VZCZCXRO5969
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0374/01 1141532
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231532Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7918
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0036
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS PHUM KPKO CG RW UN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES - NAIROBI PROCESS: 18TH MEETING OF THE JMG TASK 
FORCE, APRIL 18, 2008 
 
REF:  Kinshasa 349 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Rwanda told the Joint Monitoring Group Task Force 
(JMG-TF) during its April 18 session in Goma that it should be more 
active and consider meeting in the field as a matter of course, but 
drew no support.  UN agencies led presentations on reducing negative 
impact on IDPs and returning soldiers, and updating DDRRR 
operations.  Rwanda praised the DDRRR portion and the group arranged 
for a briefing on DDRRR results every other week.  Rwanda complained 
about the TF secretariat and proposed it be reconstituted to afford 
more accurate reporting of Rwandan positions and opinions.  The 
members quashed any return to the time-consuming reporting 
characteristic of the TF's earlier meetings.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Rwanda's delegation, and nearly all present at the April 18 
Joint Monitoring Group Task Force meeting, presented condolences to 
the Congolese government on the April 15 plane crash.  The Congolese 
delegation acknowledged these expressions. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In reply to Rwanda's renewed criticism of a Task Force that 
confines itself to a conference room, the Congolese delegation 
answered that only local commanders know when it is safe to visit 
rural areas.  Rwanda should not confuse security conditions in their 
own country with what is happening in the Congo, they said, and when 
the head of the Congolese delegation, Colonel Augustin Mamba, 
returns on April 25 he will consider the areas that Rwanda wants to 
visit. 
 
UN on IDPs 
---------- 
 
¶4. (U) OCHA representatives had alarming statistics on the number of 
long-term IDPs in the Kivu provinces, up to 840,000 today. 
Humanitarian operations in North Kivu remain feasible, but space for 
such activities in South Kivu has run out.  In the event of a 
military operation against the FDLR, more IDPs and still less 
humanitarian access are inevitable.  This underscores the need to 
provide FARDC soldiers with training in human rights and civilian 
protection.  Presenters agreed that experience in FARDC operations 
carried out with MONUC shows that the larger the attacking force, 
the greater the negative impact on civilians.  A system of 
observation is needed to curtail human rights violations, and a 
system of prior warnings to civilians in the path of military forces 
to reduce new displacement. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Rwanda's delegate wondered why displacement went up when it 
was supposed to go down, and specifically why local authorities do 
not seem aware of the impact of the Nairobi and Goma processes. 
OCHA said that part of the answer is the discovery of previously 
unknown IDPs, more visible since the population became more mobile. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite the success of the cease-fire, civilians are 
skittish about going home, fearing reprisals by armed groups and 
recognizing that banditry is on the rise.  Often people who want to 
go home will leave one family member in place to be certain nobody 
usurps their existing toehold while they scout a new location.  In 
South Kivu, families are remarkably static, operating on their own 
timetable rather than that of the military or armed groups.  A UNHCR 
representative offered a kind of mea culpa, acknowledging that his 
agency has not kept up timely communications with authorities who 
might help families to more safely judge the climate for staying or 
moving. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Congolese delegate took Rwanda to task for questions 
that seemed to hint at operational carelessness on the part of 
FARDC.  He noted that the FARDC operates with MONUC and 
MONUC-trained soldiers, and nothing in the process is left to 
chance.  For instance, traditional chiefs were present at the Kivus 
conference in January; everyone should take seriously the business 
of explaining the cease-fire and its implications, and everyone 
including Rwanda should recognize that there is no magic wand to 
make the process go more quickly. 
 
DDRRR goal:  change attitudes 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In the absence of DDRRR principals, MONUC-Goma's acting 
public information officer (PIO) told members that the goal of DDRRR 
today is to locate and isolate its targets, talk about the 
comparative advantages of life in the two countries, explain Amani 
programs, and develop targets' confidence in MONUC and enthusiasm 
for the demobilization process at the Mutubo transit center.  The 
process requires support from provincial authorities, MONUC and the 
 
KINSHASA 00000374  002 OF 002 
 
 
World Bank's MDRP program at both the political and strategic 
levels.  It uses a variety of media at the operational level, 
including Radio Okapi, the fledgling Radio DDRRR, sports events, 
professional theatrical troops, and educational programs in schools. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) According to the PIO, it is at this operational level that 
Information Operations, also called Psychological Operations, are 
critically important. The number of FDLR returnees is increasing but 
DDRRR administrators are not sure why:  new political developments, 
public awareness, or both.  Experience shows that public awareness 
campaigns and PsyOps are most successful when personal relationships 
are in play, most obviously including the location of family and 
friends in relation to the armed fighter's present position. 
 
Praise and complaints 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Impressed by the presentation, the Rwandan delegation 
suggested that all TF members would benefit from frequent updates on 
the successes of DDRRR.  The presenters and members agreed to an 
every-second-week schedule beginning May 2. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Toward the end of the meeting Rwanda complained that the 
TF secretariat systematically under-reported members' reactions to 
its positions.  The other members discounted the complaint and 
firmly stated they would not return to the time-consuming process of 
debating and re-wording the minutes as was practiced in the TF's 
early months. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Because the JMG envoys were meeting in New York the same 
day, the members did not discuss pending correspondence and 
requests. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Members will meet briefly on April 25 to sign minutes, 
then move to a DDRRR location in Goma for a special presentation. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment.  An important theme resonated through both of the 
day's presentations, namely anxiety over when and how the GDRC and 
its partners will move to rid the country of armed groups.  An aloof 
Rwandan delegation was impatient and skeptical.  Interestingly, the 
same anxiety underlies CNDP's refusal to adopt the calendar for the 
Goma process Joint Technical Commission on Peace and Security, 
demanding guarantees of protection against FDLR for local 
populations before it will move toward disengagement and brassage 
(septel).  New and credible assurances of military competence, 
consistent humanitarian intervention, and skillful DDRRR, including 
PsyOps assistance, would help to dispel the anxiety.  End comment.