (as opposed to support), there is no reason to 
believe the government calculus will change.  End Comment. 
GOLDBERG